Everyone remembers the “Miracle on Ice,” when the United States hockey team stunningly defeated the Soviet Union at the Lake Placid 1980 Winter Olympics. But that was the semi-final game — not the game that won America the gold medal. America became champions by beating Finland 4–2 in the finals two days later. Now, as President Donald Trump ramps up urgency for a Russia–Ukraine peace deal, the United States needs to remember the same thing: It’s not enough to just beat Russia. You have to beat Finland, too. The fighting must certainly end, but lasting peace must be ensured in the process as well.
Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 for three reasons: energy, deterrence against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and historical chauvinism. While Russia’s military campaign directly targets Ukraine, its consequences will reshape the global balance of power from Washington to Beijing. Moscow fears NATO expansion because it hardens a Western-led security order at its borders. How that order responds in Ukraine will also signal to Beijing how effectively Western alliances can constrain, or deter, China’s expansion.
A negotiated peace is now the right decision. Russia has adapted its military, Ukraine faces domestic governance challenges, the European Union cannot provide sustained support and America is increasingly unwilling to continue unlimited funding. But ending the war with Russia is insufficient. America must ensure Ukraine does not become the next Finland.
Today, Finland is affluent, democratic and a member of NATO: a Nordic success story. However, this required the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991. Throughout the Cold War, Finland was a model puppet state — independent in legality, dependent in reality.
After fighting bravely against the Soviet invasion in 1939–40, Finland ceded 10% of its territory. But territorial loss was only the beginning. The 1948 Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union preserved nominal independence at a steep price: Finland could not join NATO, criticize Soviet actions or pursue an independent foreign policy.
For example, the treaty obligated Finland to defend against an attack “by Germany or its allies” on the Soviets — Cold War code for the Western European alliances that eventually became NATO. Moscow reinforced these constraints through election interference, ministerial pressure and support for Finnish communists, keeping Helsinki politically subdued.
Finland preserved independence by surrendering sovereignty. Current peace proposals threaten to replicate this model for Ukraine.
The emerging framework from the early December meetings between Trump’s special envoy and the Kremlin contains three provisions that would effectively Finlandize Ukraine: constitutional amendments removing NATO membership as a national goal, a binding NATO statute confirming Ukraine will never join the alliance and military caps limiting Ukraine’s forces to 600,000 troops with restrictions on weapons systems.
Ukraine would be preserving their independence by sacrificing their sovereignty.
Proponents of the current proposal critique a more aggressive approach by arguing that it wrongly treats negotiations as zero-sum. In pressing Ukraine to extract maximum leverage, the framework assumes any Ukrainian gain must come at Russia’s expense, ignoring that Moscow will pursue its own advantage just as forcefully and resist any settlement that meaningfully constrains its future power.
This critique fundamentally overstates Russia’s position. Russia has suffered 1.1 million casualties, faces mounting economic pressures from sanctions and needs access to international capital markets. Moscow’s conventional military supplies are degraded, forcing reliance on outdated Soviet equipment and North Korean munitions. Russian President Vladimir Putin needs a deal not just to end the war, but to reintegrate Russia into the global economy.
This gives Washington, D.C. substantial leverage to demand more: rotational U.S. training missions or pre-positioned NATO equipment without permanent basing, Ukraine retaining its constitutional right to pursue NATO membership even if accession is delayed and sanctions relief phases over years conditioned on verified Russian compliance. Reconstruction funds should remain under the supervision of Western institutions — principally the EU, International Monetary Fund and World Bank to ensure Ukraine’s recovery cannot be manipulated by Moscow for political leverage.
Russia will threaten to walk away. America should call that bluff. The strongest stance won’t break the deal, but produce a better one.
The stakes in Ukraine extend far beyond Eastern Europe. China is watching these negotiations more closely than any other nation. The parallel is inescapable: Russia views Ukraine as China views Taiwan — a breakaway province requiring reintegration. If Moscow succeeds in reducing Ukraine to a neutral buffer state stripped of meaningful security guarantees, China will draw unmistakable lessons about the achievability of forcible territorial revision in Taiwan.
China’s global influence rests on dominance in powering the 21st century. China controls more than 80% of global solar panel production and more than 75% of lithium-ion battery manufacturing, and produces more than 90% of rare earth elements — essential for everything from defense systems to electric vehicles. The Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., China’s leading battery producer, holds 37% of the global market alone. The U.S. gets 77% of its rare earth supply from Chinese sources, and Beijing has demonstrated willingness to weaponize this dominance through export controls.
A weak peace deal in Ukraine would signal to Beijing that territorial aggression works, while demonstrating that the West lacks strategic discipline to defend its own interests. If America cannot secure meaningful terms in Ukraine where costs are manageable, why would China believe that the U.S. could effectively defend Taiwan?
How many other countries — from Taiwan to Vietnam, from Kazakhstan to Georgia — will watch Ukraine’s fate and conclude that accommodation with authoritarian neighbors offers better odds than alignment with an unreliable West?
A weak deal teaches revisionist powers a formula: invade your neighbor, sustain initial costs, wait for Western attention to waver and accept a settlement giving you most of what you wanted. The question becomes not whether to invade, but when. This is why the quality of peace matters infinitely more than speed. A rushed settlement prioritizing diplomatic closure over strategic consequence will reshape global politics more than another six months of fighting.
From America’s strategic perspective, the goal is a peace deal that ends the war without creating the next one. A weak peace deal sets the template for the next century of conflicts.
Negotiators face immense pressure from an exhausted Europe and a distracted America while casualties continue mounting. But they also act under the shadow of a larger conflict still forming. The compromises they make will shape Beijing’s calculations more than any speech afterward: If Russia gains from violating a sovereign border, China will take note. This settlement will define not only Ukraine’s boundaries, but the rules that govern Asia, Africa and Latin America, determining whether small states view alignment with the West as protection or a risk.
The U.S. needs to win the gold medal here. Like that 1980 Olympic hockey team that beat the Soviets, they still needed to beat Finland in the final. The same principle applies today. Stopping Russia’s advance is necessary. Avoiding the Cold War Finland model where a smaller nation’s foreign policy was constrained by a larger neighbor’s veto is imperative. And ensuring that peace establishes real security rather than hollow neutrality will determine whether we’re building a more stable order or setting the stage for conflicts to come.
Carter Linardos is an Opinion Columnist who writes about geopolitics & global finance in his column “The Macro Game.” You can reach him at linardos@umich.edu.
Related articles