Whenever Natuna or Ambalat is mentioned in Indonesia’s public discourse, the reaction is almost instinctive: anxiety over sovereignty. Any discussion of cooperation in these areas is quickly framed as a weakening of Indonesia’s national position. While emotionally understandable, this perspective is strategically problematic. It narrows policy options and risks obscuring opportunities that arise precisely from a correct understanding of international maritime law.
Sampe L. Purba
What is often overlooked is that Indonesia is not a laggard in maritime boundary management. On the contrary, over the past two decades Indonesia has successfully concluded most of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitation agreements with neighbouring states, including Vietnam and Malaysia. These agreements were achieved peacefully, firmly grounded in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and widely recognized by the international community. The situations in the North Natuna Sea and Ambalat should therefore not be read as failures, but as residual and highly specific challenges.
This distinction matters. The areas frequently debated in the North Natuna Sea, as understood by Indonesia, and in the Ambalat area of the Sulawesi Sea, are located beyond Indonesia’s territorial sea. In legal terms, they are not areas of sovereignty, but areas where Indonesia exercises sovereign rights. The difference is fundamental. Territorial seas are subject to absolute sovereignty and are non-negotiable. Areas under sovereign rights, by contrast, are governed by international law in a way that allows pragmatic and flexible management, including provisional arrangements and cooperation.
Public confusion often arises because very different contexts are conflated. On one hand, Indonesia has finalized EEZ boundaries with Vietnam and Malaysia through legally binding agreements. On the other, Indonesia faces China’s so-called nine-dash line claim, which has no basis in UNCLOS and has been rejected by many states and international legal opinion. These situations cannot be treated as equivalent. Firm rejection of unlawful claims does not require closing all avenues for managing economic interests in sensitive areas governed by sovereign rights.
President Prabowo Subianto grasps this distinction clearly. In his meetings with President Xi Jinping, he has emphasized dialogue and stability in the South China Sea. A similar approach has been taken with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim regarding Ambalat and the Sulawesi Sea. The message is consistent: Indonesia does not compromise its legal principles, but chooses strategic and calibrated ways to manage geopolitical realities.
Yet high-level diplomacy requires institutional follow-through. Without concrete policy instruments, strategic dialogue risks remaining symbolic. This is where the concept of a Joint Energy Border Authority (JEBA) becomes relevant — provided it is properly understood and carefully designed.
JEBA is not a mechanism to manage Indonesia’s entire EEZ, nor an attempt to reopen maritime boundaries that have already been settled. It is a selective and targeted instrument, applicable only to specific overlapping or sensitive areas beyond the territorial sea. Its purpose is to manage energy resources without prejudice to the legal positions of the states involved. This approach is consistent with international practice and has proven capable of delivering long-term stability.
In the context of the North Natuna Sea, the strategic dimension is particularly pronounced. The area lies at the intersection of major power interactions and critical global energy and trade routes. At the same time, its hydrocarbon potential is technically complex, including extremely high CO₂ content. Development under such conditions requires long-term certainty, advanced technology, and geopolitical stability – conditions that are difficult to achieve without a credible cooperative framework.
Ambalat presents a similar logic on a bilateral scale. For decades, it has been treated primarily as a symbol of dispute rather than a source of shared economic value. Yet under international law, Ambalat lies in an area of sovereign rights that has not been finally delimited. Managing it through a joint authority could break a long-standing stalemate and transform a latent source of tension into a platform for cooperation.
Another critical dimension is the global energy transition and international investment climate. Even as the world moves toward cleaner energy systems, frontier hydrocarbon projects continue to play a strategic role in energy security and supply stability. Global investors are increasingly sensitive to geopolitical risk and governance quality. States that demonstrate legal certainty, institutional maturity, and strategic clarity are better positioned to attract capital and technology.
Energy management in border areas is never purely technical. It is inherently embedded in energy geostrategy, where energy functions simultaneously as an economic asset and a geopolitical instrument. How Indonesia manages Natuna and Ambalat will shape international perceptions of its capacity to navigate global dynamics – whether it is reactive and defensive, or rational, confident, and forward-looking.
Viewed through this lens, JEBA is not an erosion of sovereignty. It is an expression of policy maturity. It reflects an understanding of where sovereignty must be asserted unequivocally, and where national interests are better protected through intelligent cooperation. By adopting such an approach, Indonesia strengthens – not weakens –its position as a major maritime state capable of transforming sensitive border areas into strategic opportunities amid an increasingly complex global geopolitical landscape.
The writer is Doctor of Energy Geostrategy, Alumnus of the Indonesian Defense University.