Summary and Key Points: A new investigation argues China is supplying much of the manufacturing equipment and sensitive components Russia needs to sustain weapons production for its war in Ukraine.
-The reporting links Chinese machine tools and electronics to everything from drones and cruise missiles to the nuclear-capable Oreshnik system, which some analysts describe as a reworked RS-26 design rather than a clean-sheet weapon.
Capt. Michael Terry, 36th Fighter Squadron F-16 pilot, prepares to launch at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, July 9, 2020. The 36th Aircraft Maintenance Unit and the flight line operators wokred to make this aircraft mission-capable after being grounded for 186 days. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Noah Sudolcan)
-Ukrainian forensic examination of recovered missile sections is cited as evidence of older component dates.
-The supply list includes microchips, bearings, piezoelectric crystals, telescopic sights, and test instruments, with routes increasingly obscured via third countries and intermediaries.
China’s $10.3 Billion Supply Chain Keeping Russia’s War Machine Running
An investigation by the London Daily Telegraph found that China has almost single-handedly provided the manufacturing equipment and technology that Russia’s defense industry needs to sustain its war against Ukraine.
This hardware runs from the moderately sophisticated electronic components used in Shahed drones and cruise missiles to the tools needed to help Russia build its nuclear-capable Oreshnik hypersonic missile.
The Oreshnik is the same missile Russian President Vladimir Putin regularly uses to threaten the West. Earlier in January, Russia fired the 8,000-mile-per-hour Oreshnik at the western Ukrainian city of Lviv. It impacted just 40 miles from the Polish border.
Russian Mobile ICBMs. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Russian Mobile ICBMs. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The design of the Oreshnik has been a subject of some detailed investigations in recent months. Russia claims it is a brand-new, state-of-the-art hypersonic ballistic missile, but U.S. Department of Defense technical-intelligence analysts say it is little more than a reconfigured variant of Russia’s RS-26 Rubezh missile.
The RS-26 is an older intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) design that began testing in 2011. Some assessments are that it contains no more than 10 percent new components—making it a textbook example of the old Soviet weapon-development practice.
In many weapon systems, a new design is simply an evolutionary upgrade of an older model. This contrasts with the Western approach of groundbreaking “clean sheet” designs that are near-complete breaks with previous-generation technology.
Examination of unexploded sections of the missile by the Kyiv Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise show the Oreshnik is anything but a new design. One component that was analyzed by the institute’s team of experts dates back to 2017. Another section of the system that was discovered inside one of the missile’s warheads was manufactured in 2016.
The first test-launch of this missile dates back to 2012, and its development began two decades ago, in 2006. That missile in turn was based on the 1990s-era Topol-M ICBM. But the same Ukrainian investigators still rate it as a threat to the West.
Machine Tools
The Telegraph’s research found that Russia has expanded production of the missile’s warheads since the war began in 2022, and that most of the machine tools that have been supplied to Moscow’s defense industrial sector have come from China.
Those shipments are reportedly part of the $10.3 billion-worth of technology and advanced equipment Telegraph investigators identified as having been sent to Moscow by Beijing, in violation of international sanctions.
If the reporting is accurate, the machinery China has sent to Russia is key to Moscow’s increasing weapons manufacturing. Despite the danger of falling under secondary sanctions, China has sent billions of dollars’-worth of the components Moscow requires to turn out precision-guided weapons and fighter aircraft, according to the Telegraph.
These are components that can either not be produced in Russia or that local industry cannot turn out in the required numbers.
It Comes From China
Sanctions cover 50 commonly produced items that are high priorities for the Russian defense industry. These components are produced in 39 countries, including the UK and US, that have previously agreed to banning their export to Moscow.
But as Ukrainian defense industry specialists explained to the Telegraph, “all of these components are getting into the Russians’ hands anyway—and in sizeable numbers.”
China never agreed to abide by the Western sanctions regime. In these past years, Beijing has supplied microchips and memory boards to Russian military enterprises. These components are the key to Russia’s production of precision-guided weapons and Sukhoi fighter aircraft, according to Import Genius, a U.S. trade-data analysis company that supported the Telegraph investigation.
Other key items from China include ball bearings, which carry loads, reduce friction, and allow movement, making them vital for the construction of aircraft and other vehicles. In the first three years of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China delivered at least $3.1 billion of machine tools to Moscow, according to the report.
T-14 Armata Tank from Russia. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Tu-160 Bomber from Russia. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Beijing has also sent at least $97m of mounted piezoelectric crystals, according to the report—these are used in the production of radar and electronic warfare systems—and $42 million-worth of telescopic sights that can be fitted to kinetic weapons.
“One thing that has dogged the Russian defense industry is the speed of production. A lot of their factories are very old-fashioned—they don’t produce aircraft or engines very quickly or very well,” said Nick Reynolds, a research fellow the Royal United Services Institute, a UK defense think tank that has conducted numerous in-depth assessments of the Ukraine war. “That’s why you’re seeing imports being of such high importance,” he said. “The Chinese manufacturing ecosystem is leaps and bounds ahead of the Russian manufacturing sector.”
Beijing is also reportedly sending key testing instruments, such as multimeters and oscilloscopes.
“These are used to check that weapons and microelectronics are working effectively and efficiently,” says the Telegraph. “They can ensure electronic warfare systems and radars are functioning appropriately and that microchips in drones will process, store and transmit data collected.”
A 2025 Telegraph investigation found that Chinese companies directly supplied at least $55 million-worth of parts and materials to Russia’s wartime drone industry from 2023 to 2024. This was a period during which Moscow was creating large-scale logistics infrastructure for its domestic drone programme.
These monetary figures, despite being high, remain an underestimate. Neither Beijing nor Moscow gives transparent reports on trade and customs data. An increasing number of shipments are going to Belarus and other third countries that import and then re-export to Russia.
“Capturing the full scale of shipments of sensitive goods between China and Russia is increasingly difficult because of routes, shell companies and intermediary logistics companies used by shippers to evade detection,” said William George, director of research at Import Genius.
About the Author: Reuben F. Johnson
Reuben F. Johnson has thirty-six years of experience analyzing and reporting on foreign weapons systems, defense technologies, and international arms export policy. Johnson is the Director of Research at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation. He is also a survivor of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. He worked for years in the American defense industry as a foreign technology analyst and later as a consultant for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Departments of the Navy and Air Force, and the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia. In 2022-2023, he won two awards in a row for his defense reporting. He holds a bachelor’s degree from DePauw University and a master’s degree from Miami University in Ohio, specializing in Soviet and Russian studies. He lives in Warsaw.