To the editor,
Public discussion about Greenland and Arctic security has recently drifted into political theater, as though northern defense were a matter of personality, posture or novelty. It is not. It is a matter of physics, treaties and time.
The United States did not “rediscover” Greenland in the modern era, nor is its role the result of improvisation. Since 1951, the United States has operated in Greenland under a formal defense agreement with the Kingdom of Denmark, an arrangement that remains active, cooperative and fully understood by Copenhagen. That framework was built during the Cold War for a specific problem set: detecting and responding to high-arching ballistic missiles crossing the Arctic on predictable trajectories.
The strategic environment has changed.
Hypersonic weapons now in circulation were designed precisely to exploit the limits of that older system. They fly lower, maneuver unpredictably, and compress decision timelines. The uncomfortable but honest reality is this: hypersonic capability has outpaced the fully fielded, fully integrated sensor architecture the United States ultimately wants. That is why defense planning language today emphasizes modernization, integration and urgency, with timelines extending into the later 2020s.
This does not mean the United States is blind. It means risk is managed, not eliminated. Mitigated, not cured.
The Arctic warning system was optimized for ballistic arcs. Hypersonic profiles stress horizon limits and prediction models. The response is not bravado or rhetoric, but engineering: layered sensors, space-based tracking to maintain custody, over-the-horizon radar to extend visibility, and faster integration between detection and decision. That work is already underway, quietly and deliberately, across the U.S. and allied defense institutions.
Greenland remains central not because of symbolism, but because geometry still matters. It sits where curvature, latitude and time intersect. Its role is not ownership or spectacle, but access, infrastructure and alignment under long-standing agreements.
If there is a lesson worth stating plainly, it is this: Arctic defense is not a political invention of the moment. It is an evolving technical problem being addressed within established treaties, allied cooperation and sober acknowledgment of emerging threats. The race underway is not for dominance, but for clarity – shortening ambiguity and lengthening decision time in a world that allows less margin for error.
Joe Cozart
Grand Forks