(AP Photo/Cristian Hernandez)

Bottom Line Up Front

Just hours before the U.S. military operation in Venezuela on January 3, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro had met with a senior diplomatic delegation from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Washington’s intervention in Venezuela has raised questions not only about the future of PRC economic and political influence in the country, but also the broader region and ultimately Beijing’s efforts to build what they call “South–South Cooperation” to counterbalance the U.S. globally.
Domestic foreign policy commentary in China surrounding recent events has centered on recalibrating political risk in Latin America by moving away from infrastructure investment toward a greater emphasis on trade.
The PRC is likely to capitalize on the opportunity to condemn U.S. action in Venezuela and position itself as the defender of international order in order to shore up support globally.

Just hours before the U.S. military operation in Venezuela on January 3, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro had met with a senior diplomatic delegation from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), led by President Xi Jinping’s Special Envoy for Latin America and the Caribbean, Qiu Xiaoqi. Following Maduro’s capture, Beijing condemned the U.S. operation as a violation of the UN Charter and Venezuelan sovereignty, with Xi calling it “unilateral bullying” that undermines the international order. The United States has framed its military operation, coupled with the intensifying blockade of Venezuelan oil exports, as targeting narcotrafficking and countering “adversaries” in the Western Hemisphere. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said: “We’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors and rivals of the United States.” Venezuela is the PRC’s closest partner in Latin America, but over the past two decades, Beijing has also increased its economic assistance, diplomatic engagement, trade, infrastructure, and energy development across Latin America and the Caribbean as part of its Global South strategy. Washington’s intervention in Venezuela has raised questions not only about the future of the PRC’s economic and political influence in the country, but also about its influence across the broader region and, ultimately, Beijing’s efforts to build what it calls “South–South Cooperation” as a counterbalance to the U.S. globally.

In 2023, Beijing elevated its relationship with Caracas to an “all-weather strategic partnership” — the PRC’s highest bilateral designation. Since Hugo Chávez came to power, Venezuela has been the PRC’s closest partner in Latin America, and as U.S. sanctions deepened, China increasingly filled the energy, financing, trade, arms deals, and technology vacuum. Chinese creditors have extended more loans and grants to Venezuela than any other country in the region, with an estimated $10 billion still outstanding (with other estimates putting it higher, at between $13 and $15 billion). Data analytics firm Kpler estimates that approximately 80 percent of Venezuelan crude was likely exported to China in the last few months of 2025. Venezuelan oil, however, only accounts for around four percent of the PRC’s total imports. If oil flow from Venezuela stops, Beijing can source it from elsewhere, though likely at a higher price. Caracas is also the biggest buyer in Latin America of PRC-made weapons, including tanks, missiles, armored vehicles, aircraft, and radar systems, with reports of the latter being ineffective during the U.S. raid. Politically and diplomatically, Beijing has supported Caracas, including recognizing Maduro’s re-election in 2018 — widely criticized by the international community as lacking democratic legitimacy — and using its veto power in the UN Security Council to block resolutions critical of Maduro. Venezuela signified, until recently, a flagship project for Beijing’s Global South strategy: a politically aligned, resource-rich partner where the PRC can project influence through capital, commodities, and infrastructure without formal security guarantees.

The PRC’s concept of “South-South Cooperation” dates back to the early days of the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign policy. Under Xi, the “collective rise of the Global South” has become an organizing principle, integrated into the PRC’s foreign policy. Beijing’s goal is to mobilize support from the Global South to leverage it as a counterbalance to the West (or the “Global North”), from an economic, security, and ideological standpoint. Flagship PRC foreign policy initiatives, like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the four Global Initiatives (the Global Development, Global Security, Global Civilization, and Global Governance Initiatives), are primarily oriented toward countries in the global south and are presented as alternative mechanisms to Western-led models. Beijing’s calculus is based on how economic, demographic, and political weight are shifting toward the global south, which accounts for 84 percent of the world’s total population. The World Bank estimated that the average annual economic growth rate of the global south has been 4.5 to 5.0 percent over the past 20 years (whereas that of developed countries has been only 1.8 to 2.0 percent). The persistent structural gaps and constraints in technology, industrial capacity, and infrastructure in developing economies serve as entry points of influence for the PRC.

In practice, Beijing has intensified diplomatic outreach, expanded trade and credit arrangements, tariff liberalization, and large-scale infrastructure projects across Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. The Trump administration’s disengagement from international institutions, re-calibrated diplomatic engagement, and protectionist trade practices have accelerated the PRC’s efforts to seize on the opportunities presented by American isolationism policy. At the 80th UN General Assembly, the PRC announced the launch of the China-UN Global South-South Development Facility.

Latin America and the Caribbean are an integral part of Beijing’s Global South strategy. Last spring, Xi announced a credit line of 66 billion yuan (approximately 9 billion U.S. dollars) to support development in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Over a decade ago, the PRC overtook the U.S. as South America’s top trading partner, and 2024 trade data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce placed the PRC as Latin America and the Caribbean’s second largest trading partner (after the U.S.). Over 20 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have signed on to the BRI, and the Chinese large-scale infrastructure projects in the region include, for example, the Chancay deep-water port in Peru. In recent years, Beijing has also pursued deepened cooperation and supply-chain integration related to electric vehicles, critical minerals, and mining. The PRC’s deepening cooperation with the region also has political and geopolitical benefits. In 2017, 18 out of 33 countries recognized Taiwan’s sovereignty, whereas in 2025, only seven countries maintained diplomatic relations with the self-governed island.

The U.S. operation to remove Maduro should be seen as a setback for Beijing’s broader influence and ambitions in the region. Immediately, it was an intelligence failure for the PRC, which had a senior diplomatic delegation on the ground when the operation took place. In addition, the execution of the military operation signals not only American military might but also calls into question the effectiveness of Chinese- and Russian-provided arms and weapons systems used by Venezuela, including the failure of the Venezuelan air defense systems. In the short term, it is unlikely that the U.S. action against Venezuela would impact the U.S.-PRC relationship, especially ahead of the planned meeting between Trump and Xi in April. Domestic foreign policy commentary in China offers insight into the potential limits of what the PRC can do in the long-term. Suggested options and countermeasures center on recalibrating political risk in Latin America by moving away from infrastructure investment toward a greater emphasis on trade.

The PRC is, however, likely to continue capitalizing on the opportunity to condemn U.S. action in Venezuela and position itself as the defender of international order to shore up support globally. U.S. action will likely be framed by Beijing as yet another example of how the West’s “rules-based order” only serves America and its interests, in order to solidify political support in the Global South. This, however, showcases the limits of the PRC’s so-called “all-weather strategic partnership,” which — in the face of hard power, as seen in the U.S. strikes on Iran in 2025 or the most recent intervention in Venezuela — primarily results in strongly worded condemnations to score diplomatic and political points vis-à-vis the United States, alongside potential re-calibrations of economic and trade policy to protect Beijing’s interests.