Europe Should Exploit Georgia’s Regime Ructions

The latest fracture in Georgia’s elite came on January 12, when former primed minister Irakli Garibashvili was jailed for five years after pleading guilty to money-laundering. Garibashvili, who only left office in 2024, has long been seen as one of the closest aides to Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire founder of the ruling Georgian Dream party, and the country’s de facto ruler.

Garibashvili’s fall follows the detention of a former defense minister, several deputy ministers, and the former head of the State Security Service in a broader purge at the top of the party. While Ivanishvili’s motives remain unclear, his actions signal a willingness to cannibalize those closest to him.

In doing so, he has eroded a foundational rule of post-Soviet kleptocracies: that loyalty guarantees protection. By rendering senior figures expendable, Georgian Dream has left its remaining apparatchiks looking over their shoulders.

At the same time, Ivanishvili has intensified the crackdown on opposition to his party’s rule. Last week, Georgian courts issued the first administrative detentions to demonstrators for rallying on sidewalks, using recent amendments to the law requiring prior authorization for protests that “impede movement.”

These measures built on legislative changes which expanded criminal liability and increased fines for direct action, such as blocking roads. The European Union said the new rules were part of a systematic campaign to silence dissent and undermine the rule of law. Meanwhile, political prisoners, including prominent journalist Mzia Amaglobeli, remain jailed.

On January 27, Georgian Dream announced unprecedented legislative amendments that expand state control over foreign funding and criminalize a broad range of grant-related activities for NGOs and media outlets. Set to be adopted when parliament reconvenes in February — its legitimacy still challenged by opponents — the measures mark a significant escalation in the regime’s efforts to all but eliminate the civic space and insulate itself from external scrutiny.

The shake-up, and the uncertainty that comes with it, presents a timely opportunity for Europe to reclaim regional influence. Coordinated, targeted financial sanctions on the ruling elite, their families, and their enforcement networks could sever access to European banking, property, and institutions, so undermining the foundations of regime power.

Europe wields extensive financial power that it can deploy with real effect. No small country in the region — and no ruling elite — can function if cut off from the European banking system. This is particularly true of Georgia, which is deeply integrated into Western financial networks.

Europe also holds powerful leverage over Georgia’s ruling elite because it is one of the few places where their spoils can be safely converted into travel, healthcare, and education for their children.

With little political protection abroad, and diminishing protection at home, these individuals have few alternatives. Russia offers neither credibility nor appeal as a substitute, and increasingly lacks the capacity to serve as a reliable protector. From Syria to Venezuela, the Kremlin has proved a mere spectator to events, and even in the South Caucasus it has been sidelined in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, where the US has taken the lead.

These shifts create a rare strategic opportunity for Europe to help Georgia move forward.

EU states may need to act without unanimity to bypass the gridlock repeatedly caused by countries like Hungary and Slovakia. If a core group of leading European states took the initiative through a coalition of the willing, action could be swift and decisive — demonstrating both a commitment to democratic values and the capacity to shape outcomes in Europe’s immediate neighborhood.

For sanctions to be effective, they need to go beyond targeting the top of the regime, and should disrupt the full chain that enables repression — from police and courts to officials who coerce state employees and crony businesses sustained by public funds. While Ivanishvili and the highest echelon may absorb sanctions to retain power, repression is carried out by mid- and lower-level implementers whose loyalty is more transactional.

Extending sanctions to these individuals and their families, through financial restrictions, visa bans, and asset freezes, would fundamentally alter their cost-benefit calculations. Crucially, such pressure must be paired with credible off-ramps, including relief for those who refuse illegal orders or disengage from repressive practices.

Once compliance with the regime threatens basic financial security and access to Europe, and disengagement offers a viable exit, the machinery of repression will begin to fracture.

Establishing a systematic enforcement mechanism, through which individuals are identified domestically, referred to European authorities, and subjected to swift financial and travel sanctions, would create an enforcement crisis for the regime. Sustained European pressure would gradually deprive it of willing operatives.

This approach must be matched by continued support for civic activists, independent media, and democratic forces on the ground.

European action could also help revive momentum in Washington. By taking the first step and engaging directly with Congress, Europe could advance its own sanctions framework and catalyze renewed consideration of US legislative measures targeting the Georgian regime under the MEGOBARI Act.

Although the legislation passed the House, it stalled in the Senate and was stripped from the 2025 defense authorization cycle. However, a coordinated European move might help revive the bill’s momentum in 2026.

For more than a year, protests have continued in Georgia despite arrests, violence, and intimidation. External pressure therefore matters not as a substitute for civic resistance, but as a multiplier.

Europe would affirm that those defending democratic principles on the streets of Tbilisi are not alone, and that persistence, rather than submission, is the rational choice.

At a time when Europe is often reduced to a bystander in major geopolitical developments, spearheading support for democratic processes in Georgia would signal its ability to exercise autonomous geopolitical power in a region where Moscow is eager to fill the vacuum.

Georgia offers a rare opportunity for Europe to help steer an increasingly pro-Western country in its own neighborhood away from the Russian orbit and toward democratic transformation.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned in his speech at Davos that, “Europe loves to discuss the future, but avoids taking action today, action that defines what kind of future we will have.” For once, Europe holds the decisive cards in a geopolitical contest that has strategic implications — if it can muster the will to act.

Irina Arabidze is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at CEPA and a visiting lecturer at the Caucasus University in Tbilisi. A Fulbright scholar, she holds a master’s degree in International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a graduate degree in International Relations and European Studies from the Central European University. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.