Behind closed doors, pressure has been exerted on Israel in recent days to agree to Turkey’s participation in the international stabilization force in the Gaza Strip. US President Donald Trump wants to reach understandings quickly that will allow him to present political progress and regional stability so he can focus on other open issues around the world.

For Trump, the Turkish presence in Gaza is not problematic. However, for Israel, Egypt, and Greece, the picture is completely different.

Israel

Last October, Benjamin Netanyahu publicly announced his rejection of a Turkish presence in Gaza, saying “No.” But in recent weeks, reports have indicated that Netanyahu is under pressure to accept. Turkey, under Erdogan’s leadership, is considered by Israel to be a problematic player on the regional stage, and approving its entry into Gaza would be interpreted as a retreat from the red line and the “no” that he has repeatedly emphasized. This is what has led Netanyahu to relentlessly try to exclude Turkey.

On December 17, Turkey was excluded from the meeting organized by the US Central Command (CENTCOM) in Doha. Some reports in the Israeli media interpreted this as tacit approval of Israel’s demand that Turkey not be part of the international force, even if the decision was not officially announced by the White House. However, in recent days, talk has resurfaced about the US pushing for a Turkish presence in Gaza.

The assessment in Israel is that Netanyahu will prefer to avoid a direct confrontation with Trump, but he will try to find a way to say “yes” to a Turkish presence in Gaza, albeit with stringent conditions that Erdogan would find difficult to accept. For example, Israel might request that Turkey “curb its harsh anti-Israel rhetoric and shift its discourse from hostile to a more conciliatory approach.” It is not certain that Erdogan will comply.

Egypt

Egypt’s position on the Turkish presence in Gaza is complex. Egypt considers the Gaza issue to be a matter for the concerned parties (the Palestinians and Israel) and rejects any foreign military presence or non-Palestinian presence on its borders or in an area directly adjacent to them. Cairo believes its national security is directly linked to the situation in the Gaza Strip, and the presence of another country’s military forces in a sensitive area bordering its territory could pose a security challenge.

Cairo also wants to maintain its pivotal role as a key mediator between the Palestinian factions and Israel. However, the presence of Turkey, which has strong ties with one of the Palestinian factions, could diminish its effectiveness as a mediator in the conflict. Despite the recent improvement in relations between Egypt and Turkey, there are sensitivities in Egyptian-Turkish relations regarding various regional issues, including roles and influence in the region.

Meanwhile, Israeli media reports indicate that last November, Egypt was reportedly holding intensive talks with Washington to prevent Turkey from joining the international force planned for deployment in the Gaza Strip. A report in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, which is close to Hezbollah, stated that the absence of Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty from the Arab-Islamic ministerial meeting in Istanbul in November was a further indication of Egypt’s escalating stance toward Ankara, which seeks intervention in Gaza – a move Cairo “strongly” rejects.
Greece

For Greece, Turkey’s presence in Gaza strengthens Ankara ’s regional standing and is a step in its “Blue Homeland” plan. It also poses a challenge to Greek interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, in addition to the potential for cooperation with terrorist groups or the weaponization of migration flows.
This has prompted Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, which share these concerns, to strengthen their cooperation. The strategic partnership is a counterweight to Turkish expansion and influence in the region.

Senior military officials from Greece, Israel, and Cyprus signed a joint defense action plan committing to increased joint air and naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2026. This followed a trilateral summit in Jerusalem, where the leaders also signed an agreement for cooperation in maritime security and energy. The agreement builds on existing defense purchases worth billions of euros, including Greece’s planned Achilles’ Shield air defense system and Israel’s PULS rocket artillery.

This strengthened military bloc represents a significant geopolitical realignment in the Eastern Mediterranean, creating a pro-Western, Israel-centric security architecture explicitly aimed at containing Turkish influence.

What will happen?

Turkey will not back down from intervening in Gaza, especially after its presence in Libya, Syria, and Somalia, because it wants to close the circle of its regional influence and tighten its grip on the region. 

Turkey is seeking to send forces to Gaza despite Israel’s objections, and it hopes that the reluctance of other countries to send troops to the Strip will leave US President Donald Trump with no option but to rely on Turkish participation in the international stabilization force.

Even if Turkey is not allowed to send troops, it will continue to intervene in other ways. Independent Turkish donations will also remain a tool of influence in the Strip through Turkish organizations operating there. Furthermore, Turkey’s contribution to persuading Hamas to accept Trump’s plan makes excluding it from participation in the Strip complicated.

The dilemma for Israel, which is reflected in Egypt and Greece, is that Trump – recently – does not fulfill all of Netanyahu’s demands.

Trump ignored Israel’s hardline stance toward Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and lifted sanctions on Syria. He also approved the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, and it’s possible Turkey will return to the stealth fighter program. For Trump, Erdogan has done “great things in Syria,” and he considers him an ally despite everything.

Netanyahu is now walking a tightrope, trying not to undermine the framework Trump has established while ensuring Israel’s security red lines are maintained. This means further maneuvering to get rid of Erdogan in his own way, the first of which appears to have been the “recognition of Somaliland” to curtail the Turkish presence in Somalia.

Sara Sherif is a journalist and foreign affairs analyst based in Egypt.