Major European Union laws enacted in the last few years, including the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), have strengthened the European Commission’s role as digital enforcer. Those rules have also irked the United States, especially under President Donald Trump. In August, Trump threatened to impose sanctions on EU officials enforcing the DSA. Previously, the US Federal Trade Commission chief compared EU regulation to imposing taxes on American firms.
The Commission’s widespread digital enforcement powers thus expose it to blackmail: it would be surprising if trade considerations did not influence current and future EU regulatory enforcement. Trade pressure affects any economic sector. For example, in 2012 the Commission reversed its decision to extend its emissions trading system to extra-EU flights, yielding to trade threats.
Ongoing Commission assessments of whether Apple and Meta are complying with DMA rulings issued in April 2025 are potentially vulnerable. The Commission also needs to determine whether X has breached the DSA. In the future, it might be pressured to allocate fewer resources to open and investigate new cases.
How can the Commission protect itself against potential blackmail? Delegating digital enforcement to an independent body would strengthen the EU’s bargaining position against the US. In game theory, this strategy is known as ‘burning the bridge’. By deliberately limiting its scope of action, the Commission would establish a credible commitment that EU laws will be enforced, regardless of external pressures.
A new institutional framework that would prevent the Commission from exchanging softer enforcement for better trade deals would render US trade threats ineffective. That does not mean the US would necessarily hold back from retaliating if a European Digital Authority were to impose sanctions on an American company. Rather, retaliation would not distort the EU’s regulatory power. The US would obtain nothing in return; retaliation would be just an end in itself.
Currently, the Commission risks over-enforcing EU digital regulations. It could succumb to the temptation to use its enforcement powers to penalise foreign competitors unduly, driven by the false belief that this would help the EU become less dependent on foreign tech. It could also divert resources (including political capital) away from investigating EU national mergers or subsidy policies towards activities that focus mainly on big tech. An independent digital authority would be more credible as an enforcer because it would lack the incentive and ability to divert internal resources to favour domestic players. The Commission would also be less vulnerable to regulatory capture.
Moreover, protectionism does not boost competitiveness and strategic autonomy; instead, it has the opposite effect. Applying the rules impartially increases the reliability of the regulatory framework and fosters competition based on merit. This helps reduce uncertainty, a major barrier to investment, and encourages innovation as the best way to succeed against foreign competitors.
In the EU Treaties, the Commission was originally established as a technocratic body, focused mainly on economic integration within the single market. Insulation from political control was considered a source of legitimacy. But the Commission is no longer only technocratic; it has evolved into a political entity. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen pursues strategically ambitious, politically charged goals, including those related to climate and technology, and employs trade and defence policies to further the EU’s geopolitical ambitions. As a political decision-maker, however, the Commission is unlikely to be an effective market watchdog. The EU institutional framework should recognise this shift and adapt to the Commission’s new role.
Independent European agencies can be established without amending the EU Treaties, as long as their powers are defined clearly and they are limited to technical tasks (a principle known as the Meroni doctrine). For example, the Commission could retain the authority to designate DMA gatekeepers or the very large online platforms subject to the DSA (a process that companies can rebut and that entails a degree of discretion), while the new European Digital Authority might concentrate on identifying and sanctioning non-compliance, enforcing remedies, monitoring implementation and auditing algorithms. Furthermore, the establishment of independent agencies with significant operational autonomy and supervisory powers, including the European Securities and Markets Authority and the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering, raises questions about whether the Meroni doctrine constraints remain relevant.
Designing regulatory agencies is complex. No single institutional structure fits all. Greater autonomy may lead to reduced accountability. Furthermore, standalone agencies, being outside the Commission, lack the same influence in the legislative process, which may result in lower-quality proposed regulations. However, at the current juncture, external pressures and the risk that the politicisation of the Commission erodes the EU’s regulatory objectivity is significant enough to outweigh any downsides of stripping the Commission of its digital enforcement powers.