France’s first serious step into developing FPV strike drones has come not from its defense industry, but directly from the military, highlighting a growing gap between battlefield realities and Western procurement systems.
The 1st Parachute Hussar Regiment has presented its own FPV drone, designated Fronde 2.0, showcasing the results of a three-year internal development effort. The project was carried out in cooperation with the Army Technical Section and the small private company Hexedrone.
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According to the Regiment, Fronde 2.0 spine is built on a 10-inch frame and has successfully completed range trials. Demonstrations show the drone capable of striking targets using rifle-launched grenades from AC58 system as well as 81 mm mortar rounds adapted for aerial delivery.
Despite these demonstrations, the timeline itself raises questions. The Fronde 2.0 project is only expected to be formally completed in 2026, meaning that the development of a relatively simple FPV strike drone will have taken more than three years, an unusually long cycle for a technology that evolves in months on modern battlefields.
More critically, the drone appears ill-suited for use against a real, technologically competent adversary. Video footage from Fronde 2.0 system indicates that it relies on a control and video link operating at 5.845 GHz, a standard commercial frequency commonly used by Wi-Fi devices and basic consumer drones.
Both the 5.8 GHz and 2.4 GHz bands have long been effectively suppressed by even the most widespread and inexpensive battlefield electronic warfare systems. As a result, the survivability and operational effectiveness of Fronde 2.0 drone in a contested electromagnetic environment would likely be close to zero.
Additional concerns arise from the relatively low quality of the video feed, which could make it difficult for operators to distinguish real targets from decoys or mock-ups, further limiting combat usefulness.
At the same time, the project illustrates structural constraints faced by France and other Western armed forces. Military units are generally prohibited from procuring uncertified electronics or components produced outside approved domestic or allied industrial chains.
The inability to use inexpensive Chinese components, without having affordable domestic alternatives, inevitably leads to higher costs, longer development cycles, and solutions that lag behind the realities of modern drone warfare.