Trump’s gamble with Iran

[Nikos Mitroussias/InTime News]

It isn’t clear whether the rising tension between the United States and Iran will lead to war. The US forces that have gathered in the region, though, provide Donald Trump with many options. No one can safely predict what will follow any kind of clash, as this will depend on whether the Iranian regime survives, whether it falls, and whether clashes break out across the country. 

The consequences, in any case, will be felt not only in Iran but throughout the Middle East and beyond. Russia and China are among many countries that will be affected, to a greater or lesser extent. 

What does Trump want? His priority always is that he look good – which is confirmed by the official White House account posting clumsy AI-generated images of him as a hero, trying to fuse his image with that of US military power. The successful kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro provided the American president with a victory that he would like to repeat. 

Kidnapping the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, though, would be far more difficult. Killing Khamenei would be easier, but it is not certain that the United States and their allies (notably Israel) would know where to find him. To avoid the possibility of failure, Trump might choose to hit symbolic targets, to weaken the regime and encourage the rebellious Iranians. But after so much suppression, it is difficult to know whether the rebels have the resources, strength and organization to take to the streets again. An important intervention by the United States would be to destroy the regime’s communications systems while providing satellite services to citizens, so that they can organize and also show the world what is happening. Trump may also simply try to use the threat of force to push Tehran into making concessions. But if the regime cannot accept his terms, the American president will have to do something, so as not to appear to be backing down. 

The United States and Israel may want an Iran that is no longer powerful in the region, but this worries other countries. Turkey is one of those pressing Washington not to attack militarily. For Ankara, the Iranian regime’s survival would rule out instability and the possibility of Iran’s Kurds gaining autonomy. Also, the installation of a pro-US government in Tehran would deprive Ankara of some of its “usefulness” as a US ally and, in addition, would end the profitable cooperation with Iran in breaking international sanctions. For Russia, losing the supply of military equipment from Iran would be a substantial blow (something that Trump has not seemed willing to attempt, so far). For China, Iran is not greatly important, aside from being a supplier of some of its energy needs. But China’s leadership would probably not want the world to see that a popular uprising could topple a well-established regime. On the other hand, the longer the United States is focused on the Gulf, the less they will be doing in China’s region.

A crucial aspect of the whole issue is whether the outcome will be seen as a victory for Trump or a reversal. This will be decisive for America’s relationship with its allies, as well as affecting its president’s actions at home and across the globe.