In 2024–2025, reports from Russian sources stated that at least two children from the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine were brought to the Songdowon camp in North Korea for the purpose of “reeducation”. Human rights advocate Kateryna Rasevska, an expert at the Regional Center for Human Rights, voiced this position during hearings before the U.S. Senate on December 3, 2025. Our investigative group established that trips to the camp were coordinated by Russian youth organizations, notably the Movement of the First, and that it was possible to identify individuals from Ukraine who visited North Korea, as well as to determine how groups are formed and what daily life is like at Songdowon.

Songdowon International Children’s Camp is located near the port of Sonsan on the coast of the Sea of Japan. It is often described as the North Korean counterpart to the Soviet Artek. The camp opened in 1960, modernization took place in 2014. Children from Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos, and several African countries visited the camp. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, access for foreigners was restricted, but in 2024 relations between Moscow and Pyongyang deteriorated, and Russian tour groups began visiting the camp again.

According to a travel portal, the cost of housing foreign children is covered by the North Korean Socialist Patriotic Youth League. It was also noted that foreign parents allegedly pay an extra 250 to 350 dollars for a two-week trip for their child.

In 2024, the Russian youth organization Movement of the First announced a contest “First – to Songdowon.” The winners were 50 teenagers aged 14–17 from various regions of the Russian Federation; about 3,500 students submitted applications, and 50 of them won. The organizers described the trip as a joint project of the Movement of the First, the official international children’s center Artek, and the Directorate of the World Youth Festival. According to Russian media, 3,500 students submitted applications, and 50 of them became winners.

To participate, children recorded a video answering the question “Why should I win the contest?” and wrote an essay on one of the topics: “What role should Russia play in a new multipolar world?”, “Why am I interested in visiting North Korea?”, or “What would I tell the children of North Korea about Russia?” Applications were submitted through an online form, and participants posted their videos on social media. The selection coordinator was Maria Raievska, one of the leaders of the Movement of the First.

In the summer of 2025, Russian media reported a second trip of schoolchildren to Songdowon, aimed at demonstrating “Korean-Russian friendship.” The Telegram channel “Youth of Russia” stated that the main goal of the trips was “strengthening traditional fraternal ties between the two peoples.”

Rights advocates’ view on international exchanges

“Do these international exchanges matter to them?” responds Kateryna Rasevska.

«Child trips, in particular from the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, to North Korea, Russia presents as ‘cultural exchanges,’ an element of so-called children’s diplomacy. But in essence, it is a tool of political propaganda», – said Rasevska. «Such practices have much in common with Soviet methods of using children for state ideological purposes, and they are prohibited by international law. It is not about culture or development, but about forming loyalty to the aggressor and its allies, in particular to North Korea, which is effectively an accomplice to the war against Ukraine and is recognized by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism».

– Kateryna Rasevska

She adds that such trips will continue; new generations from the occupied territories risk ending up in an environment where a distorted worldview is systematically imposed, imperialist aggression is perceived as normal, and war is considered justified. “After such an experience, returning to Ukraine will be difficult to fully adapt,” the human rights advocate concludes.

The story of a Ukrainian participant: Mykhailo from Makiyivka

In 2025, there were two summer sessions at Songdowon Camp. Our team’s investigation gathered data from open sources and cross-checked them with references to the camp in Russian publications; some materials are corroborated through Telegram topic chats. Names of the children will be kept confidential for safety reasons, but we will tell the story of the Ukrainian boy Mykhailo who attended the first summer session in 2025.

Mykhailo, 12, from Makiyivka, was the only child from the open-occupied territories at that session. He studied at a local school and actively participated in competitions with Russia. In 2023, he became a bronze prize-winner of the all-Russian competition “Wonder of Russia” for a video presentation “Honored Illya from Makiyivka”; in the video, the boy expressed views on the region’s future and supported integration with Russia.

Mykhailo’s mother, Iryna Popova, is a Doctor of Economics, an associate professor, and heads the Department of Banking at the Donbas National University of Economics and Trade. Information about the child’s father could not be determined. There was also a publication on a Russian social network where Mykhailo talked about the trip to the DPRK; in the comments to the post, he said he learned about the contest on the “Youth of Russia” site.

In the camp, Mykhailo participated in joint cultural and sports activities, and the boy stated that he learned more about the culture and traditions of both countries.

“We visited five to six monuments every day; I really liked how, in a country with a personality cult, leaders like Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un are respected. People stroll, no one complains; everything is about welfare and order,” the boy admitted in the video. He also said that exchange participants kept in touch, but from Russia they could not maintain constant contact with Korean friends due to North Korea’s special social networks.

Ideological component and camp rules

After the arrival of the first group to North Korea, a cultural-ideological cycle began: visiting liberation monuments and a water park. According to Pyongyang’s official position, the 1945 liberation events are linked to the participation of Soviet troops, which is reflected in the camp’s exhibits.

The camp also developed a Russian propaganda line: videos appeared in which participants spoke about the alliance between Russia and the DPRK and the threat of American imperialism. One of the speakers from the Russian section of the camp named Vladislav Kushnirenko delivered a speech in Ukrainian and Korean.

«Now that Russia and North Korea have become allies, the days of American imperialism are coming to an end. Washington, rapidly losing influence, will try to start a new conflict near our borders. Therefore we must be vigilant and always ready to repel a new aggression by the United States. We, the young armies, and you, our North Korean allies, will become the new followers of our fathers who serve in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Korean People’s Army. And together we will bring closer the day when American imperialism will be destroyed».

– Vladislav Kushnirenko

In 2024, a girl from Simferopol, 16-year-old Lisa, also won the Movement of the First’s contest for a trip to the camp. However, confirmation of the trip is currently lacking; the girl’s activity on social networks does not provide clear proof of participation, although in reviews for 2024 she mentioned several Russian camps.

Rasevska sums up that such “cultural” trips are used as tools of propaganda and state ideology, with direct consequences for shaping loyalty to the aggressor and its allies, including North Korea, which the United States regards as a state sponsor of terrorism. She warns that continuing such practices threatens a new generation from the occupied territories and leaves deep and long-lasting impacts on their worldview.

In conclusion, the investigation emphasizes that despite outward “peacefulness” and cultural packaging, these initiatives are political in nature and require international evaluation and an appropriate response from the global community.

Conclusion

Trips of Ukrainian children to Songdowon reveal a complex chain of propaganda, ideology, and the use of educational and cultural formats to bolster influence in the context of hybrid warfare. At the same time, they underscore the importance of ongoing monitoring and international response to protect children from manipulation and safeguard their rights in challenging political conditions.