With the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) set to expire in 2026, the U.S. and Russia are running out of time and options to renew the last arms control agreement. Beyond President Putin’s general recalcitrance towards restraint from nuclear saber-rattling, the Trump administration has contributed to this stonewall by its insistence that China be added in future arms control agreements. Expectedly, Beijing has rejected such trilateral talks with Moscow and Washington, arguing that its nuclear arsenal is significantly smaller vis-à-vis the Russian or American nuclear arsenal. Indeed, from the Chinese view, it is only right and fair that the two superpowers, which collectively own close to 87% of the world’s nuclear arsenal, first engage in deeper cuts to their nuclear arsenal before any Chinese involvement. Such complex entanglement has resulted in a general impasse in the global nuclear order, under the backdrop of a nuclear arms race.
Yet, this stalemate is not unbreakable. Much of the discussions centered around Chinese participation in U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations have, unfortunately, crowded out the possibilities of different pathways in reinvigorating stalled strategic dialogues between the U.S. and China. In particular, France and the United Kingdom could hold the keys to breaking the stalemate. Given the unlikelihood of China’s participation in a New START type of agreement with the U.S. and Russia, a more realistic approach might be to encourage exploratory dialogues between China and Europe’s nuclear powers, which, by extension, may illuminate greater information and possibilities for the U.S. to better craft its approach to China in the strategic domain.
Towards exploratory talks between China, the UK, and France
Recent analyses have suggested the possibility of China engaging the United Kingdom and France in a trilateral dialogue on clarifying nuclear strategies, as the three nuclear powers are somewhat similar in the size of their nuclear arsenals and profess a “minimum deterrence” strategy. The argument follows that such commonalities make dialogues less asymmetrical, which may facilitate discussions.
Although parity matters, it is only one piece of the puzzle. Furthering the discussion, the strategic politics of Europe’s nuclear powers undeniably make the UK and France enticing dialogue partners for China. Paris and London—often sidelined in nuclear diplomacy—could offer a pragmatic bridge by serving a unique interlocutory role for Beijing and Washington. In short, France and the UK could play a bridging role by engaging China directly on nuclear issues while also providing the U.S. with indirect assurances and insights that would help unlock future U.S.–China strategic dialogue.
Why London and Paris can be strategic intermediaries
With the Russia-Ukraine War already passing the three-year mark and having no signs of abating, European security arrangements have been fundamentally impacted. Compounding this would be the Trump administration casting doubts on American credibility with NATO and the defense of Europe.
Indeed, with many European leaders feeling that they can no longer rely on American nuclear commitment to Europe amid rising threats from Russia, both the UK and France are being pushed and have positioned themselves to shoulder greater security burdens in Europe. Following President Macron’s announcement that the UK and France “have a special responsibility for the security of the continent,” both the UK and France have agreed to coordinate nuclear operations. Separately, British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer’s emphasis on the UK having an independent nuclear deterrent is followed by the Élysée Palace’s indication that France might be open to expanding its nuclear deterrence to other European states. Hence, should Paris and London reconsider the scale and role of their nuclear forces in commensurate with the expanded security responsibilities, the two European superpowers will inevitably expand their nuclear arsenals and review existing nuclear strategies. This illustrates the growing strategic role that France and the UK will play.
Viewed this way, this generates added impetus from China to engage both the UK and France as part of their broader goal of courting U.S. allies to blunt America’s coalition building. During the Munich Security Conference, where U.S. Vice President JD Vance berated European leaders, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi articulated China’s desire to “deepen strategic communication and mutually beneficial cooperation.” Political observers have noted that the Chinese charm offensive seeks to attract European states that have been disillusioned by Trumpian diplomacy. As such, Chinese engagements with Britain and France on nuclear issues could be a low-hanging fruit that would align with Beijing’s broader diplomatic outreach efforts. More importantly, given the relative similarity in the size of nuclear arsenals, it confers on China a more politically acceptable forum to better explain and reconcile how its minimalist strategy matches with an expanding arsenal.
To be clear, both the UK and France are close allies with the U.S. However, unlike the U.S., neither Britain nor France is locked in a direct adversarial spiral with China. This suggests that Sino-Franco or Sino-British relations need not be as testy or adverse as U.S.-China relations. As President Macron attested, “France is a friend and cooperates with China despite disagreement and competition.” Considering the rough parity shared by the three countries as Tong alluded to, coupled with the relative distance from direct contestation, the UK, France, and China could make plausible partners for candid nuclear exchanges.
Lastly, given that U.S.-China strategic dialogues are at an impasse, having the U.S. partners engage with China can provide an indirect way of probing and learning China’s strategic thinking. London and Paris, through their interaction with Beijing, could offer valuable insights into China’s evolving doctrine while reducing risks of outright confrontation in U.S.-China channels. Such an interlocutory role, if conducted well, could form the bridge between subsequent U.S.-China strategic dialogues.
Europe’s Nuclear Powers as the Missing Link
The somber truth is that China is unlikely to enter U.S.-Russia arms control dialogues for the foreseeable future. With China dismissing attempts to include it in New START as “unreasonable and unrealistic,” forcing Chinese participation in trilateral talks might risk hardening Beijing’s resistance and may close off any future attempts to include China. Hence, a more realistic approach might be to encourage exploratory dialogues between China, France, and the UK. A strategic dialogue between Beijing, Paris, and London could discuss nuclear strategies and doctrines, identify common risks, and even propose measures of arms control.
While such exploratory dialogues and talks would not realistically deliver immediate arms control breakthroughs, such talks could build channels and habits of communication. This would go a long way in reducing misunderstanding and allow room for further formal negotiations down the line. Importantly, insights garnered from talks with China may also demystify Chinese nuclear thinking. As a result, Western nuclear powers, including the U.S., France, and the UK, may learn and adjust their policies and approach accordingly as they interact and engage China in strategic dialogues. This presents a possible pathway out of present deadlocks.
For a nuclear order that is currently at an impasse, instead of forcing China into a trilateral dialogue that it will never accept, Washington should look to Paris and London. Acting as strategic intermediaries between the U.S. and China, France and the UK may be the all-essential bridge that can keep dialogues alive and move the process forward to ensure the possibility of great power arms control.