By Hollie Younger / Staff writer

This year could see the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) undertaking “more aggressive, ambitious operations around Taiwan,” in preparation for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) stated goal of the PLA having the capability to take Taiwan by next year, Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) director John Dotson said yesterday.

It is thus the last year for the PRC to reach that capability, said Ann Kowalewski, a senior non-resident fellow at the Washington-based GTI.

The institute yesterday held a panel discussion titled “Looking Ahead for Taiwan Policy in 2026.”

Photo courtesy of the Global Taiwan Institute

Last year saw a mounting escalation in pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against Taiwan, including the PLA’s “Justice Mission 2025” military exercises conducted around Taiwan in December, the GTI said.

Analysts expect next year to be a flash point in cross-strait relations, after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson in 2021 warned that Xi had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.

However, substantial political analysis shows that they are “not quite there yet,” Kowalewski said.

“What we might see is a massive ramp-up this year in PRC military capability,” she said.

It remains unclear whether Taiwan and the US would increase their military capabilities or think through unique postures to ensure they can asymmetrically keep the balance of power in a relatively stable area, she said.

Conversely, at the end of the year, the PRC might have complete military dominance, she added.

An increase in military activity this year by the PLA might try to signal to Xi: “Hey boss, we got the message and look at the cool stuff we can do now,” Dotson said.

Dotson noted last year’s two PLA military exercises, held in April and December, which were conducted toward the south and southeast of Taiwan, in closer and closer proximity to the nation’s main island, and featured more aggressive use of the China Coast Guard.

Deploying the coast guard serves China’s narrative as it can be explained away as law enforcement patrols rather than military incursions, he said.

China gives a “narrative justification” for each of its military exercises, such as blaming a speech by President William Lai (賴清德) on policies to target Chinese infiltration in March or an arms sale package with Washington last month, Dotson said.

He added that he recommends “skepticism” around these narratives, as large-scale exercises are planned out far in advance, but might have their exact dates adjusted to coincide with key events.

Meanwhile, Taiwan has maintained dialogue with Japan and the Philippines, and there is now “more of an opening on [South] Korea-Taiwan than we have seen previously,” Kowalewski said, adding that Seoul “may not want to fight, may not want to get involved in Taiwan.”

However, even if South Korea does not get involved militarily at the outset, its economy would be greatly affected if the waterways around Taiwan become a war zone, so it might have to get involved for its own national security reasons, she said.

Dotson is a former US Navy officer and was a staff member of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission under the US Congress.

Kowalewski formerly led the Indo-Pacific portfolio as a senior professional staff member of the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs.