The Trump administration released its National Security Strategy (NSS) in early December 2025, outlining the US’ “America First” foreign policy aims. This policy formulation appears to indicate the Indo-Pacific region will take a back-seat to regions closer to home, such as Latin America and the Caribbean (LATAM). Underscoring this strategic refocus is Washington’s January 4, 2026 military operation in Venezuela to capture Nicolas Maduro as part of operations to allegedly combat drug trafficking concerns emanating from the country.

However, the White House’s apparent revival of the Monroe (or “Donroe”) Doctrine and subsequent aggressive engagement sets a dangerous precedent. Indeed, actors that the White House views as adversaries could heighten their military capabilities to avoid becoming the next Venezuela. It is through this strategic lens that the omission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK) from the latest NSS creates a strategic blind spot for the White House.

Despite its moniker as the “hermit kingdom,” North Korea is and always has been an active participant in the international community, albeit not necessarily within the Western hegemonic order. Pyongyang’s propensity for supporting anti-West forces can be seen most recently and most vividly through its ongoing support of Russia in the Ukraine conflict, providing both weapons and troops. As other non-US-aligned countries potentially prepare against a more aggressive US foreign policy, Pyongyang could become a more attractive military and economic partner for other countries, including those in Latin America or the Middle East. This creates a heightened risk that Washington’s blind spot will leave it unprepared for potential provocations linked to DPRK-led arms proliferation.

To prepare for these scenarios, it is essential to examine both North Korea’s history of supporting anti-Western actors and why the US NSS creates fertile ground for Pyongyang to profit from it. By doing so, Western policymakers and intelligence and security services will be able to maintain a more proactive approach to threats likely to emerge from North Korea’s shifting position within the international community.

Historical Precedent of North Korea’s Arms Trafficking Activity

A common misconception is that North Korea is an isolationist country that does not actively engage politically or economically with other countries outside of its two most prominent allies, China and Russia. In reality, Pyongyang has a robust foreign policy and a long history of illicit arms trafficking, which has presented a consistent global threat to the West and its allies.

Pyongyang’s arms trafficking and military aid activity dates back to the Cold War through its “guerrilla internationalism” strategy. As a part of this strategy, the DPRK “committed to the ethos of guerrilla fighting and assisting non-state actors in their own struggles for sovereignty and independence” by providing training and military equipment to anti-colonial forces. With this as the focus, each North Korean leader employed a version of the strategy to capitalize on the geopolitical triggers of their era, providing military aid in exchange for ideological reasons and, later, economic benefits. The military assistance to Russia is just the latest and most pronounced example.

Kim Il Sung Era

Under Kim Il Sung, the country leveraged its experiences fighting Japan’s imperialist campaign to inform its foreign policy, devoting a “large number of resources to aiding guerrilla fighters” in regions such as Latin America, Africa, and Asia. For example, in 1966, a Tricontinental Conference brought together “83 non-aligned leftist countries” in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and led to the agreement that nations in the Global South could intervene in the “internal affairs of other countries” to further anti-imperialist causes.[1] This created the platform through which Kim Il-sung’s DPRK could expand its influence via its illicit goods and services.

Based on this 1966 agreement, the DPRK, for example, supported the Sri Lankan People’s Liberation Front, which used Pyongyang’s money, arms, and explosives to unsuccessfully overthrow Colombo in April 1971.[2] However, after the collapse of the Communist Bloc and the death of Kim Il Sung in the 1990s, the DPRK shifted its focus under the DPRK’s second leader, Kim Jong Il.

Kim Jong Il Era

In contrast to his father, Kim Jong Il only selectively aided “groups with self-determination aims,” such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. The reason for this shift was the collapse of the Communist Bloc and China’s opening to the West in the 1980s-1990s, which left a significant diplomatic and economic void for the DPRK. As such, the funds raised through this further privatization of the “guerrilla internationalism” concept sought not only to fill Pyongyang’s coffers but also to secure new strategic allies.

According to former US Defense Intelligence Agency Officer Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Kim was “willing and able to support any non-state actor that chooses to engage in terrorism – that is, as long as it can pay.”[3] As such, previously unsupported (non) state actors such as Islamic extremist groups received aid from North Korea. For example, MILF and Pyongyang allegedly signed an arms agreement in 1999 worth an estimated USD 2.2 million according to confiscated MILF documents. Similarly, the DPRK provided Iran with equipment such as Scud-B missiles, anti-tank weapons, and small arms during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.

Kim Jong Un Era

The trend of illicit arms trafficking further changed after Kim Jong Un took over following his father’s death in 2011. For example, the implementation of a severe sanction regime against North Korea for its nuclear and ballistic missile program in the 2000s made it a less attractive trading partner for non-state actors who were seeking recognition and legitimacy on the international stage, with Hezbollah or the Houthis as notable exceptions.[4]

In addition, the diversification of the North’s illicit operations, eventually including cybercrime, made support of guerrilla internationalism less attractive, or necessary during the first decade of Kim Jong Un’s rule. According to Chainalysis’s December 2025 report, for instance, North Korean hackers have stolen a total of USD 2.02 billion in cryptocurrency in 2025 alone. The lucrative nature of this type of activity has largely supplanted several of the other illicit activities, which elicited significant ire from both its allies and the international community.

The Impact of the Russia-DPRK Partnership on Pyongyang’s Arms Trafficking

While the aforementioned military aid trends held true throughout the pre-COVID period of Kim Jong Un’s regime, the severe economic decline in the DPRK during the COVID-19 pandemic altered the country’s stance. According to Statistics Korea’s 2023 report, North Korea’s economy contracted by approximately 5% over the first three years of the pandemic. This contraction was largely due to Pyongyang’s stringent COVID-19 policies, which closed its borders to all countries, including its most important economic trading partners, such as China and Russia, to prevent the spread of the virus.

However, the DPRK’s fortunes changed on 24 February 2022 when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since 2023, Western and South Korean intelligence agencies allege North Korea has provided Russia with significant military aid, including 14,000 to 15,000 troops, more than 12 million artillery shells, and more than 120 multiple launch rocket systems. In exchange, not only did Russia provide North Korea with “knowledge and means to modernize its military capabilities”, but they also provided much-needed economic relief.

Implications and Risks

The Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom’s Korea Office reported in September 2025 that North Korea has sent an estimated USD 10 billion worth of weapons and troops to Russia. However, they have only received an estimated USD 1.2 billion in direct compensation from Mocow.[5] Despite this comparatively limited monetary compensation, previous Kim regimes held the view that “civil wars and conflicts opened spaces for Pyongyang to sell weapons and improve their own military tactics and capabilities.” If this is any indication of how DPRK may assess new opportunities going forward, America’s shifting foreign policy priorities create conditions ripe for Pyongyang to profit further from its now battlefield-tested arms. These include:

Potential access to areas “where it [Moscow] holds sway and arms embargo enforcement is weak,” such as Syria, Libya, Sudan, the Sahel, Cuba, and Nicaragua; and
A live sales pitch of the effectiveness and robustness of its military equipment to (non) state actors in the countries being newly targeted by the Trump administration.

For example, during the operation against Maduro, Venezuela’s Russian and Chinese-built air defense systems were allegedly unable to shoot down a single US aircraft. As such, current and prospective buyers of Russian and Chinese military equipment may reassess their partnerships going forward and choose to diversify their procurement supply chains to include other suppliers, such as North Korea.

Indeed, North Korea’s apparent willingness to provide arms for either non-monetary means or at below market cost, even if lower quality, may be especially appealing to actors who are economically limited and want to boost their resilience to US military operations. Moreover, Kim Jong Un indicated throughout 2025 that he wishes to improve not only conventional weapons production but also weapons for future battlefields. This will likely signal to potential buyers that North Korea will remain relevant as an arms supplier for the foreseeable future, adapting to modern methods and needs.

Lastly, the omission of the DPRK and any reference to denuclearization from the US NSS suggests that Washington may be seeking to increase its chances of achieving diplomatic headway with Pyongyang in the coming years. US President Trump has repeatedly indicated his eagerness to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un without preconditions. If Trump’s actions towards Putin can be taken as a baseline, this “dealmaking” style of diplomacy in the North Korean case could entail “ignoring” certain inflammatory behavior from Pyongyang for the sake of the deal.

Should sanctions relief or weaker sanctions enforcement be part of any future US-DPRK arrangements, this could entice actors previously reluctant to buy from North Korea back into the fold, including those who are in or could come into direct military conflict with the US. This scenario would be particularly troublesome if North Korean military equipment was found to help deter a US operation and/or resulted in the deaths of US soldiers, which could lead to Trump reviving his “fire and fury” attitude towards North Korea.

Conclusion

Considering these factors, the continued reordering of US foreign policy priorities will be monitored closely not only in countries coming into America’s crosshairs, but also in countries like North Korea, which now stand to gain—both politically and economically—from growing geopolitical uncertainties.

A reduced focus on North Korea as a central US threat amid weakening international law and norms—and overall weaker sanctions enforcement—creates conditions for Pyongyang’s appeal as an alternative partner for arms and military supplies to grow, particularly in regions increasingly targeted by Washington, such as the Global South. The prospects of North Korean military equipment or soldiers being used to undermine future US military operations should not be taken lightly. Therefore, while North Korea’s nuclear program may not be one of America’s top threats or priorities right now, its illicit activities still pose a formidable cross-regional threat that needs sustained attention to address.