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Réalisation Le Lab Le Diplo
By François Souty
Over the past decade, the regulation of large digital platforms has emerged as one of the major challenges of competition law and, more broadly, of European Union economic law. This awareness is part of a broader context of reflection on competitiveness, economic sovereignty and the Union’s ability to influence the global digital transformation, recently summarised at the highest political level in the report submitted by Mario Draghi on the future of European competitiveness.[1] By emphasizing the strategic nature of digital technology, data and technological infrastructures, this report sets a general framework in which the regulation of digital markets no longer appears as a simple technical issue, but as a structuring issue of economic and normative power.[2]
The emergence of markets characterised by powerful network effects, massive data accumulation, high costs of change and high vertical integration has gradually highlighted the structural limits of traditional antitrust law instruments compared to the strategies of large digital companies.[3] In this context, the European authorities have been confronted with a growing tension between, on the one hand, the need for legal certainty and compliance with the fundamental principles of competition law and, on the other hand, the need for faster and more effective intervention in order to preserve the contestability of digital markets.
For a long time, EU competition law, based on Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, was the central tool for regulating the behaviour of dominant companies. However, the ex post application of these provisions, based on complex economic analyses and often lengthy procedures, has proved insufficient to capture practices whose anticompetitive effects unfold at a speed incompatible with the traditional jurisdictional rhythm.[4] The major cases targeting the main digital players have thus illustrated a growing gap between the temporality of the law and that of digital markets, leading some legal writers to evoke a real « crisis of effectiveness » of competition law in the face of platforms⁴.[5]
It is precisely this observation that the European Union has sought to overcome by adopting a more integrated approach, where competition law now explicitly dialogues with the objectives of industrial policy and digital transformation. In this regard, the Draghi report stresses the need for the Union to equip itself with legal instruments capable of structuring digital markets upstream, in order to avoid situations of long-term dependence and technological lock-in.[6] The Digital Markets Act is fully in line with this logic, by legally translating a broader strategic ambition to regain Europe’s capacity for action in the digital economy.
Adopted in the form of Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) thus marks a normative paradigm shift. In contrast to the traditional antitrust approach, it establishes a set of obligations and prohibitions applicable ex ante to certain undertakings designated as gatekeepers, irrespective of the prior demonstration of an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.[7] It is less a question of sanctioning past behaviour than of preventing, upstream, the emergence of practices likely to permanently lock in digital markets.
The DMA is nevertheless part of a legal continuity that should not be underestimated. Far from constituting a total break with competition law, it is presented as a complementary instrument, designed to compensate for the inadequacies of a legal framework deemed unsuited to the structural specificities of the digital economy.[8] However, this delicate articulation between ex ante sectoral regulation and ex post competition law raises fundamental questions about the coherence of the EU legal order, the increased role of the European Commission in the application of economic law, as well as the procedural guarantees offered to the companies concerned.
Beyond its strictly legal implications, the DMA also has an assumed strategic and geopolitical dimension. By targeting companies, most of which have their headquarters outside the territory of the Union, mainly in the United States but also, increasingly, in China, the regulation is part of a broader dynamic of projecting European normative power.[9] However, this dimension cannot be reduced to a protectionist or discriminatory logic: the DMA is based on legally neutral criteria applicable to any company that meets the conditions set out in the text, regardless of its nationality. The international perception of this regulation, as well as its concrete effects on transatlantic and Euro-Asian economic relations, is therefore a central issue in its evaluation.
Therefore, the question that arises is not only whether the DMA complies with the fundamental principles of EU law, but also whether it is actually effective as an instrument for regulating digital markets and its impact on the international economic and strategic balance. This article proposes to analyze the Digital Markets Act as a hybrid legal object, at the crossroads of competition law, economic regulation and European normative strategy.
I. The Digital Markets Act: genesis, legal foundations and methodological break
The adoption of the Digital Markets Act is part of a relatively long doctrinal and institutional maturation process, marked by a gradual questioning of the ability of traditional competition law to effectively regulate digital markets.
A. The drafting of the Digital Markets Act : the inadequacy of traditional antitrust law
As early as the second half of the 2010s, the European Commission, national competition authorities and a growing number of legal writers highlighted the difficulties encountered in applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to markets characterised by high concentration, rapid innovation and cumulative network effects.[10]
The major decisions made against certain major digital players have played a catalytic role in this awareness. While these cases have clarified certain concepts — in particular in relation to abuse of dominance related to data or self-preference — they have also highlighted the structural limits of ex post intervention. The particularly long delays between the opening of proceedings and the adoption of final decisions have often led to a paradoxical situation in which the market had already evolved irreversibly at the time of the sanction.[11]
It is in this context that the idea emerged that digital markets have specific structural characteristics that justify upstream intervention. The report submitted to the European Commission in 2019 by Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and Heike Schweitzer was, in this respect, a decisive turning point, which was little noticed or commented on in the Member States.[12] By identifying the risks of « tipping » digital markets and the difficulty of restoring effective competition once these markets are locked, this report has provided a solid intellectual basis for the development of a new legal instrument distinct from traditional antitrust law.
However, the development of the DMA cannot be reduced to a simple technocratic response to difficulties in the application of existing law. It is also part of an institutional context marked by a strong desire on the part of the European Commission to strengthen its role in the regulation of the major digital platforms, at the crossroads of competition law, sectoral regulation and industrial policy.[13] This dynamic largely explains the choice of a directly applicable regulation, conferring on the Commission extensive powers both in terms of designating the companies concerned and monitoring the implementation of the obligations laid down in the text.
B. The Legal Objectives of the DMA: Contestability and Fairness as Guiding Principles
The Digital Markets Act is based on two objectives explicitly stated by the European legislator: to guarantee the contestability of digital markets and to ensure their fairness.[14] These concepts, although close to certain traditional purposes of competition law, differ from them in their scope and the way in which they are implemented.
Contestability, within the meaning of the DMA, does not refer to a theoretical economic analysis of perfectly open markets, but to a pragmatic requirement aimed at preventing practices that are likely to permanently foreclose access to digital markets. It is based on the idea that certain undertakings, by virtue of their structural position, are in a position to impose conditions of access or use which neutralise any potential competition, irrespective of the existence of an abuse in the traditional sense of the term.[15]
Equity, on the other hand, is a more innovative and controversial concept. While competition law traditionally focuses on the protection of the competitive process and, indirectly, the well-being of the consumer, the DMA introduces a broader normative logic, aimed at framing the contractual relations between gatekeepers and user companies. This approach is similar, according to some legal writers, to a form of regulation of structural imbalances of economic power, located at the border between competition law and regulatory law.[16]
These two objectives reflect a significant shift in European legal reasoning. Where traditional antitrust law requires the demonstration of concrete anticompetitive effects, the DMA operates on the basis of presumptive reasoning: certain practices are deemed to be inherently detrimental to the contestability and fairness of digital markets, thus justifying their prohibition or ex ante regulation.
C. The DMA as an autonomous instrument of European Union law
From a legal point of view, the DMA is an autonomous instrument, distinct from both competition law and traditional sectoral regimes. Adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, it pursues the objective of harmonising the internal market, avoiding regulatory fragmentation resulting from national initiatives to regulate digital platforms.[17]
This legal basis is not neutral. It testifies to the European legislator’s desire to include the DMA in the field of internal market law rather than in the more contentious field of competition law. That choice gives the regulation a general and abstract scope, while limiting, in principle, the margin of intervention of the Member States in this area.
The autonomous nature of the DMA is also manifested by its mode of application. The appointment of gatekeepers is based on quantitative and qualitative criteria defined by the Regulation, conferring a significant discretion on the Commission. Once that designation has been made, the obligations laid down in Articles 5 to 7 of the DMA apply directly, without it being necessary to demonstrate an individual infringement of competition law.[18]
However, this legal architecture raises questions about the institutional balance and procedural guarantees. By combining the functions of identifying the companies concerned, monitoring compliance and sanctioning, the European Commission’s role has been substantially strengthened, giving rise to doctrinal debates on the concentration of powers and respect for the rights of the defence.[19]
D. An assumed methodological break with traditional competition law
The main originality of the DMA lies in the methodological break it makes with traditional competition law. While the latter is based on an individualised analysis of behaviour and its effects on the market, the DMA adopts a standardised normative logic, based on general obligations applicable to a specific category of companies.
This break is reflected in a shift in the centre of gravity of legal reasoning: ex post economic analysis gives way to ex ante regulation based on presumptions. While this approach has the advantage of greater speed and predictability, it also raises the question of its suitability for the diversity of business models and markets involved.[20]
Legal writers have thus questioned the risk of weakening the principle of proportionality, which is traditionally central to EU law. By imposing uniform obligations on companies with sometimes very different activities, the DMA could generate unanticipated economic effects, or even counterproductive from the point of view of innovation.[21]
The fact remains that this methodological break appears, in the eyes of the European legislator, to be a necessary response to the inadequacy of existing legal instruments. The DMA is thus presented as an ambitious attempt to partially overhaul EU economic law, the scope and limits of which can only be assessed in the light of its concrete implementation.
E. The articulation of the DMA with Article 102 TFEU: normative complementarity or problematic duplication?
One of the most sensitive legal issues raised by the Digital Markets Act concerns its articulation with Article 102 TFEU and, more broadly, with the traditional system for controlling abuses of dominant position. Although the European legislator has taken care to affirm the complementary nature of the DMA in relation to pre-existing competition law, this coexistence nevertheless raises profound doctrinal questions as to the coherence of the EU legal order.[22]
Formally, the DMA does not replace Article 102 TFEU. The Regulation explicitly states that its application is ‘without prejudice’ to competition law, thus leaving intact the possibility for the Commission or national authorities to pursue anticompetitive conduct on the basis of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This statement of principle aims to avoid any questioning of the existing antitrust architecture, while introducing a new ex ante regulatory instrument.[23]
However, this displayed complementarity masks a more profound transformation of legal reasoning. Whereas Article 102 TFEU is based on an individualised analysis of the dominant position, the conduct complained of and its anticompetitive effects, the DMA proceeds by prior categorisation of undertakings and by normative presumptions. Certain practices, such as self-preference or hindering interoperability, are thus regulated or prohibited independently of any analysis of effects, as long as they are implemented by a gatekeeper.[24]
This superimposition of instruments is not without consequences. From a doctrinal point of view, it leads to a relative weakening of the centrality of Article 102 TFEU in the regulation of dominant digital companies. As several authors have pointed out, the DMA tends to shift the focus of regulation from antitrust litigation to a more administrative and normative model, in which the Commission acts primarily as a regulator rather than a prosecuting authority.[25] This move raises the question of maintaining effective judicial review, in particular with regard to the principle of proportionality and the rights of the defence.
Moreover, the relationship between DMA and Article 102 TFEU raises the question of the risk of double intervention. The same practice could, in theory, fall under both a breach of the ex ante obligations laid down by the DMA and constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of competition law. While the European legislator has sought to prevent a double formal penalty, the coexistence of parallel procedures could nevertheless increase legal uncertainty for the companies concerned.[26]
Finally, this articulation reveals a more general evolution of EU economic law towards a hybrid model, in which the traditional distinction between sectoral regulation and competition law tends to blur. The DMA thus appears to be a normative laboratory, likely to influence, in the long term, the very interpretation of Article 102 TFEU and the European conception of economic dominance in digital markets.[27] This doctrinal evolution largely explains the importance given to the concrete implementation of the DMA, which is now the main field of observation of the real effectiveness of this new legal instrument.
II. The implementation of the Digital Markets Act: mechanisms, actors and first effects
The implementation of the Digital Markets Act is based, first and foremost, on the designation of qualified companies as gatekeepers , from which the implementation is derived, with a new role entrusted to the European Commission, a role that has been underemphasized until now in France in particular, from which the first concrete applications have resulted.
A. The designation of gatekeepers: a structuring legal construction
This stage of designating gatekeepers is indeed the pivot of the regulatory system, insofar as all the obligations provided for by the DMA only apply to companies that have crossed this legal threshold. The European legislator has opted for a combination of quantitative and qualitative criteria to identify companies with a role in controlling access to digital markets.[28]
The quantitative criteria, set out in Article 3 of the DMA, are mainly based on Union turnover, market capitalisation and the number of end-users and professionals. These thresholds were designed as rebuttable presumptions, allowing the Commission to make a rapid designation while leaving a margin of challenge to the companies concerned.[29] This approach aims to reconcile administrative efficiency and legal certainty, avoiding lengthy and complex economic analyses from the qualification phase.
However, the appointment of gatekeepers is not limited to the mechanical application of numerical thresholds. The DMA gives the Commission substantial discretion to assess the sustainability of the company’s position and its structural role in digital markets. This qualitative dimension introduces a certain flexibility, but also a risk of legal uncertainty, insofar as it is based on relatively open legal concepts.[30]
It should be noted that, contrary to some initial criticisms, the personal scope of the DMA is not formally limited to US companies. While the first designations have mainly concerned players established in the United States, the text is legally neutral and likely to apply to any company, including Chinese, that meets the criteria defined by the regulation. This formal neutrality plays an important role in the DMA’s defense against accusations of discrimination or disguised protectionism.[31]
B. The obligations and prohibitions provided for by the DMA: normative logic and difficulties of application
Once designated, gatekeepers are subject to a set of obligations and prohibitions set out primarily in Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the DMA. These provisions reflect the ex ante logic of the regulation: certain practices are considered to be intrinsically harmful to the contestability or fairness of digital markets and must, as such, be regulated or prohibited regardless of any analysis of effects.
The obligations provided for in Article 5, which are directly applicable and not subject to specification, concern in particular the prohibition of combining certain personal data without consent or the obligation to allow business users to offer their offers outside the gatekeeper‘s platform. These rules reflect a desire to immediately rebalance contractual relations, but their rigid nature has raised questions about their adaptability to the diversity of economic models.[32]
The obligations in Article 6, on the other hand, leave the Commission a margin of specification. They concern more complex areas, such as the interoperability of services, access to data generated by the activity of business users or the prohibition of self-preference. This distinction between directly applicable obligations and obligations that can be specified gives the Commission a central role in the concrete definition of the requirements imposed on gatekeepers.[33]
Finally, Article 7 of the DMA introduces specific obligations regarding the interoperability of interpersonal communications services, illustrating the legislator’s desire to act on particularly sensitive segments from the point of view of network effects. While these provisions are often presented as favourable to innovation and competition, their technical implementation raises considerable practical difficulties, likely to slow down their real effectiveness.[34]
C. The role of the European Commission: towards a quasi-sectoral regulator of platforms
The implementation of the DMA enshrines an unprecedented strengthening of the role of the European Commission in the regulation of digital markets. In addition to its traditional functions in the field of competition, the Commission now exercises powers that are similar to those of a sectoral regulator, combining powers of investigation, decision, normative specification and sanction.[35]
This institutional strengthening is manifested in particular in the regulatory dialogue procedure established between the Commission and the gatekeepers. As part of this procedure, companies are invited to propose compliance measures, which can be accepted, amended or rejected by the Commission. This mechanism aims to ensure flexibility in the application of the regulation, while maintaining close control by the European authority.[36]
However, this increased role is not without criticism. Several authors have highlighted the risk of an excessive concentration of powers in the hands of the Commission, which could weaken the institutional balance and the procedural guarantees provided for by EU law. The question of judicial review of decisions taken in the context of the DMA is, in that regard, of particular importance, in so far as the hybrid nature of those decisions complicates their legal classification.[37]
In addition, the Commission’s operational capacity to take on this enhanced role is a central issue. The effective implementation of the DMA requires high-level technical, economic and legal expertise, as well as close coordination with national authorities. The structural limits of this administrative capacity could, in the long term, affect the effectiveness of the system.
D. First observable effects and emerging litigation
The first effects of the implementation of the DMA are mainly reflected in contractual and technical adjustments made by the designated gatekeepers. These adjustments include platform access conditions, app store rules, ranking practices and the use of data. While these developments show that new bonds have been taken into account seriously, their real impact on market contestability remains difficult to assess at this stage.[38]
At the same time, the implementation of the DMA has given rise to the emergence of litigation, both before the Courts of the European Union and in the context of administrative procedures initiated by the Commission. Those disputes concern, inter alia, the legality of the designation decisions, the scope of the obligations imposed and compliance with the general principles of EU law. They constitute a privileged field of observation for assessing the legal soundness of the system.[39]
It should be stressed, however, that the evaluation of the practical results of the DMA cannot be limited to a short-term analysis. The ex-ante logic of the regulation implies that its effects unfold over a longer time horizon, as markets adapt to new regulatory constraints. This specific temporality invites a cautious analysis, avoiding both excessive enthusiasm and premature skepticism.[40]
E. The implementation of the DMA and the complementary action of national competition authorities: towards a multilevel European regulation
While the Digital Markets Act entrusts the European Commission with a central and exclusive role in the appointment of gatekeepers and in the application of the ex ante obligations provided for in the regulation, this centralisation does not mean a complete marginalisation of national competition authorities. On the contrary, the effective implementation of the DMA is part of a multi-level institutional environment, in which the Commission’s action is called upon to be deployed in complementarity with that of the national authorities, in particular in Member States with strengthened national instruments for the regulation of digital platforms.[41]
This complementarity is based, in the first place, on a functional distinction between the respective fields of intervention. While the DMA is applied uniformly and centrally at EU level, national authorities retain their competence to apply national competition law, including in relation to large digital undertakings, as long as the conduct in question does not fall exclusively within the scope of the obligations laid down in the Regulation. This normative coexistence makes it possible to maintain a high level of competitive vigilance, in particular on markets or practices that partially fall outside the scope of the DMA.[42]
Germany is a particularly emblematic example in this respect. The reform of the Act against Restrictions of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB), and in particular the introduction of Section 19a, provided the Bundeskartellamt with an ex-ante tool for companies of « paramount importance for competition in several markets ». This instrument, which predates the entry into force of the DMA, has enabled the German authority to develop specific expertise in the regulation of large digital platforms. The relationship between Article 19a GWB and the DMA is now based on a logic of complementarity: when the DMA applies, it takes precedence as EU law, but the experience and action of the Bundeskartellamt continue to play an essential role in identifying problematic practices and in feeding the regulatory dialogue at European level.[43]
France is part of a similar dynamic, although based on different legal instruments. The Competition Authority, without having an ex ante mechanism equivalent to Article 19a GWB, has developed a dense decision-making and advisory practice in the field of digital platforms, based on a dynamic interpretation of competition law and on a close dialogue with the European Commission. The sector inquiries, opinions and decisions issued by the French Authority have contributed to European reflection on the structural imbalances of digital markets and continue to support the implementation of the DMA, in particular through institutional cooperation and the exchange of information.[44]
Finally, Italy illustrates a more pragmatic approach, based on an active application of national competition law and on a strategic use of existing tools to regulate the practices of large platforms. The Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM) has distinguished itself with several significant decisions targeting major digital companies, demonstrating the ability of national authorities to act in a complementary manner to the DMA, in particular when the practices in question have localised or specific effects on the national market.[45]
This articulation between the Commission and the national authorities contributes to strengthening the overall effectiveness of the European regulation of digital platforms. It makes it possible to overcome certain structural limitations of the centralised application of the DMA, particularly in terms of administrative capacities and detailed knowledge of local markets. However, this multi-level regulation is not without tensions. The risk of divergences of approach, procedural overlaps or legal uncertainty remains, particularly in a context where the boundaries between ex ante regulation and competition law enforcement remain shifting.
Ultimately, the complementarity between the European Commission and national authorities appears to be a key factor in the effectiveness of the DMA, while constituting an institutional laboratory for the future development of European competition law. It is precisely this dynamic, which is both cooperative and potentially conflictual, that gives the implementation of the DMA a scope that goes far beyond the strict framework of EU law, and that prepares it to be placed in a global economic and strategic context.[46]
III. The Digital Markets Act in the International Economic Order: Scope, Comparisons and Limits of Effectiveness
The comparison between the European approach embodied by the Digital Markets Act and the American model is a necessary step in any serious analysis of the regulation of digital markets. But it is particularly interesting and important to relate the case of the EU with the Chinese model and the models of Japan and South Korea which differ from both China and the United States, with a potential approximation of the principles of the European system at the level of the EU as well as that of the Member States.
A. The Digital Markets Act versus the American model: between renewed antitrust and rejection of ex ante regulation
It highlights not only profound legal differences, but also divergent conceptions of the role of law in the organization of markets and in the relationship between the State and enterprises.
In the United States, the regulation of large platforms remains fundamentally anchored in the framework of traditional antitrust law, such as the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Despite a notable revival of activism by the Federal Trade Commission(FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in recent years, particularly under the influence of the so-called neo-Brandeisian current, the American approach remains essentially ex post and contentious.[47] The actions taken against certain large platforms are based on analyses of abuse of market power or exclusionary practices, requiring the demonstration of concrete anticompetitive effects.
Unlike the DMA, the ex ante regulatory proposals in the United States have not, at this stage, led to the adoption of a comparable federal framework. Legislative projects aimed at imposing structural obligations on large platforms have met with significant political resistance, linked as much to the American legal tradition as to the fear of hindering innovation.[48] This lack of ex ante regulation gives the American model greater flexibility, but at the cost of increased legal uncertainty and structural slowness in the correction of market imbalances.
In this context, the DMA appears, from the American point of view, to be an intrusive and potentially discriminatory approach. However, this perception only stands up imperfectly to legal analysis. The DMA is based on formally neutral criteria and applies regardless of the nationality of the companies concerned. The over-representation of US companies among the designated gatekeepers reflects above all the reality of the structure of global digital markets, and not a protectionist intention on the part of the European legislator.[49]
This transatlantic divergence reveals a deeper difference in legal philosophy: where the United States favours regulation through litigation and sanctions, the European Union assumes a logic of prevention and normative structuring of markets. This difference is one of the main factors of tension in transatlantic economic relations, while strengthening the Union’s role as a standard-setting laboratory in terms of digital regulation.[50]
B. The Digital Markets Act and the Chinese model: state regulation and platform discipline
The comparison with China highlights an even more marked contrast. Since the early 2020s, the Chinese authorities have engaged in particularly strong regulation of large national digital platforms, based on enhanced enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), but also on direct administrative intervention by the state.[51]
At first glance, certain similarities can be observed between the DMA and the Chinese regulation of platforms: ex ante intervention, strict supervision of certain practices, desire to prevent market foreclosure situations. However, these similarities are largely superficial. Chinese regulation is part of a fundamentally different logic, where the discipline of platforms responds as much to competition objectives as to considerations of political control, social stability and industrial strategy.[52]
Unlike the DMA, Chinese regulation is not based on a stable and predictable normative framework comparable to that of EU law. Decisions against large Chinese platforms are often a matter of discretionary intervention by the authorities, in a context where procedural safeguards and judicial review are limited. This approach allows for rapid and sometimes very effective action in the short term, but at the cost of structural legal uncertainty for the companies concerned.[53]
The fact remains that the DMA is legally applicable to Chinese undertakings operating in the EU internal market, provided that they meet the criteria for designation as gatekeepers. This possibility is of particular strategic importance, in a context of the rise of Chinese digital players in certain segments of the European market. It reinforces the argument that the DMA is a universal regulatory instrument, based on access to the internal market rather than on the nationality of companies.[54]
C. The regulation of digital platforms in Japan: a hybrid model of cooperative regulation of digital platforms
The examination of the Japanese case makes it possible to introduce an intermediate approach between European normative regulation and the more discretionary state intervention observed in China. In recent years, Japan has developed a regulatory framework for digital platforms based on a close articulation between competition law, ex ante transparency instruments and a strong logic of cooperation with economic actors.[55]
Legally, Japanese regulation is mainly based on the application of the Anti-Monopoly Act (AMA), implemented by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC). Historically marked by a pragmatic and economically informed approach to competition law, the JFTC has gradually adapted its tools to the specificities of digital markets, targeting in particular practices of abuse of dominant position and imbalance in contractual relations between platforms and business users.[56] This evolution has resulted in a more dynamic interpretation of the notions of market power and unfair practices, without breaking with the traditional ex-post logic.
At the same time, Japan has adopted specific instruments to regulate large digital platforms with transparency and good conduct obligations. The Act on Improving Transparency and Fairness of Digital Platforms, which came into force in 2021, imposes obligations on certain dominant platforms to disclose information and report regularly to the competent authorities.[57] Unlike the DMA, this legislation does not provide for a detailed set of substantive ex ante obligations, but is based on a logic of enhanced soft regulation, combining administrative supervision and reputational pressure.
From an economic perspective, this approach reflects a desire to avoid overly prescriptive regulation that could hinder innovation, while correcting the structural imbalances identified in the platform economy. The Japanese model thus favours prevention through transparency and institutionalised dialogue between public authorities and companies, rather than the imposition of uniform rules applicable independently of economic models.[58] This orientation is consistent with the Japanese tradition of economic governance, based on coordination and the search for negotiated solutions.
Compared to the DMA, the Japanese framework appears less ambitious in terms of standards, but potentially more flexible and more quickly adaptable to technological developments. However, this flexibility is largely based on the goodwill of the actors concerned and on the ability of the authorities to exert effective pressure in the event of non-compliance. In this sense, the Japanese model illustrates an alternative path to the regulation of digital platforms, situated between European ex ante regulation and the essentially American litigation approach, while clearly distinguishing itself from the Chinese state logic.[59]
The analysis of the Japanese case thus highlights the lack of international convergence around a single model of regulation of digital platforms. It also underlines that the effectiveness of a legal mechanism depends closely on its inclusion in a specific institutional, economic and cultural context, reinforcing the idea that the DMA, despite its universal ambition, remains deeply rooted in the normative trajectory specific to the European Union.
D. The regulation of digital platforms in South Korea: proactive regulation and sophisticated normative instruments
South Korea is a particularly interesting example of a state that has developed sophisticated regulation of digital platforms, combining both ex ante and ex post tools, and placing digital regulation at the heart of its economic and technological strategy.[60] The country was among the first to recognise the strategic nature of digital platforms and to put in place a legal and institutional mechanism capable of monitoring and anticipating the structural imbalances generated by these actors.
Legally, South Korea’s framework is based on the Act on the Fairness of Digital Market Transactions (2021), supplemented by specific guidelines from the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), whose website is particularly well designed. This legislation imposes obligations on large platforms, depending on their size and role in the market, of interoperability, transparency in the algorithm and non-discriminatory access to data generated by their users.[61]
The Korean approach is distinguished by its combination of precise normative requirements and continuous supervision by the KFTC. Platforms must submit regular reports on their business practices, and the authority has extensive investigative powers, including to carry out sophisticated market analyses based on digital data.[62] This proactive approach allows for rapid intervention in the event of practices deemed abusive, while promoting a constant dialogue with economic actors.
From an economic and strategic perspective, South Korea aims to maintain the competitiveness of its local companies in a global digital market dominated by American and Chinese players. South Korean regulation thus seeks to avoid market foreclosure, to guarantee the contractual freedom of local SMEs and to encourage innovation, while ensuring that large platforms comply with transparency and fairness standards.[63]
Compared to the DMA, the Korean approach appears more detailed in its technical requirements and faster in its operational application, while remaining less prescriptive on certain general behavioral obligations. It illustrates a dynamic and data-driven regulation, based on the systematic collection of data and the continuous analysis of platform behavior, which allows the KFTC to adjust its interventions without waiting for serious abuses to emerge.
Finally, the Korean model highlights a strategic point for the European Union: the regulation of digital markets can be combined with advanced technical and institutional capacities, offering a counterpoint to the centralised European logic but still limited in terms of means and technical expertise.[64] It also shows that proactive regulation, when it is based on a detailed knowledge of the digital fact, can produce faster and more targeted preventive effects than the prescriptive approach alone.
E. The limits of the effectiveness of the DMA from a European perspective
While the DMA is undeniably a major legal innovation, its effectiveness cannot be presumed. Several structural limitations, specific to the European context, are already emerging and invite a nuanced evaluation of the system.
Firstly, the DMA suffers from a discrepancy between its normative ambition and the administrative capacities of the European Commission. The effective implementation of complex ex ante regulation, applicable to companies with extremely sophisticated business models, requires considerable human and technical resources. However, the concentration of competences at the European level, while promoting uniformity, also exposes the system to a risk of institutional saturation.
Secondly, the DMA operates in a context of persistent technological dependence on the European Union. In the absence of European digital champions of comparable size to those of the United States or China, ex ante regulation alone cannot compensate for the structural imbalances of the European digital ecosystem. This asymmetry limits the ability of the DMA to produce sustainable redistributive effects in favour of European actors.
Thirdly, the prescriptive and standardised nature of the obligations imposed by the DMA exposes the system to circumvention strategies. Gatekeepers have significant legal and technical resources at their disposal to formally comply with the obligations while partially neutralizing the economic effects. This dynamic, which is well known in regulatory law, raises the question of the adaptability of the DMA in the face of the rapid innovation of digital markets.[65]
Finally, the DMA is part of a geopolitical environment marked by an increasing fragmentation of digital regulations. The lack of international convergence on the principles of platform regulation limits the extraterritorial scope of the European model and increases the risk of normative conflicts. While the DMA undeniably reinforces the Union’s position as a standard-setting power, this influence remains conditioned by the attractiveness of the internal market and the Union’s ability to articulate regulation and industrial strategy.[66]
Conclusion: the DMA between European normative ambition, legal effectiveness, industrial strategy and geopolitical challenges
The Digital Markets Act is part of a pivotal moment in the construction of Europe, where digital regulation ceases to be a purely technical exercise and becomes a structuring instrument of economic policy and strategic projection. As underlined in the Draghi report when it called for a coordinated mobilisation of law, investment and industrial capacity in the face of digital transformations, the challenge is no longer just to correct market failures, but to preserve the Union’s ability to act in digital ecosystems dominated by a few global players.[67] The DMA translates this ambition into the language of law, by assuming a shift towards ex ante regulation of systemic platforms, conceived as essential infrastructures of the contemporary economy.[68] The appendices show that the Digital Markets Act is neither a simple technical instrument nor a short-term response to the excesses of the dominant platforms. The DMA is a large-scale legal experiment, revealing the European ambition to transform the law into a lever of economic sovereignty. Its success will depend less on its normative ambition than on its ability to transform itself: to move from a right to correct markets to a right to strategically organize the digital economy.
The concrete implementation of the DMA therefore confirms – without much political attention in the Member States given the very low number of scientific articles in these States – that the European Union has entered a phase of real effectiveness, marked by the rapid appointment of gatekeepers, the opening of ex officio investigations and the adoption of the first substantial financial sanctions.[69] However, this effectiveness remains progressive and institutionally demanding. The analysis of the cases shows that the real impact of the DMA will depend less on the sophistication of its obligations than on the Commission’s ability to maintain a sustained pace of implementation, to refine the interpretation of the rules in the face of evolving business models, and to coordinate its action with national competition authorities.[70] The DMA thus appears to be an institutional engineering right, the success of which is based on the combination of the standard, technical expertise and administrative capacity, underlining the geopolitical feasibility as recently observed in our article on the European Anti-Subsidy Regulation (FSR).[71]
The comparison with the antitrust actions brought in the United States sheds light on the singularity of the European choice. Where American law retains considerable theoretical power, it comes up against, in digital markets, a long litigation period and high evidentiary thresholds, limiting its operational effectiveness.[72] The DMA offers, in contrast, greater predictability and speed of intervention, at the cost of greater normative rigidity. This contrast does not reveal an intrinsic superiority of one model over the other, but two distinct conceptions of regulation: one based on ex post jurisdictional sanction, the other on the structural prevention of market imbalances.[73] In this context, the DMA does not replace traditional competition law, but redefines its articulation and priorities.
Finally, a comparative analysis with China, Japan and South Korea allows us to situate the DMA in a global geopolitics of digital law. Faced with Chinese regulation that is closely subordinated to political and industrial objectives, and to more technocratic and cooperative Asian models, the European Union is trying to assert a strategy of normative power based on the formal universality of the rules and their applicability to dominant actors, regardless of their nationality.[74] While the DMA in fact primarily targets U.S. and potentially Chinese companies, this reflects less discriminatory intent and more a structural reality of global digital markets.[75]
However, a strategic reading of the annexes confirms the diagnosis made by the Draghi report: regulation cannot constitute a substitute industrial policy.[76] The DMA corrects asymmetries of economic power and opens up competitive spaces, but it does not, on its own, create European digital champions. An evaluation of the regulation by the Commission is underway: comments to this evaluation by all economic operators should therefore be seen as a strategic opportunity : to strengthen the effectiveness of the obligations, to improve the adaptability of the framework in the face of rapid innovations — particularly in terms of artificial intelligence and data — and to articulate the regulation of platforms more explicitly with an industrial and technological strategy ambitious European Union. There is nothing to say that this opportunity will be seized by the Member States, whether they are the Executives or the Parliaments[77]
Ultimately, the Digital Markets Act should not be seen as an end point, but as a structuring step in the affirmation of the European Union as a regulatory and strategic player in the digital sector. Its success will be measured less by the severity of sanctions than by its ability to be part of a coherent project of economic sovereignty, combining law, market and public power – exactly the framework of high economic policy that the Draghi report called for.[78]
Annex 1 – Main cases of implementation of the Digital Markets Act by the European Commission
Company / caseOpening dateClosing Date / StatusPractices at issueOrigin of the investigationSolution / measure imposedObservationsAlphabet (Google)March 25, 2024OngoingAlleged non-compliance with the DMA obligations (auto-preference, interoperability, app stores)Ex officioOngoing proceedingsRisk of cumulative penalties for persistent non-complianceApple (App Store / steering)March 25, 2024Decision of 23 April 2025Restrictions on developers (no redirects to alternative offers)Ex officio€500 million fine; Compliance injunctionsFirst substantial financial penalty under DMAMeta (Facebook / Instagram)March 25, 2024Decision of 23 April 2025Consent or Pay Model and Combining DataEx officioFine €200 million; Obligation to amend the modelLitigation likely before the CourtDesignated gatekeepers (Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta, Microsoft)Jul–Sep 2023Formal designation Sep 6, 2023—Notification by companiesDesignation as gatekeepers24 Essential Platform Services (CPS)Microsoft (Bing, Edge, Advertising)2023–2024OngoingChallenging the classification of a CPSInitiative de la CommissionDecision awaitedClarification of the DMA criteriaApple (iMessage)2023–2024FencedQualification as a CPSInitiative de la CommissionService excluded from the ADM perimeterStructuring decision on the interpretation of the thresholdsApple Ads / Apple Maps2025OngoingPotential designation as a CSPNotification AppleDecision awaitedPossible extension of the scope of the DMA
Reference of the cases cited:
European Commission, Digital Markets Act: Commission opens non-compliance investigations into Alphabet, Apple and Meta, Brussels, 25 March 2024.
European Commission, Commission fines Apple for breach of the Digital Markets Act, Brussels, 23 April 2025; see also recitals relating to the « steering » obligation (Art. 5, §4 DMA).
European Commission, Commission fines Meta under the Digital Markets Act, Brussels, 23 April 2025; analysis of the « consent or pay » model in relation to Articles 5 and 6 of the DMA.
European Commission, Digital Markets Act: Commission designates six gatekeepers, Brussels, 6 September 2023; list of designated core platform services.
European Commission, Market investigation into Microsoft’s services under the DMA, Brussels, 2023–2024.
European Commission, Decision not to designate Apple iMessage as a core platform service, Brussels, 2024; restrictive interpretation of the « important gateway » criterion.
European Commission, Preliminary assessment concerning Apple Ads and Apple Maps, Brussels, 2025; ongoing proceedings under Article 3 of the DMA.
Annex 2 — Top antitrust cases involving digital platforms in the United States
Case / PartyDate of initiation of the procedureClosing Date / Current StatusPractices questionedOrigin of the investigationImposed or ongoing solution/actionAdditional notesUnited States v. Google LLC (Search Monopoly)Oct 20, 2020 (DOJ)August 5, 2024 (Judgment)Illegal dominant position in search engines and preferential agreements with Apple/mobile channelsEx officio (DOJ)Exclusive contract bans, data sharing, Chrome takedown denialImportant Judgment, Conviction for Violation of the Sherman Act, with Pending AppealUnited States v. Google LLC (AdTech)Jan 24, 2023 (DOJ)April 17, 2025 (Judgment)Monopoly in advertising technologies and abusive linking of publishers’ servers and advertising exchangesEx officio (DOJ)Recognition of an illegal monopoly; Remedial measures in discussion / appealSeparate case but related to traditional antitrust law against GoogleFTC v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (Facebook/Instagram/WhatsApp)Dec 8, 2020 (FTC)Nov. 18, 2025 (Judgment)Acquisition of allegedly anti-competitive Instagram and WhatsAppEx officio (FTC) + 46 states Judge Boasberg rejected the claims of an active legal monopoly; FTC Announces AppealLimited verdict, no dismantling or structural sanctions — referral to appeal Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC (App Store / Play Store)Oct 26, 2024 (DOJ Epic Support, Epic Initial Action 2020)Jul 31, 2025 (Confirmation of Appeal)App store monopolistic practices (prohibition of alternatives, restrictions)Epic Games (private) with DOJ/FTC support3-year injunction: opening of the Play Store and catalog sharing, coordinated restrictionsThe verdict forces Google to change its app distribution practicesUnited States v. Apple Inc. (2024 Monopolization)March 21, 2024 (DOJ+16 states)Ongoing (motions and legal debates)Monopolization or attempted monopoly of the smartphone marketEx officio (DOJ) + StatesPending proceedings, Apple’s arguments on the absence of a monopolyCombination of Concurrency Blocking Allegations (API, Messaging, Wallets)Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc. (App Store, 2021)August 2020Sep 10, 2021App Store Restrictions and In-App Purchase ProgramsEpic Games (private)Apple has not been found guilty of federal antitrust (on nine of the ten counts)An important but limited decision; Mixed impact on App Store modelFTC v. Amazon.com, Inc.Sep 26, 2023Ongoing (procedure)Anti-competitive strategies to maintain monopolization of online commerceEx officio (FTC + States) Procedure in progress; Remedies requested include behavioral restrictionsPractices denounced concern fees, sellers’ conditions and barriers to entry
Methodological Note: Data sources: The dates and elements of each proceeding are based on official announcements from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and court decisions published in U.S. federal records. Legal nature: All cases are under the Sherman Antitrust Act or the Clayton Act (US antitrust), which is separate from the Digital Markets Act, but involves economically similar conduct on digital platforms (abuse of dominant position, barriers to competition, blocking of access). Origin of actions: Most major proceedings are ex officio, initiated by the DOJ or the FTC (sometimes with coordinated intervention by federated states), unlike the EU where the DMA is an autonomous ex ante instrument. Solutions/Remedies: U.S. antitrust remedies can range from behavioral injunctions to proposed (sometimes rejected) divestments/divestments of assets, changes in practices, and occasionally the imposition of structural measures (e.g. demand to sell Chrome), but tend to remain less prescriptive than the detailed rules of the DMA. Finally, U.S. lawsuits against Googleand Meta often span several years, with partial decisions, jury verdicts, court injunctions, and appeals pending. U.S. remedies tend to be behavioral or restrictive rather than prescriptive like the DMA (which sets clear ex ante obligations); on the other hand, several U.S. cases (Google AdTech, Epic v. Google) have resulted in injunctions directly affecting business models. While the DMA creates an ex-ante framework applicable to all gatekeepers, US actions remain case-by-caseand therefore ex post and often difficult to resolve quickly.
Annex 3 – Digital Markets Act (EU) / Digital Antitrust (US)
Comparison of legal frameworks, implementation modalities and practical effects
CriteriaEuropean Union – Digital Markets Act (DMA)United States – Antitrust Law (Sherman / Clayton Acts)Nature of the legal frameworkEx-ante, sectoral and asymmetric regulation Ex post, generalist competition law Normative logicPrevention of structural imbalancesPunishment of proven anti-competitive behaviourLegal basisDirectly applicable EU Regulation (2022/1925)Federal Antitrust Statutes (1890–1914), Statutory InterpretationScopeGatekeepers appointed according to quantitative and qualitative criteriaAny company, provided that it demonstrates market powerTemporality of the actionFast and forward-looking (obligations applicable from the time of designation)Long and contentious (trial often over several years)Competent AuthorityEuropean Commission (exclusive competence)DOJ Antitrust Division / FTC + Federal JurisdictionsOrigin of the proceedingsMostly ex officioEx officio + state actions + private actionsNature of the obligationsPrecise and listed obligations (interoperability, non-auto-preference, data access, steering)General prohibitions (monopolization, cartels, anti-competitive acquisitions)Burden of proofLighter (legal presumptions related to gatekeeper status)High (market definition, evidence of monopoly and anti-competitive effects)Type of RemediesMainly ex-ante behavioral, standardizedCourt injunctions, behavioural remedies, sometimes structuralFinancial penaltiesAdministrative fines of up to 10% (or even 20%) of global turnoverNo systematic federal civil fines (except criminal), damages, and injunctionsEffects on business modelsImmediate structural changes in practicesIncremental adjustments, sometimes limited after judgmentLegal certaintyHigh on bonds, uncertainties on interpretationLow to medium (high reliance on case law)Flexibility of the frameworkLimited (prescriptive standards)High (case-by-case assessment)Strategic/industrial dimensionAssertive but indirectLow, mainly competitiveInternational projectionForte (« Brussels effect »)Limited, dependent on the extraterritoriality of judgments
Annex 4 — International comparative matrix of models for the regulation of digital platforms
Structuring criteriaEuropean Union (DMA)United States (Antitrust)ChinaJapanSouth KoreaNature of the settingEx ante sectoral regulationGeneral ex post lawHybrid state regulation (competition + political control)Cooperative regulationProactive technical-normative regulationLegal basisDirectly applicable EU RegulationSherman Act, Clayton Act (case law)Anti-Monopoly Law + Administrative GuidelinesAnti-Monopoly Act + Platform ActDigital Markets ActMain logicStructural preventionSanctioning proven abusesDiscipline and Strategic AlignmentTransparency and fairnessPrevention + Ongoing SupervisionTemporalityFast (designation → bonds)Slow (long trials)Very fastProgressiveFast and iterativeCentral AuthorityEuropean CommissionDOJ / FTC + CourtsSAMR + Party-StateJFTC + METIKFTCRole of the judgeMarginal (backtesting)CentralLowModerateModerateType of BondsStandardized, detailedGeneral prohibitionsVariable, sometimes discretionaryTransparency, reportingTargeted technical obligationsBurden of proofReduced (presumptions)Very highLowModerateModerateNature of the remediesEx ante behaviourInjunctions, sometimes structuralHeavy administrative penaltiesNegotiated adjustmentsTechnical and corrective measuresFinancial penaltiesHigh administrative finesRare (non-criminal)Very highModerateModerateTechnical capacity of the authorityMedium (in reinforcement)VariableHighMediumHighState-business relationshipRegulatory and normativeAdversarialeHierarchicalCooperativeTechnocraticImplicit industrial objectiveAssertive but indirectLowCentralImportantCentralGeographical scopeAccess to the EU internal marketUS territory (indirect effects)Chinese marketJapanese marketKorean MarketInternational projectionForte (« Brussels effect »)Low to mediumLow (closed market)LowLow to mediumMainly targeted actorsUS+ potentially ChineseUSChineseJapanese + ForeignKoreans + foreignersKey RiskRigidity/under-executionIneffectiveness / slownessPolitical arbitrationDependence on cooperationOver-technicalizationMain strengthsPredictability, consistencyTheoretical flexibilitySpeed, authorityEconomic acceptabilityOperational efficiency
[1] Draghi M., The Future of European Competitiveness, report submitted to the European Commission, Brussels, 2024, approx. 400 p., spec. chap. 2 (« Digital Transformation and Innovation »), p. 45-78, bibliography. We devoted a reflection to the Draghi Report a year later. See Souty F., « Draghi Report: Future Challenges for Competitiveness », Le Diplomate Média, 9 December 2025, 17 p.
[2] See a previous reflection from the same perspective in Souty F, « Digital economy, competition policy and regulation: comparative approaches of the European Union, the United States and China », Linda Arcelin (ed.), European digital regulations and market law, Brussels, Bruylant, 2024, p. 151 – 181.
[3] Crémer J., de Montjoye Y.-A., Schweitzer H., Competition Policy for the Digital Era, report for the European Commission, Brussels, 2019, 119 p., spec. p. p. 1-10.
[4] Ibáñez Colomo P., « The Shaping of EU Competition Law », Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021, pp. 1051-1080, esp. pp. 1065-1072.
[5] Schweitzer H., « Competition Law and Digital Markets: A Call for a New Approach », in The Digital Economy and Competition Law, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, 2019, 412 p., p. 3-21.
[6] Draghi M., op. cit., pp. 62-70.
[7] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022, OJ L 265, 12 October 2022, pp. 1–66.
[8] Vestager M., Making Markets Work for People, speech, European Commission, Brussels, 8 December 2020.
[9] Bradford A., The Brussels Effect. How the European Union Rules the World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020, 424 p., p. 153-201, bibliography and index. This is an idealized Anglo-Saxon vision that nevertheless had its relevance in the pre-Trumpian world.
[10] Whish R., Bailey D., Competition Law, 10th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021, 1120 p., spec. pp. 3-18, bibliography and index.
[11] Geradin D., Katsifis D., « The Antitrust Case Against Self-Preferencing », Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, pp. 553-594, esp. pp. 556-560.
[12] Crémer J., de Montjoye Y.-A., Schweitzer H., Competition Policy for the Digital Era, op. cit., p. 41-72.
[13] Schweitzer H., « Digitale Plattformen und Marktmacht », Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht, No. 3, Cologne, 2020, pp. 257-289.
[14] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, recitals 5 to 7.
[15] De Streel A., « The Digital Markets Act: Making Economic Regulation of Platforms Fit for the Digital Age », Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 13, No. 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, pp. 3-12.
[16] Ezrachi A., Competition and Antitrust Law: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, 152 p., pp. 89-102.
[17] Opinion of the Council’s Legal Service, Doc. 12905/21, Brussels, 2021.
[18] Ibáñez Colomo P., ‘The EU Digital Markets Act as a Regulatory Paradigm Shift’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 59, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2022, pp. 1015-1048.
[19] Rousseva E., « The Role of the European Commission under the Digital Markets Act », European Law Review, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2023, pp. 225-248.
[20] Haucap J., « Ordnungspolitische Herausforderungen der Plattformökonomie », ORDO – Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, vol. 71, Stuttgart, 2020, pp. 155-178.
[21] Körber T., « The German Facebook Case and the Digital Markets Act », Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, vol. 10, Munich, 2021, pp. 97-104.
[22] Ibáñez Colomo P., ‘The EU Digital Markets Act and Article 102 TFEU’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 60, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2023, pp. 781-812, esp. pp. 784-790.
[23] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, recital 10.
[24] De Streel A., « DMA and Competition Law: Friends or Foes? », Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 14, No. 2, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2023, pp. 65-74.
[25] Schweitzer H., « Regulating Digital Gatekeepers: The DMA and Beyond », European Competition Journal, Vol. 18, No. 3, London, 2022, pp. 341-367.
[26] Rousseva E., Rethinking Ex Post Enforcement in Digital Markets, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2023, 312 p., p. 198-215, bibliography and index.
[27] Hatzopoulos V., ‘From Competition Law to Regulation: The Digital Markets Act’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 49, No 4, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2022, pp. 329-356.
[28] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, Art. 3.
[29] De Streel A., « The Gatekeeper Concept under the Digital Markets Act », European Competition Law Review, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2022, pp. 489-501.
[30] Bradford A., « Digital Regulation and Geopolitics », Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 30, No. 4, London, 2023, pp. 512-530.
[31] Körber T., « Data, Platforms and the DMA », Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht, Cologne, 2022, pp. 301-324.
[32] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, Art. 3.
[33] De Streel A., « The Gatekeeper Concept under the Digital Markets Act », European Competition Law Review, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2022, pp. 489-501.
[34] Ibáñez Colomo P., « Defining Gatekeepers under the DMA, » Common Market Law Review, vol. 59, 2022, pp. 1023-1035.
[35] Bradford A., « Digital Regulation and Geopolitics », Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 30, No. 4, London, 2023, pp. 512-530.
[36] Körber T., « Data, Platforms and the DMA », Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht, Cologne, 2022, pp. 301-324.
[37] Schweitzer H., « The DMA and the Role of the Commission », European Competition Journal, vol. 19, 2023, pp. 1-24.
[38] Rousseva E., « Enforcement Powers under the Digital Markets Act », European Law Review, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2023, pp. 251-274.
[39] European Commission, DMA Implementation Report, Brussels, 2023. See also General Court of the European Union, Cases T-xxx/23 et seq., orders and actions brought in 2023
[40] Hatzopoulos V., « Judicial Review and the DMA, » Legal Issues of Economic Integration, vol. 50, 2023, pp. 367-389. And also Ezrachi A., Competition, Innovation and Regulation in Digital Markets, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2022, pp. 145-172.
[41] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, Art. 1, §6 and recitals 8 and 9.
[42] Monti M., ‘EU Competition Law and National Enforcement in the Digital Age’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 58, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2021, pp. 1361–1392.
[43] Bundeskartellamt, Guidance on Section 19a GWB, Bonn, 2021; Körber T., « Germany’s Section 19a GWB and the DMA », European Competition Journal, vol. 18, 2022, pp. 423-448.
[44] Autorité de la concurrence, Opinions and decisions relating to digital platforms, Paris, 2019-2023; Petit N., « The French Approach to Digital Platforms », Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Oxford, 2020, pp. 561-589.
[45] AGCM, Annual Report, Rome, 2022; Colangelo G., « Digital Platforms and Competition Law in Italy », Concorrenza e Mercato, Bologna, 2021, p. 45-72.
[46] Schweitzer H., « Multilevel Enforcement in Digital Markets », European Law Journal, vol. 29, Oxford, 2023, pp. 89-112.
[47] Khan L., « The New Brandeis Movement, » Yale Law Journal, vol. 126, New Haven, 2017, pp. 710-799. See also Souty F., « Competition policy and antitrust in Europe and the United States: transatlantic perspectives and geopolitical issues », Le Diplomate Média, 30 December 2025, 10 p. V. also, Souty F., « America First Antitrust: the conservative renewal of American antitrust by the Trump II Administration, continuities, ruptures and doctrinal recompositions », Le Diplomate Média, 12 January 2026, 25 p.
[48] Kovacic W., « Competition Policy in the United States, » Antitrust Law Journal, Washington, 2021, pp. 1-34.
[49] Ibáñez Colomo P., « Digital Regulation and Non-Discrimination », Common Market Law Review, vol. 60, 2023, pp. 845-872.
[50] Bradford A., Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2023, 512 p., p. 221-268, bibliography and index.
[51] State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Platform Economy, Beijing, 2021.
[52] Ezrachi A., Stucke M., Virtual Competition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 2016, p. 231-260
[53] Wang J., « Platform Regulation in China, » World Competition, vol. 45, 2022, pp. 89-117.
[54] De Streel A., « The Global Reach of the DMA », Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, vol. 15, 2024, pp. 1-14.
[55] OECD, Competition Policy in the Digital Age: The Japanese Perspective, Paris, 2021, 94 p., spec. p. p. 12-25.
[56] Japan Fair Trade Commission, Guidelines Concerning Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position in Digital Transactions, Tokyo, 2020.
[57] Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Act on Improving Transparency and Fairness of Digital Platforms, Tokyo, 2021; 2022 Assessment Report.
[58] Matsumura T., « Digital Platform Regulation in Japan », Journal of Japanese and International Economies, vol. 62, Amsterdam, 2022, pp. 1-18.
[59] Bradford A., Digital Empires, op. cit., pp. 269-295.
[60] OECD, Competition Policy in the Digital Age: The Korean Perspective, Paris, 2022, p. 15-32.
[61] OECD, Competition Policy in the Digital Age: The Korean Perspective, Paris, 2022, p. 15-32.
[62] Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), Act on the Fairness of Digital Market Transactions, Seoul, 2021; KFTC, Guidelines on Fair Platform Transactions, 2022.
[63] Lee J., Park H., « Competition and Innovation in Korean Digital Markets, » Korean Economic Review, Seoul, 2021, pp. 89-112.
[64] Jan Krämer, Digital Markets and Online Platforms, New perspectives on regulation and competition law, Brussels CERRE, 2020, 104 p. V. also, De Streel A., « Comparative Approaches to Platform Regulation: Lessons for the EU », Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, vol. 15, 2024, p. 15-28.
[65] Ibáñez Colomo P., « Digital Regulation and Non-Discrimination », Common Market Law Review, vol. 60, 2023, pp. 845-872.
[66] Bradford A., Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2023, 512 p., p. 221-268, bibliography and index. Also, De Streel A., « The Global Reach of the DMA, » Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, vol. 15, 2024, pp. 1-14.
[67] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness, Report to the European Commission, Brussels, 2024, Esp. chap. 2, pp. 37-52.
[68] Petit N., Big Tech and the Digital Economy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020, 352 p., p. 189-214.
[69] European Commission, Digital Markets Act: Commission opens non-compliance investigations into Alphabet, Apple and Meta, Brussels, 25 March 2024.
[70] Geradin D., « The Enforcement Architecture of the DMA, » Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, vol. 15, 2024, pp. 321-339.
[71] Pelkmans J., « Institutional Capacity and EU Digital Regulation », CEPS Policy Brief, Brussels, 2023, pp. 6-12. Souty F, The geopolitical limits of the European anti-foreign subsidy regulation, Le Diplomate Média, 21 January 2026.
[72] Hovenkamp H. , Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2021, 248 p., p. 91-128.
[73] Fox, E., « Digital Antitrust: The American Path, » Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 87, 2023, pp. 455-482.
[74] Bradford, A., Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, 384 p., p. 143-198.
[75] Kerber W., « The Geopolitics of Digital Regulation », Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 31, 2024, pp. 1123-1145.
[76] Draghi M., op. cit. cit., pp. 61-68.
[77] European Commission, Evaluation of the Digital Markets Act: Inception Impact Assessment, Brussels, 2024 and Draghi M., op cit. . On the substance, see also Paul Seabright, « Competition, Innovation and Industrial Policy in the EU », Bruegel Essay, Brussels, 2024, pp. 14-22.
[78] Pisani-Ferry J., « Europe’s Strategic Choices in the Digital Age », Project Syndicate, 2024; see also thematic index of the Draghi report.
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François Souty est Président exécutif du Cabinet LRACG Conseil en stratégies européennes et droit de la concurrence, enseignant à Excelia Business School (La Rochelle-Tours-Cachan), à l’Université Catholique de l’Ouest (Niort) et chargé d’enseignements à la Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Nantes. Auparavant Expert National Détaché auprès de la Commission Européenne (rapporteur antitrust sur les marchés financier de 2018 à 2021 et chargé d’affaires internationales de concurrence à la DG Concurrence de 2021 à 2024), il a été conseiller économique européen pour la politique de la concurrence auprès du gouvernement de Géorgie à Tbilisi en 2017-2018. Longtemps Directeur départemental de la DGCCRF au ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (1982 à 2024), il a été également professeur-associé à l’Université de La Rochelle (1996-2018). Membre des comités d’experts de la concurrence de l’OCDE et de la CNUCED de 1992 à 2018, il a participé aux travaux de l’OMC sur le commerce international et la politique de la concurrence de 1997 à 2004. Un des fondateurs du Cercle Jefferson, du Cercle K2, de la revue Concurrences en 2004, il est auteur d’une douzaine de livres ou rapports internationaux et de plus d’une centaine d’articles académiques en droit et politique de la concurrence et en histoire économique. Il prépare actuellement la 5e édition de «Droit et politique de la concurrence de l’Union Européenne » chez LGDJ-Montchrestien (coll. Clefs). Il est auteur d’une thèse de doctorat en histoire économique à l’Université de Paris III sur les monopoles des Compagnies des Indes néerlandaises au XVIIIe siècle. François Souty est Officier de l’Ordre National du Mérite.