Shafaq News
Despite mounting rhetoric, visible military deployments, and sustained
unrest inside Iran, the United States has stopped short of issuing direct
military strike warnings against Tehran. The restraint, according to analysts
and recent US statements, reflects neither indecision nor appeasement, but a
deliberate strategy that prioritizes pressure, deterrence, and risk management
over total war.
In recent days, US President Donald Trump has intensified his language
toward Tehran while stopping well short of authorizing military action.
Speaking aboard Air Force One, Trump said the United States had dispatched “a
massive force” toward the Middle East, adding, “maybe we won’t have to use it,”
a formulation that underscored deterrence rather than imminent attack.
In another statement, Trump stressed that Washington was “watching them
very closely,” reiterating opposition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its
handling of domestic protests, while signaling a preference to avoid
escalation.
For many, this balance offers insight into Washington’s current
calculus. Political analyst and Dean of the College of Public Affairs at the
University of Baltimore, Ivan Sascha Sheehan, described US policy as a form of
“strategic paralysis,” arguing that Washington has quietly concluded that
military force cannot produce democratic change in Iran, yet failed to fully
embrace support for a credible internal alternative.
Speaking to Shafaq News, Sheehan contends that the absence of a
recognized democratic opposition capable of assuming power has become the
central obstacle preventing decisive action. In his view, the true deterrent is
not Iran’s military capabilities, but uncertainty over what follows a strike.
While his assessment frames US hesitation as political failure, other
experts interpret the same restraint as a calculated response to hard realities
on the ground.
Security and political analyst Munir Adib argues that any US military
move, if undertaken, would be tightly calibrated and limited in scope. Rather
than a sweeping campaign, he suggests Washington would aim to degrade specific
elements of Iran’s power, including missile capabilities and air defenses,
without triggering systemic collapse.
Such an approach, Adib notes to Shafaq News, reflects a broader
objective: weakening Iran’s strategic posture while avoiding uncontrollable
regional fallout. “All scenarios remain possible,” he cautions, “and Iran’s
response will be the decisive factor.”
This emphasis on limits resonates across regional assessments, where the
fear of destabilizing Iran outright often outweighs the appeal of decisive
military action.
Omani political researcher Habib al-Hadi points to a narrowing of
Washington’s options, particularly after repeated waves of internal unrest
failed to fracture Iran’s governing structures.
In his assessment, the inability of protests to produce a clear
political rupture has reinforced caution in Western capitals. Military strikes,
he argues, would at best “resize” Iranian power, not guarantee regime change,
an outcome that many regional states view as a dangerous gamble.
For Gulf countries and neighboring states, the collapse of Iran’s
central authority raises the specter of prolonged instability, fragmented power
centers, and cross-border spillover. Containment, however imperfect, is often
seen as less risky than the unknown consequences of sudden regime
disintegration.
Beyond military calculations, US restraint toward Iran is also shaped by
a political dilemma regarding the absence of a credible, internationally
recognized alternative capable of managing a post-regime transition.
Sheehan maintained that military force alone cannot resolve the Iranian
question without a clear successor, warning that “the true deterrent is not
Iran’s nuclear bluff or oil prices– it is the fear of what comes after a
military strike if there is no democratic alternative ready to take power.”
The issue has gained renewed attention as exiled opposition figures,
most notably Reza Pahlavi, have increased their visibility in Washington and
abroad, calling for faster international intervention. Yet heightened exposure
has not translated into a broad political consensus. Analysts note that
symbolic leadership, while influential in mobilizing attention, has yet to
coalesce into a unified alternative with clear internal authority or external
recognition.
“History shows that durable regime change in Iran will not come from
American missiles or secret deals, but from sustained internal resistance led
by an organized democratic movement. Every day Washington hesitates, the
Iranian people pay the price,” Sheehan said.
Read more: Escalation without Collapse: Washington’s options against Tehran
This ambiguity is reflected in US political messaging. While President
Donald Trump has repeatedly called for change in Iran’s leadership and
intensified pressure on Tehran, his statements have stopped short of endorsing
any specific opposition figure as a successor. The focus, instead, has remained
on deterrence, leverage, and signaling —rather than naming an alternative
political outcome.
Taken together, the lack of a recognized successor reinforces
Washington’s caution. For US policymakers, the challenge is not only how to
confront Iran’s current leadership, but how to avoid a vacuum that could
destabilize the region further. Until that question is answered, analysts
suggest, military escalation will remain a tool of pressure rather than a
pathway to transformation.
Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and State Mark Kimmitt
offers a more doctrinal explanation for Washington’s posture, framing potential
US military action not as preparation for war, but as deterrent signaling aimed
at shaping Iranian behavior.
From this perspective, limited strikes —if they occur— would serve as
political-military messages rather than opening salvos in a regional conflict.
The goal would be to impose costs, reinforce red lines, and restore deterrence
without committing the United States to an open-ended confrontation.
Kimmitt’s view aligns closely with recent US behavior: visible
deployments, public warnings, and conditional threats designed to influence
Tehran’s calculations rather than overthrow its leadership.
Underlying Washington’s restraint is a sober assessment of Iran’s
ability to absorb and respond to military pressure. Beyond its conventional
forces, Tehran retains a broad network of regional allies and proxies,
including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ansarallah in Yemen, and Kataib Hezbollah in
Iraq, alongside missile capabilities that could draw US partners into a wider
conflict.
A direct strike risks triggering retaliation across multiple theaters,
from the Gulf to the Levant, complicating US efforts to limit escalation. For
US planners, the challenge lies not in initiating force, but in controlling its
aftermath.
In addition, Iran is consistently ranked among the world’s top 20
military powers in several global assessments, including the Global Firepower
Index.
This reality might help explain why Washington has paired military
readiness with diplomatic signaling and economic pressure, seeking leverage
without crossing thresholds that could lock both sides into a cycle of
escalation.
Recent developments at the United Nations have added another layer to
the equation. While the UN Human Rights Council is set to convene an emergency
session to address Iran’s crackdown on protests today, backed by more than 50
countries, Tehran continues to rely on diplomatic cover from key allies,
particularly Russia and China. Their support does not necessarily block debate
within the council, but it helps dilute consensus, challenge investigative
mandates, and limit the likelihood of follow-up measures being translated into
binding international action through other UN bodies.
For Washington and its allies, multilateral pressure offers an
alternative avenue to constrain Tehran while avoiding unilateral military
action. It also reinforces a broader strategy that places international
legitimacy and collective action alongside deterrence.
Taken together, recent statements and expert assessments suggest that US
restraint is less about hesitation and more about design. Washington appears
intent on maintaining pressure, preserving deterrence, and avoiding
irreversible steps until clearer outcomes —or red lines— emerge.
Whether this approach amounts to strategic patience or prolonged delay
remains a matter of debate. For now, however, the absence of a US strike
reflects a calculation shared across multiple camps: that war with Iran may be
easy to start, but far harder to control or conclude.
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.