Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has redrawn the region’s diplomatic map, turning what was once ignored into something that must now be reckoned with. For Washington and its partners, the debate is no longer about Somaliland’s relevance but about how to integrate Somaliland—alongside Israel—into a strategic framework capable of securing the Red Sea, stabilizing the Horn of Africa, and reshaping the balance of regional security.
Following Israel’s historic recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, bilateral relations entered a new phase on 6 January 2026, when Israel’s Foreign Minister, Gideon Sa’ar, made the first official visit to Hargeisa since recognition. Received with full state honors, Sa’ar held substantive talks with Somaliland’s president and later affirmed on X (formerly Twitter), “We are determined to vigorously advance relations between Israel and Somaliland.” Reports indicate that Somaliland’s president is expected to visit Israel soon to finalize key bilateral agreements, potentially within the framework of the Abraham Accords. Many observers believe this deepening engagement could encourage other Abraham Accords signatories to follow Israel’s lead, signaling a broader diplomatic realignment in the Horn of Africa.
With formal recognition now in place, Israel and Somaliland, alongside the United States, can expand cooperation across multiple sectors, particularly maritime security, trade, and economic development. The Horn of Africa remains one of the world’s most volatile regions, marked by armed conflicts in neighboring states and the entrenched presence of Al-Shabab in Somalia. Against this backdrop, Somaliland stands out as a rare case of political stability, democratic practice, and internal peace—a functioning state in a region too often defined by fragility.
Since declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland has built a largely self-reliant system financed through domestic taxation and livestock exports. It has conducted multiple competitive elections, with peaceful transfers of power from the 2001 constitutional referendum through the most recent presidential elections on 13 November 2024, all without external funding. These elections were widely regarded as free and fair, praised by international observers for their transparency and organization, and have set a democratic benchmark that many larger African states have yet to achieve.
For international actors operating along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, deeper engagement with Somaliland offers a compelling strategic proposition: enhanced maritime security, reliable economic corridors, and a dependable local partner. Yet Somaliland’s pursuit of recognition has met organized resistance from Somalia and several of its regional partners, including Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, and Saudi Arabia. For instance, tensions intensified after Ethiopia’s 2024 maritime Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, which prompted Turkey to assume a mediatory role between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. Ankara’s role is particularly significant, as it continues to train and equip Somali forces while simultaneously advancing its own energy ambitions, including plans to deploy a deep-water drilling vessel to Somali waters in February 2026. At the same time, reports of an emerging security alignment between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Somalia suggest a coordinated effort to counter Emirati influence and constrain Somaliland’s diplomatic momentum.
Somalia’s federal government terminated its security agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), explicitly citing Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as the trigger. This rupture led to the withdrawal of Emirati forces from Bosaso and fueled speculation that the UAE—already Somaliland’s closest economic partner—may itself be moving toward recognition. Such reports sparked public celebrations in Hargeisa, reflecting strong popular support for a partnership that has already delivered tangible results. Central to this relationship is the 2016 agreement with DP World to develop Berbera Port. The $442 million investment has modernized the port and established a free trade zone, positioning Berbera as a major African maritime hub. Despite Mogadishu’s repeated efforts to block such projects, the success of the Berbera corridor demonstrates the declining influence of the federal government over Somaliland’s economic trajectory.
Rather than concentrating on its own severe security challenges, Mogadishu has increasingly focused its diplomatic energy on obstructing Somaliland’s international progress. This strategy has taken a troubling turn, as some officials have suggested that extremist groups might “react” to Somaliland’s recognition—language that risks normalizing terrorist organizations as political actors. These tensions have become most visible in the Sool region, where Mogadishu is accused of fueling instability in Las Anod to weaken Somaliland’s internal cohesion. The Somali president’s visit to Las Anod on 16 January 2026 has been described by observers as a direct intervention, reportedly supported by Turkish-supplied weapons and personnel. Critics warn that such deployments could unintentionally strengthen extremist elements. Somaliland’s government has responded by formally urging the United Nations and the African Union to address what it views as destabilizing actions that threaten the wider Horn of Africa. Despite sustained pressure, Somaliland continues to frame recognition not only as a political goal but also as a platform for contributing to regional and global security.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland also forced the issue onto the global stage. It triggered an emergency session of the UN Security Council, unexpectedly amplifying Somaliland’s international profile. During the debate, U.S. Ambassador Tammy Bruce defended Israel’s decision, stating, “Israel has the same right to conduct diplomatic relations as any other sovereign state.” Israel further cited the 1988 mass atrocities in Somaliland—when more than 200,000 people were killed and major cities destroyed—a reality that Somalia’s delegation denied despite extensive international documentation.
In Washington, support for Somaliland has been growing quietly for years. During Donald Trump’s first term, strategic priorities such as countering China and partnering with democratic actors in Africa gave Somaliland new relevance. Lawmakers, including Senator Ted Cruz and Congressman Chris Smith, actively promoted Somaliland’s case, presenting it to the White House as a future pillar of U.S. engagement in the Horn of Africa. Security cooperation has also expanded. U.S. Africa Command conducted senior-level visits to Somaliland in 2024 and 2025, culminating in General Dagvin Anderson’s visit to Hargeisa. These engagements signal Somaliland’s increasing importance in U.S. strategic planning and reflect a shift toward partnerships built on stability and democratic governance.
As the Horn of Africa moves through a period of acute fragmentation—defined by ethnic conflict, weakened state institutions, and the persistent spread of extremist networks in Somalia—the recognition of Somaliland, together with its partnerships with the United States and Israel, opens a rare strategic window. This alignment offers the possibility of building a security framework grounded not in rivalry, but in shared responsibility for regional stability and the protection of vital corridors. Berbera, situated at the intersection of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea—through which more than 30 percent of global container trade flows—can serve as a cornerstone of this effort, enabling coordinated safeguarding of sea lanes essential to international commerce. Somaliland’s expanding circle of partners reinforces this trajectory: its coast guard cooperation deal with Taiwan in July 2025 signals the emergence of a wider coalition committed to stability, open trade, and a rules-based maritime order.
In this context, recognition is not merely Somaliland’s passage from isolation to legitimacy; it is an opportunity for the Horn of Africa to shift from a geography of crisis to a platform of cooperation. Somaliland is no longer a peripheral actor but a rising strategic partner whose democratic resilience and location place it at the heart of Red Sea security calculations. For the United States, Israel, and Somaliland, the conditions now exist to shape a trilateral framework that advances maritime security, counterterrorism, and economic integration—turning diplomatic recognition into a lasting regional security architecture.
Fathi Jama is a writer and researcher specializing in the politics of the Horn of Africa and Somaliland. He is currently a visiting scholar at the International Taiwan Studies Center, National Taiwan Normal University. His work has been featured in The Elephant, Democracy in Africa, Somaliland Chronicle, and Geeska.