When faced with a negative perception of their performance that could damage their reputation, policymakers attempt to connect more with the public by using a language that relates to the wider society or social groups, and people’s lived experiences – what the authors call “people-centred communication”.
However, when actual economic performance worsens, policymakers subtly change their communication style, retreating from the public and becoming more technical and expert-orientated in their language instead. Researchers describe the approach as the “spoken equivalent of strategic silence”.
A study published in the journal Governance examines how members of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) adjust their public explanations in response to reputational pressure. Analysing more than 900 speeches delivered between 1997 and 2024, Dr Michele Scotto di Vettimo and Professor Christel Koop focus on whether and how policymakers shift their language towards the wider public when their performance comes under scrutiny.
Their findings point to a clear distinction between perception and performance expressed in key indicators. When media coverage of the bank’s performance turns negative, MPC members are more likely to frame their explanations around people’s experiences, everyday concerns and the public interest. According to the researchers, they become more “people-centred” in how they explain policy decisions.
However, this effect does not extend to objective economic indicators. When inflation moves further away from its target or unemployment rises, policymakers do not become more people-focused. Rather, the study finds, under-performance on measurable indicators is associated with less people-centred language, suggesting a retreat towards more technical or expert-oriented explanations.
The researchers, from the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London, also find no evidence that reputational pressure leads to simpler language overall. Measures of accessibility, such as sentence length and complexity, are shaped mainly by long-term communication strategies and the type of event at which a speech is delivered, rather than by short-term performance concerns.
The study argues that this pattern reflects the importance of reputation for independent bodies whose legitimacy rests largely on delivering results. Negative media attention appears to prompt an effort to connect with the public, while poor headline economic outcomes may instead encourage caution and technical defensiveness.
While the analysis focuses on the Bank of England, the authors suggest the findings may have broader implications for how independent technocratic institutions seek to protect their autonomy and reputation, not by changing policy, but by changing how they explain it.