A new analysis shows that just 32 fossil fuel companies were responsible for half of global carbon dioxide emissions in 2024. A relatively small group of producers continues to extract and sell the fuels driving the resulting climate change. The consequences are visible in everyday life.
Data such as this shifts the debate from vague global responsibility to identifiable producers whose business models depend on continued fossil fuel expansion. These companies have profited for decades while communities, especially in vulnerable countries, pay the price through floods, heatwaves, crop losses, displacement, and rising food and energy insecurity.
State-owned fossil fuel producers make up 17 of the top 20 global emitters. Unsurprisingly, all 17 are controlled by countries that opposed a proposed fossil fuel phaseout at COP30, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and India. Much of today’s fossil fuel production is embedded in those countries’ national development strategies and energy security concerns, with some still identifying as developing states.
Yet the onus for a just transition must not fall disproportionately on developing countries that inherently carry lower historical responsibility for emissions. Corporations must be held accountable too. This is the basis of the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities principle that sits at the heart of international climate law under the 1992 UNFCCC. It recognises that climate change is a shared problem, but that countries do not share equal blame or equal capacity to respond. Obligations differ according to historical emissions and economic strength. Developed countries are expected to move first on emissions cuts and to provide finance and technology for mitigation and adaptation, while the development priorities and constraints of poorer nations must be taken into account.
Historical emissions make this point clear. Global cumulative CO₂ emissions are about 1,850 gigatonnes. The United States alone accounts for about 435 GtCO₂, roughly 23.5% of the total. The European Union accounts for around 15.4%. China’s cumulative total is about 301 GtCO₂, roughly 16.3%, reflecting its later but rapid industrial rise. India’s cumulative emissions are only around 4.3% of the global total. Russia stands at roughly 6%. And Saudi Arabia’s emissions are near 3%, while the United Arab Emirates is minimal in cumulative terms.
China is now the largest annual emitter, but its historical and per capita profiles differ from those of older industrial powers.
The United States and Europe industrialised early, building wealth on centuries of fossil fuel use and contributing a large share of the carbon now heating the planet. Many countries in the Global South industrialised much later, with far lower cumulative and per capita emissions and with large populations still lacking reliable and affordable energy.
China is now the largest annual emitter, but its historical and per capita profiles differ from those of older industrial powers. India’s per capita and cumulative emissions remain far lower still. Countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have oil-dependent economies and, in some cases, high per capita emissions, but their cumulative contributions and development trajectories differ from those of traditional industrial powers.
Given this context, countries that grew rich on fossil fuels cannot now demand constraint from those still grappling with energy access, poverty, and burgeoning industrialisation. In particular, the Global South must be granted concessions consistent with its lower historical responsibility and present development challenges.
This is why corporate accountability and climate finance must move together. If a small group of fossil fuel producers is responsible for such a large share of emissions, then holding them liable through regulation, taxation, and litigation can help generate resources for transition. At the same time, the Global North must accelerate climate finance, technology transfer, and contributions to loss and damage funds. Without scaled-up support, calls for phaseouts in developing countries will be seen as unjust and politically unworkable.
Developed countries, with higher historical emissions and greater financial capacity, must lead in rapid phaseouts at home and in funding transitions abroad. Developing countries must also shift, but in a way that protects development gains, jobs, and energy access while expanding clean, affordable alternatives.
Climate justice requires acknowledging history, inequality, and differentiated capacity. Climate action that ignores these realities will deepen divides. Climate action that combines corporate justice with fair international support offers a path that is more equitable and more politically durable.