The capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces on January 3, 2026, has sent shockwaves around the world. U.S. adversaries in Beijing, Moscow, and Havana are closely watching what the future may hold for their own aspirations in the Western Hemisphere. In the case of Russia, the immediate prognosis is negative. The Kremlin has lost a key outpost in the Americas, the reputation of Russian military equipment has been further tarnished, and robust U.S. sanctions enforcement against shadow tankers portends poorly for the Russian war economy. In many ways, Maduro’s capture underscores that Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine has been a tremendous folly. That conflict’s immense human and fiscal cost has hamstrung Moscow’s ability to project power further afield.
Nevertheless, Russia continues to seek an advantage despite its defeat. Most notably, Russian media outlets have seized on narratives about the erosion of international law and the resurgence of spheres of influence to legitimize the Kremlin’s own revisionist ambitions and highlight U.S. disputes over Cuba, Greenland, and Mexico. Such narratives are likely to be leveraged in Russia’s ongoing influence campaigns in the Global South.
Q1: How has Russia reacted to the capture of Maduro?
A1: If it were not already apparent from its anemic response to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, as well as U.S. and Israeli air strikes against Iran, Russia has proven itself once again to be a fair-weather friend to Venezuela. While Russian officials and government agencies have issued statements condemning the capture of Maduro, these have failed to give way to concrete action. Russian foreign policy analyst Fyodor Lukyanov summed up much of this approach, stating: “Putin and Trump are currently focused on a far more consequential issue for Moscow: Ukraine. And for all the Kremlin’s sympathies towards Caracas, it is unlikely to upend a much larger strategic game with a critical partner over what it sees as a secondary concern.”
Furthermore, the operation may have also revealed cracks within Russia and China’s purported “infinite friendship.” According to recent reports from the Wall Street Journal, Russia was aware of an impending military operation against Venezuela, but declined to notify China, whose diplomats met with Maduro in Caracas less than 24 hours before U.S. forces stormed into the city.
Outside of official channels, some Russian officials and military bloggers have even expressed a begrudging respect for the precision and effectiveness of Operation Absolute Resolve. The successful exfiltration of a sitting head of state from his own capital city draws a stark contrast to failed Russian efforts at assassinating Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the disastrous Russian airborne attack on Hostomel Airport in the early days of the 2022 invasion.
Even before the January 3 raid on Caracas, Maduro’s pleas for increased military support fell on deaf ears. In October 2025, Venezuelan Minister of Transportation Ramón Celestino Velásquez visited Moscow, where he reportedly delivered a letter from Maduro requesting additional radars, air defense systems, and help in repairing the country’s increasingly decrepit fleet of Su-30MK fighter jets. Later that month, help seemed to come in the form of a single Ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane, which landed in Caracas. While the contents of the plane remain unconfirmed, the contents of Maduro’s wish list would be impossible to ferry on a lone aircraft. Whatever aid Russia was able to proffer, it was clearly either too little or too late to make much difference.
Q2: How does the failure of Venezuelan air defense impact the already tarnished reputation of Russian weapons?
A2: Russian equipment comprises the backbone of Venezuela’s air defense system. In particular, Venezuela’s Buk-M2E medium-range and S-300 long-range anti-air systems were heralded as its best hope against U.S. airpower. Ultimately, not a single one of the more than 150 U.S. aircraft employed in Operation Absolute Resolve was lost, although one MH-47 Chinook was reportedly damaged by gunfire, and the pilot was struck three times in the leg. The failure of Venezuelan air defenses certainly reflects poorly on the reputation of Russian hardware, especially when coupled with the failure of similar systems in Iran. The emerging picture is that these systems can handle low and medium threats, such as those presented in Ukraine, but not the most challenging attacks. The United States used kinetic attacks that integrated high-speed anti-radiation missiles, electronic jamming, and possibly cyberattacks.
The most important element of any air defense system remains the people who operate it. In the case of the Venezuelan armed forces, technical overmatch by the United States, combined with institutional rot, contributed to the disastrous performance witnessed on January 3. Years of corruption, abuse, and coup-proofing efforts in Venezuela have resulted in a fighting force that is profoundly unprepared for combat against another military, let alone an opponent like the United States. Poor maintenance always meant that it was an open question as to how many of Venezuela’s air defense platforms were actually operational the night of Operation Absolute Resolve. Post-mortem analyses have highlighted, for instance, that Venezuela’s S-300s may even be out of commission entirely. Satellite imagery analysis from CSIS also highlighted serious inadequacies in the Venezuelan military’s preparation. Air defense systems were notably left exposed and uncamouflaged in open terrain where they could be identified and struck with precision by U.S. pilots.
Russian military doctrine emphasizes a layering of air defense capabilities, with short- and medium-range systems deployed to provide overlapping protection for longer-range systems like the S-300 and S-400. Venezuela had the elements of such a system but was unable to make it operate coherently. Furthermore, U.S. forces in Operation Absolute Resolve exploited the natural geography of Caracas, which is situated at the base of a coastal mountain range. The mountains and hills surrounding Caracas could have prevented air defense radars outside from “looking in” and targeting the low-flying aircraft inside the city. Venezuela’s use of Chinese air detection radars might have also caused interoperability problems if the Venezuelan armed forces were unable to effectively network them with Russian-made systems.
Finally, lessons learned from the war in Ukraine also had a hand in the defeat of Venezuela’s Russian air defense network. Over the course of nearly four years of high-intensity conflict, Ukrainian forces and their U.S. partners have had the opportunity to gather extensive data on the emissions signatures of Russian air defenses like the S-300 and Buk. This almost certainly helped U.S. force planners draw up plans to identify weaknesses and design electronic warfare countermeasures for those same systems in Venezuela.
Although several factors beyond equipment quality contributed to the failure of Venezuela’s air defenses, Operation Absolute Resolve could prompt other countries in the Americas to turn away from Russian arms. This could drive opportunities for new arms suppliers as countries look to replace and upgrade legacy Russian and Soviet systems in their arsenals. Ecuador, for instance, boasts at least a half dozen 9K33 Osa short-range air defense systems, which it previously sought to offload only to reverse course in the face of Russian pressure, while Colombia has struggled to keep up its fleet of Mi-17 helicopters without Russian spare parts and maintenance assistance.
China could be positioned to emerge as a winner in the hunt to replace Russian kit. While Venezuela also purchased significant amounts of military equipment from China, including air defense radars that also reportedly failed to detect incoming U.S. forces in Operation Absolute Resolve, the past year of conflict has seen Chinese equipment emerge as a compelling option for countries still looking for low-cost gear with few strings attached. Clashes between India and Pakistan in early 2025 were seen as an important test for Chinese arms, including the HQ-9 air defense system and J-10 fighter jet, which were reportedly both employed successfully by Pakistan to shoot down Indian air force planes.
Q3: What does this mean for Russia’s larger presence in the Americas, especially for Russian allies such as Cuba and Nicaragua?
A3: Russia has historically sought to apply the Primakov doctrine in the Western Hemisphere. Named for former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, the doctrine posits that U.S. meddling in Russia’s “near abroad” is to be responded to by a reciprocal Russian presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. When the White House seeks to undermine Russia within the area it considers its own sphere of influence, escalation in the United States’ own hemisphere is a useful recourse.
In this way, anti-U.S. authoritarian regimes like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela provide convenient allies and launching points for Russian provocations in the Western Hemisphere. In the summer of 2024, for instance, Russia sailed warships to the region twice, docking in Cuba both times, as apparent retaliation for moves by the Biden administration to grant Ukraine access to long-range munitions capable of striking into Russian territory. Cuba has also been an important source of foreign fighters helping to sustain the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia continues to operate a global navigation satellite system satellite ground station in Nicaragua, which has come under scrutiny as a potential signals intelligence base.
Moscow’s ties to Havana run back for more than half a century, but historical affinities only go so far. At present, the island nation offers little of vital strategic importance to Russia. Indeed, following Operation Absolute Resolve, U.S. naval forces have maneuvered closer to Cuba, suggesting that another attempt by the Kremlin to dispatch a flotilla to the region would run into a much larger U.S. force presence than past maneuvers. But while Russia-Cuba collaboration has diminished, China is picking up the slack; previous CSIS analysis has found signs of possible Cuba-China signals intelligence cooperation targeting the United States.
Q4: What does the Venezuela raid mean for Russia’s view of the world being divided into “spheres of influence”?
A4: From Russia’s perspective, a U.S. embrace of a world order framed around spheres of influence would probably be a best-case scenario. Indeed, as early as the first Trump administration, Putin had reportedly offered a “Ukraine for Venezuela” trade, wherein Russia would relinquish its support for Maduro in exchange for the United States dropping its backing of Ukraine. The fact that the United States moved forward with the ousting of Maduro without pursuing this deal is likely a setback for the Kremlin, however, suggesting that the United States does not view Russia as an equal partner in the management of hemispheric affairs. Simply put, Washington did not have to trade Kyiv for Caracas.
Russia has sought to fan the flames of the Trump-NATO split over Greenland, amplifying statements by the U.S. president suggesting the use of force to claim the Danish territory. Likewise, outlets like RT have highlighted Mexico’s role as the primary supplier of oil to Cuba, ahead of even Venezuela, an approach likely aimed at undermining U.S. relations with Mexico and inflaming demands for military action against Cuba. Recognizing that it cannot directly contest U.S. hard power in the Western Hemisphere, Russia appears to be pivoting to a strategy aimed at keeping the United States distracted at home, even as this risks being perceived as abandoning more erstwhile allies.
The biggest risk is of miscalculation. While the United States’ reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine and its “Trump Corollary” signifies a restored commitment to keeping outside adversaries away from the Western Hemisphere, it does not necessarily imply that the White House views the rest of the world as outside its purview. President Trump’s recent statements about potential military action against Iran, for instance, clearly indicate the United States remains willing to intervene in hemispheres other than its own. In this way, a Russian push to more aggressively assert its own sphere of influence might lead to greater risk-taking behavior that increases the possibility of a confrontation with NATO. To be sure, the United States is butting heads with the alliance now, but that does not mean a Russian incursion against Poland or the Baltic states would not provoke a powerful U.S. response, or even further incursions by unmanned aircraft systems over NATO airspace. A misreading of U.S. national security objectives could therefore cause Russia to unwittingly stumble over red lines, raising potential escalation risks for both countries.
Q5: What are the consequences of the United States’ oil tanker blockade?
A5: Russia’s most dramatic move in the days that followed Operation Absolute Resolve was triggered not by the capture of Maduro, but of an oil tanker. On January 9, Russia launched its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile against a power plant in Lviv. Capable of carrying a nuclear payload, Oreshnik has come to play the role of an expensive signaling mechanism for the Kremlin. Russia’s first use of the missile was in November 2024 as retaliation for the first Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory using U.S.-supplied ATACMS missiles. As before, Oreshnik was intended to send a message, this time likely in response to the U.S. seizure of the sanctioned oil tanker Marinera (formerly known as Bella-1), which had claimed Russian registration as it led the U.S. Navy on a mad dash from the coast of Venezuela to the North Atlantic.
This response from Russia is understandable, as perhaps the most concerning implication for Russia of the United States’ Venezuela policy has been efforts to enforce a quasi-blockade of sanctioned oil tankers. Both Venezuela and Russia rely on a shadowy fleet of oil tankers operating outside of international maritime regulation and often under false flags to move their sanctioned crude to consumers. On December 16, 2025, President Trump announced a “complete blockade” of sanctioned tankers in Venezuela. The week before, U.S. forces in the southern Caribbean had already seized the Skipper, an oil tanker sanctioned for its role transporting Iranian crude and owned by a shadowy Russian magnate skilled in shadow fleet operations.
For the time being, U.S. enforcement efforts appear to be constrained to the coast of Venezuela, but the ongoing quarantine of tankers could provide a template for future operations intended to squeeze Russia. If these moves signify a broader U.S. effort to combat the estimated 1,000 tankers that belong to the global shadow fleet, Russia’s oil revenues could come under immense pressure. Furthermore, U.S. action against sanctioned tankers could spur European powers into action as well. The United Kingdom, for instance, aided U.S. efforts to capture the Marinera and pledged to bolster interdiction efforts going forward. Deterring the expansion of tanker seizures, therefore, surely ranks as a top priority for Russia and possibly a new source of leverage for the United States in ongoing negotiations over a ceasefire in Ukraine.
Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.