Until U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent comments pushed it into public view, Greenland was widely regarded as a geopolitical footnote: immense, frozen, sparsely inhabited, and far from the centre of global power politics. Yet in strategic terms it sits at the hinge of the 21st?century Arctic contest. As climate change opens northern sea routes and unlocks previously inaccessible energy reserves, the region is shifting from a frozen buffer zone to a theatre of competition between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. Russia already views the Arctic as the backbone of its long?term economic model and a pillar of national prestige. China frames itself as a “near?Arctic state” and seeks access to minerals, shipping lanes, and scientific footholds. And against this backdrop, Greenland’s geography gives the U.S. disproportionate leverage: it anchors the GIUK Gap, hosts critical early?warning infrastructure, and contains rare earth deposits that could reshape global supply chains.

Trump’s unwavering insistence that U.S. “ownership” of Greenland was necessary — rather than any lease?based arrangement — because only that would allow Washington to defend the territory surprised many. But at the heart of Washington’s Arctic strategy lies a simple principle: deny adversaries the ability to establish military, logistical, or dual?use infrastructure in locations that would threaten U.S. or NATO interests — and Greenland is the western anchor of that strategy. Its position at the top of the North Atlantic gives the U.S. and its allies control over the Greenland–Iceland–U.K.’ (GIUK) Gap, the narrow maritime corridor through which Russia’s Northern Fleet must pass to reach the Atlantic. This chokepoint has mattered since the Cold War, but it matters even more now as Russia expands its Arctic oil and gas production and deploys submarines, long?range aviation, and naval escorts to protect those assets. A strengthened U.S. presence in Greenland — expanded radar arrays, upgraded missile?tracking systems, enhanced anti?submarine warfare capabilities, and more robust air patrols — tightens NATO’s grip on this corridor. And for Moscow, that means reduced freedom to move submarines undetected, less ability to project power into the North Atlantic, and greater vulnerability for the naval forces that protect its Arctic energy infrastructure. Even if Russia continues drilling in its own waters, its ability to shield those operations from surveillance or interference becomes more constrained.

Russia’s push into the Arctic is not a distant ambition but an active, capital?intensive expansion that now underpins its long?term economic model. In broad terms, Russia’s Arctic sector holds an estimated 35.7 trillion cubic metres (Tcm) of gas and over 2.3 billion metric tons of oil and condensate, most of it concentrated in the Yamal and Gydan peninsulas on the southern edge of the Kara Sea, as analysed in my latest book. In late 2021, Rosneft discovered a massive new gas field in the Kara Sea itself, with reserves estimated at 800 billion cubic metres (Bcm). The company is also driving the vast Vostok Oil project in Russia’s Far North that includes Vankor, Zapadno-Irkinsky, the Payakhskaya group of fields and the East Taimyr cluster. Together, these assets are believed to hold at least 6 billion metric tons (about 51 billion barrels) of proven liquid hydrocarbons reserves, all close to the Northern Sea Route (NSR). This Arctic shipping corridor along Russia’s northern coast offers a shorter alternative to the Suez Canal for connecting Europe and Asia, including its key strategic partner, China. As Rosneft chief executive Igor Sechin told President Putin, the combination of ongoing exploration, a completed 770?kilometre pipeline design, and new port infrastructure would create a “new oil and gas province” on the Taymyr Peninsula.

In a global energy shipping market where Russia is increasingly blocked off due to international sanctions, the NSR also provides a vital route for delivering oil and gas to China with relative ease. The challenge has been that due to its location in the frozen Arctic, ships have been unable to sail at all during March, April, and May, and have struggled to do so at other times as well. Consequently, Moscow launched a major initiative to make the NSR fully operational year?round, according to a senior Moscow-based oil analyst exclusively spoken to by OilPrice.com. “Thirty-three million tonnes of cargo was moved in 2021, 34 million in 2022, 36 million in 2023, 38 million in 2024, and around 39 million last year,” he said. “Rosatom [the Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation, which manages a fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers], and Novatek [Russia’s second-largest gas producer and spearheading its Arctic LNG developments] have told the Far East and Arctic Development Ministry that they can support an increase to 200 million tonnes by 2030,” he added.

All of this further underscores that Putin has long viewed the Arctic as a platform for projecting Russian power far beyond its traditional boundaries — a theatre in which Moscow can present itself as the pre?eminent Arctic power. The Kola Peninsula hosts roughly half of Russia’s fleet of nuclear?powered, nuclear?armed ballistic missile submarines, including 12 strategic nuclear submarines carrying up to 192 nuclear?capable ballistic missiles, plus dozens of cruise?missile and special?purpose nuclear submarines. In practical terms, the Arctic functions as Moscow’s second?strike insurance if its main domestic nuclear forces were ever neutralised. The region also remains a key site for testing advanced systems, including hypersonic missiles, nuclear?powered torpedoes, and cruise missiles, while Russia’s state nuclear company Rosatom also maintains nuclear power plants in the Arctic. Reinforcing Putin’s vision of Russia as the dominant Arctic power was the recent ratification of the ‘Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support’ (RELOS) pact, a deal that quietly extends India’s and Russia’s military cooperation into Russia’s Arctic ports and the NSR.

The RELOS agreement allows both countries’ armed forces to use each other’s bases, ports, and airfields for refuelling, repairs, resupply, and maintenance. The pact also covers joint exercises, training missions, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Its strategic implications, however, are far more significant. For India, access to Russian ports such as Murmansk and Vladivostok provides a tangible foothold along the NSR — a corridor that shortens Europe–Asia shipping distances by nearly 40% and enhances both commercial and naval mobility. Operationally, it enables Indian forces to sustain deployments far from home without relying solely on Western partners. Even before this latest pact, India participated in the 12-16 September Russian-led ‘Zapad’ military manoeuvres, alongside Belarus, according to Russian state news agency TASS — exercises that, for the first time, included rehearsals for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. And symbolically, RELOS embeds India within Russia’s Arctic project, signalling New Delhi’s arrival as a player in polar geopolitics, projecting influence into a region that has long been central to Moscow’s ambitions.

A more assertive U.S. presence in Greenland disrupts that narrative, as the island’s geography gives it something it cannot replicate elsewhere: unparalleled early?warning visibility over Russian air, missile, and space activity. The Pituffik Space Base — already a cornerstone of U.S. missile?warning architecture — occupies a position that allows sensors to detect ballistic launches, long?range aviation, and satellite trajectories far earlier than systems in Alaska or Europe. Washington now appears likely to expand this network, increasing its intelligence advantage, as ongoing discussions with Denmark could result in the U.S. being granted the form of territorial ‘ownership’ President Trump has sought. Washington-based legal sources close to the U.S. administration exclusively told OilPrice.com over the weekend that under this scenario, Denmark would allow the U.S. to hold sovereignty over several areas of Greenland in perpetuity for military, intelligence, and logistical purposes. Additional zones may be assigned under a similar arrangement for rare?earth mining, although those details remain under discussion. It is a template based on Great Britain’s retained sovereignty over the military Akrotiri and Dhekelia ‘Sovereign Base Areas’ in Cyprus, established under the ‘1960 Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. In short, this clearly demonstrates to Russia and China that the U.S. and NATO are not retreating from the Arctic, and if necessary, they are willing to defend their ongoing presence in the region militarily.

By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com

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