The latest wave of protests in Iran was rooted in systemic corruption, chronic economic mismanagement, and the widening gap between ordinary citizens and a politically connected elite—under a regime that represents a textbook case of kakistocracy, government by the unqualified and unscrupulous, compounded by a theocracy incompatible with modern times.
At the heart of this crisis was a currency racket involving regime-linked businessmen and insiders. For years, the government granted select importers access to preferential exchange rates, allowing them to buy foreign currency at subsidized prices under the pretext of importing essential goods. In theory, this policy was meant to stabilize prices and protect consumers. In practice, it became a mechanism for corruption.
At the heart of [Iran’s] crisis was a currency racket involving regime-linked businessmen and insiders.
Initially, many of these cronies spent only a fraction—sometimes as little as 20 percent—of the subsidized foreign currency on imports and resold the remainder on the open market for enormous profits. As greed intensified, some abandoned imports altogether, diverting nearly all of the subsidized funds into overseas investments, with the foreign currency never returning to Iran.
When the government announced the end of preferential exchange rates, these networks reacted. Fearing the loss of their privileges, they helped organize protests, initially framed around their economic grievances. What began as an attempt to protect vested interests quickly spiraled out of their control into protests that rallied around the overthrow of the regime and a return to the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran.
The early demonstrations were concentrated in provincial towns and smaller cities, where social networks are tighter, and mobilization is easier. In these communities, people know each other, trust is easier established, and coordination can occur faster.
Larger cities such as Tehran saw more scattered and sporadic protests at first. However, in western regions, particularly around Ilam and Abdanan, demonstrations became intense and violent, with heavy repression.
A major psychological turning point came with the January 3, 2026, arrest of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. Many Iranian protesters hoped the Iranian regime would follow suit.
By the morning of January 8, signs of an impending crackdown were unmistakable. According to sources inside Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Saberin Special Forces—an elite, ideological unit that played a central role in suppressing protests in Tehran and other major cities after the death of Mahsa Amini—had deployed across key junctions throughout the capital.
By early afternoon, indicators of an imminent internet shutdown became apparent and by 5 p.m., contact with most sources inside the country was lost. The digital blackout was nearly complete. It was only a prelude.
The next morning, state television and pro-regime media broadcast continuous footage of burning buildings and destruction, which they claimed protestors had caused. The images included burned mosques, damaged copies of the Quran, and injured security personnel. The goal was to manipulate opinion to justify a crackdown.
Iran has experienced at least five major nationwide uprisings over two decades.
This fit a familiar pattern. Iran has experienced at least five major nationwide uprisings over two decades. Each has followed a familiar pattern: security forces initially refrain from a full-scale crackdown, using time instead to identify organizers and activists. State media then broadcasts images of arson and destruction—attributing them to the demonstrators—to manufacture a justification for repression. This is followed by an internet shutdown, mass violence, killing and widespread arrests.
The official state narrative portrayed protest leaders as agents of Zionist and U.S. interests, a storyline naively reinforced in the most recent protest by some commentators on opposition media abroad, who spoke of “Mossad agents joining the protesters.”
By the evening of January 9, the situation reached a critical juncture. Many Iran observers believe that protesters should have stayed home, preserving their numbers and denying the regime an opportunity for mass repression. Instead, exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi issued a call for demonstrators to gather at 8 p.m. and seize government buildings and police stations. He also called on all armed and security forces “who have joined the National Cooperation Platform: slow down and disrupt the machinery of repression even further, so that on the promised day you can bring it to a complete halt.” Many supporters believed this call was backed by assurances of foreign intervention and military defections.
In previous weeks, Pahlavi had claimed that up to 150,000 members of Iran’s armed forces had contacted him and pledged allegiance through a QR code he had advertised on the Saudi-funded Iran International satellite station. These statements created expectation that security forces might stand down or even defect.
At the same time, there was confidence that smuggled Starlink terminals would compensate for the internet shutdown and allow protesters to remain connected. Both assumptions were wrong.
The regime had prepared. Electronic warfare units jammed an estimated 80 percent of Starlink connections. Security forces confiscated some terminals, and users abandoned others, fearing being caught with them could lead to the death penalty. The regime cut mobile networks and electricity in key areas.
With protesters isolated, security forces launched the bloodiest crackdown in the Islamic Republic’s history. “That night, everyone who happened to be on the streets was a target, whether they were protesting or not,” one witness from a small town outside Tehran told me. The killing was indiscriminate and industrial.
With protesters isolated, security forces launched the bloodiest crackdown in the Islamic Republic’s history.
There are also reports of savagery carried out by Tehran’s foreign proxy groups and use of criminal thugs fueled by drugs that numbed them against the inhumanity that followed. Neither foreign intervention nor mass defections occurred. As in the past, strategic patience, necessary for sustaining long-term resistance, gave way to emotional enthusiasm and the belief that the regime can be overthrown overnight. The cost of this bravado was paid in blood and in the destruction of a generation.
Until Iran’s opposition leaders, activists, and the diaspora candidly confront the lessons of current and past protest failures, the cycle of failed protests and brutal repression will continue.
There remains hope among some that the massive mobilization of U.S. naval forces and aircraft carriers could end Iran’s nightmare of life under clerical rule. But even if such a moment were to arrive, nothing can restore the tens of thousands of lives already lost.