The impact of Maduro’s capture will be negligible on Venezuela’s cocaine-trafficking.
What are the defining characteristics of Venezuelan drug trafficking and how will they change after the fall of Nicolás Maduro? Venezuela is not a cocaine-producing country, yet it has become one transit hub in global trafficking. Its role in the supply chain stems from geographical factors, institutional decay and the emergence of criminal organisations capable of controlling infrastructure and communities. Among these, the Tren de Aragua (TdA) exercises forms of criminal governance over territory; as a result, its involvement in drug trafficking is indirect, regulatory and opportunistic.
The regime led by Maduro until 3 January, 2026, was not a centralised ‘narco-state’. Yet, it allowed fragmented institutional complicity that facilitated large-scale trafficking even in the absence of unified control by a single cartel. The fall of the dictator will affect neither cocaine production nor its transport, and corrupt deals continue unchanged.
Cocaine enters the country primarily from Colombia – through Zulia, Táchira, Apure and Amazonas – where production and initial processing remain under the control of Colombian armed groups such as the ELN and FARC dissidents. Venezuelan territory provides storage facilities and exits routes. According to the 2025 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, approximately 250 metric tons of cocaine transit through Venezuela each year, accounting for about 10% of global production.
Trafficking relies on three main modalities: clandestine flights from improvised airstrips; maritime routes along the Caribbean coast toward Central America and the Dominican Republic; and container shipments through ports such as Puerto Cabello. Recent investigations also document limited coca cultivation and drug processing in border regions with Colombia. Control of nodal territories is crucial. Access to airports, highways, ports and border crossings depends on negotiated agreements involving state actors, Colombian armed groups and Venezuelan criminal organisations. Among these, the TdA plays a decisive role.
Several journalistic investigations suggest that under Maduro’s presidency the state sought to regulate access to the cocaine economy, distributing rents and protection as a means of managing internal balances within the armed forces
From its origins in the Tocorón prison, the TdA expanded outward, consolidating its influence over neighbourhoods, communities and transport corridors. Its involvement in cocaine trafficking consists of regulating access to routes, protecting logistics and arbitrating conflicts, rather than controlling production or wholesale export. This model allows the group to integrate into existing transport chains without assuming the risks borne by producers and international brokers. Drug trafficking, however, represents only one source of revenue among others, alongside extortion, illegal mining, migrant smuggling, contract violence and territorial control.
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