Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks during a debate at Camp Greaves, a former U.S. military camp near the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas, in Paju, South Korea, 19 September 2025, to mark the seventh anniversary of the issuance in Pyongyang of a joint inter-Korean declaration in 2018 that called for the reduction of tensions and the prevention of accidental armed clashes, among other things. File Photo by YONHAP/EPA
Jan. 8 (Asia Today) — Cho Young-ki, secretary general of the Korea Foundation for the Advancement of the Korean Peninsula and a former Korea University professor, argues South Korea’s unification policy is losing direction as North Korea moves toward what he describes as a fourth-generation hereditary succession.
Cho points to recent North Korean state media coverage of Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Ju-ae, saying her prominent positioning during New Year events and a visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun appeared deliberate and politically significant.
He notes the palace houses the bodies of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and is treated as a symbol of regime legitimacy. Cho writes that Kim’s return there with Ju-ae on New Year’s Day, after not visiting since the end of 2023, suggests a move to elevate her status ahead of a future party congress.
Cho argues such a succession would further entrench what he calls “extractive institutions” in North Korea, worsening poverty and repression and creating another long-term obstacle to unification. He contrasts extractive systems with “inclusive institutions” and says South Korea’s unification strategy should focus on encouraging inclusive political and economic structures in the North.
He criticizes the Ministry of Unification’s recent direction, saying the ministry has shifted from unification strategy toward engagement that he characterizes as appeasement. Cho cites the ministry’s past work report describing the scrapping of a “North Korean Human Rights Center” and a move to reframe “North Korean human rights” as “inter-Korean human rights cooperation.” He argues the wording risks implying the two Koreas’ rights conditions are comparable and downplays abuses he says are normalized in North Korea.
Cho also argues the ministry’s approach effectively accommodates North Korea’s “two-state” framing, which he links to Kim’s 2023 stance. He warns that North Korea’s continued emphasis on strengthening nuclear capabilities signals it has not abandoned coercive goals, and he rejects what he calls complacent assumptions that Pyongyang would not use nuclear weapons.
Cho writes that even if public skepticism about unification is growing, the ministry should continue making the case for unification and pursue what he calls a self-directed strategy that preserves South Korea’s rights and security while supporting North Korean residents.
As a policy tool, he highlights the power of information access in North Korea, pointing to Pyongyang’s efforts to block outside information as evidence of its impact. He calls for an urgent shift in the government’s unification policy framework.
The views expressed in this column are those of the author.
— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
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