Does the meeting between Zelenskyy and Tsikhanouskaya mark the beginning of a new approach towards Belarus?

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meeting the leader of the Belarusian democratic forces Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Photo: The Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya

On January 25th in Vilnius, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and Volodymyr Zelenskyy held their first-ever bilateral meeting. Shortly thereafter, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrii Sybiha, announced a revision of Kyiv’s approach to cooperation with the Belarusian democratic forces. This shift in rhetoric by the Ukrainian authorities sparked a wave of optimism among representatives of the Belarusian democratic movement, who see it as a window of opportunity to deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian government. This article therefore aims to assess why Kyiv has changed its attitude toward the Belarusian democratic forces and what Ukraine’s future approach to Belarus is likely to look like.

Why Ukraine previously avoided cooperation with the Belarusian democratic forces

Over the past several years, Ukraine largely avoided engagement with the leader of the Belarusian opposition. Moreover, in late 2022 and early 2023, reports emerged suggesting that Kyiv was blocking the participation of Tsikhanouskaya and other opposition representatives in joint diplomatic events.

The primary reason for the lack of active engagement with the Belarusian democratic forces was related to security. Even after most Russian troops were withdrawn from Belarusian territory in the spring of 2023, the Ukrainian authorities remained concerned about the possible reopening of the northern front and the risk of Belarus being directly drawn into hostilities. The absence of active fighting along the northern border was one of the factors that contributed to the success of Ukraine’s offensive operations in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions in the autumn of 2022. As a result, the Ukrainian government refrained from actions that could potentially provoke the Lukashenka regime or Russia using Belarus as a full-fledged military actor in the war against Ukraine.

Under these circumstances, it was only natural that a temporary framework of coexistence with the regime took shape. This led to the consolidation of a status quo that, at that stage, largely suited both sides and could be summarized as follows: Belarus would not serve as a staging ground for offensive operations, would not facilitate the coordination or deployment of Russian forces from its territory, and would not take part directly in hostilities; in return, Ukraine would refrain from strikes on Belarusian territory and from steps that could threaten the stability of the regime. This restraint also extended to the systematic support and development of cooperation with various groups within the Belarusian opposition.

Although Ukraine was very cautious in its relations with the Lukashenka regime, it has nonetheless reserved the right to take asymmetric measures in response to unfriendly actions by Minsk. One of the most notable examples was the recall of Ihor Kyzym, Ukraine’s ambassador to Belarus, in response to Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s meeting with the so-called head of the occupied part of Donetsk Oblast, Denis Pushylin.

What made the Zelenskyy-Tsikhanouskaya meeting possible

However, the conditions of 2026 differ significantly from those of 2023 or 2024. This is due not only to growing doubts that Belarus could serve as a launchpad for large-scale offensive operations in the near future, but also to changes in the foreign policy environments in which both Minsk and Kyiv operate.

The Lukashenka regime has managed to establish a negotiation track with the United States and secure reciprocal concessions from Washington. At the same time, Minsk is playing a complex game in its relations with Poland and Lithuania, attempting through a combination of pressure and signals of constructive engagement to push both countries toward concessions on a number of key issues. One of these is the restoration of access to Lithuanian ports following the lifting of US sanctions on Belarus’s potash industry.

Ukraine, meanwhile, is operating under conditions shaped by US efforts to pressure both Ukraine and Russia into a peace agreement to end the Russo-Ukrainian War. This has often been done at the expense of Ukraine’s own interests, as well as through Russia’s regular strikes on energy and transport infrastructure. In these difficult circumstances, Kyiv must simultaneously pursue three critical objectives: resisting diplomatic and military pressure, mobilizing European partners toward more decisive action, and articulating its vision for the post-war security architecture.

Countering Russian strikes.

In the context of countering Russian attacks, a new challenge has emerged: Belarus has begun to play a specific technical role in the navigation and coordination of strike drones. Certain mobile communication towers on Belarusian territory have been modified to emit radio beacon signals that help Russian drones establish their own coordinate system within Ukrainian airspace. Combined with the use of Starlink satellite communications, this enables the enemy to bypass Ukrainian electronic warfare systems, fly at extremely low altitudes, manoeuvre more effectively, and conduct coordinated group flights. While this does not amount to providing territory for offensive operations, let alone direct participation in hostilities, such assistance nonetheless allows Russia to strike targets in Ukraine’s northern regions more effectively. These targets include substations that transmit electricity from the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant to neighbouring regions, as well as the Kovel-Kyiv railway line, which is quite important for the transportation of western assistance by rail from Poland.

Mobilizing European partners.

On January 22nd, during his address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Volodymyr Zelenskyy criticized European countries for their confusion and lack of readiness to act decisively. In his speech, the Ukrainian president cited Belarus as an example of a country that western states had once failed to support in its struggle for democracy. He also pointed to the deployment of the “Oreshnik” missile system on Belarusian territory as a factor posing a threat to European actors. Although the regime’s display surrounding the “Oreshnik” is more accurately described as another information and psychological operation, the meeting with Tsikhanouskaya served as a symbolic confirmation of the Ukrainian president’s remarks about the importance of preserving an independent and democratic Belarus as a cornerstone of regional security.

The beginning of a more clearly articulated position on Belarus.

The continuation of negotiations on ending the Russo-Ukrainian War; Lukashenka’s attempts to break out of foreign policy isolation with US assistance; and his efforts to insert himself into the peace process; most notably exemplified by the December incident involving the transfer of released Belarusian political prisoners to Ukraine; have demonstrated that Ukraine ultimately needs to begin formulating a more clearly articulated position on Belarus. Had Kyiv continued the passive approach of recent years, it risked being sidelined in broader regional processes concerning future relations with the Lukashenka regime, particularly in the event of Minsk’s gradual move away from international isolation. Adopting a more proactive stance is therefore aimed at preventing the regime’s participation in the negotiation process and at blocking its relatively painless reintegration into the international arena.

On the eve of change

Despite the strong symbolic significance of the step and the invitation extended to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to visit Kyiv, it is unlikely that Ukraine will build large-scale cooperation with the Belarusian democratic forces. This is due to the fact that, in their current configuration, the Belarusian democratic forces face a number of internal challenges, including a crisis of identity, fragmentation, and the emergence of alternative centres of influence. These dynamics have become particularly pronounced following the release of Viktar Babaryka and Maria Kalesnikava, who hold positions different from those of Tsikhanouskaya and advocate for a broader dialogue with the regime.

Another important factor is that Ukraine has not had (and it is doubtful that it will suddenly develop) a comprehensive vision of its interests with regard to Belarus, or a clear understanding of how to pursue them. Relying exclusively on Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her team would also leave other pro-Ukrainian actors outside the political process, most notably Belarusian volunteer fighters.

At the same time, there is a strong likelihood that contacts will become more regular and that a special envoy or ambassador-at-large for Belarus will be appointed, as already announced by Andrii Sybiha and Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The intensity of dialogue with the democratic forces may henceforth depend on Minsk’s behaviour. In the event of unfriendly actions by Minsk, the Ukrainian authorities are likely to respond asymmetrically, targeting the regime’s pressure points by stepping up engagement with the democratic forces. This would raise the issue of Lukashenka’s criminal liability for complicity in the invasion, as well as increasing pressure relating to sanctions.

According to Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to the Office of the President of Ukraine, the war has reached a stage at which pressure must be intensified on Vladimir Putin’s allies, including the Lukashenka regime. The goal of such actions is to weaken the Kremlin’s economic, resource, and logistical capacity to continue conducting active military operations. While this position taken by the Ukrainian authorities appears justified at first glance, Ukraine should not view the Belarus issue solely through the prism of confronting Russia, nor should it limit itself exclusively to a strategy of pressure on the regime.

What Ukraine should do

It is important for Ukraine to develop a distinct approach toward Belarus, with the following key objectives: (a) assessing the state of Belarusian sovereignty and advancing Ukraine’s interests in the region; (b) preserving Belarusian statehood and independence; and (c) preparing for a future change of power within Belarus itself. While it is crucial for Ukraine to prevent Lukashenka from being included in peace negotiations, it is also clear that once active hostilities end, Kyiv will need to establish a new framework for engagement with Minsk. Stepping up contacts with the Belarusian opposition and periodically increasing pressure on the regime is a solid starting point for acting from a position of strength, as well as extracting more meaningful concessions from Lukashenka.

It is equally important not to repeat the mistakes of previous years and to avoid allowing Minsk to move away from international isolation too easily. At the same time, Ukraine should keep a window open for constructive dialogue and reciprocal concessions on key issues after a verifiable rollback of specific hostile actions. Recent experience of western countries has shown that relying solely on the “stick” without the “carrot” fails to produce desired changes in behaviour. For Ukraine, security will remain the top priority. Accordingly, regular information exchanges on military capabilities and major activities; invitations for observers to military exercises; and restrictions on military operations near Ukraine’s borders could be offered in exchange for the lifting of certain sanctions and economic restrictions that do not affect the Belarusian defence sector.

Combined with the Lukashenka regime’s dialogue with western counterparts and a broader consultation process, such measures could help assess the extent to which Minsk is capable of distancing itself from Moscow and, consequently, preserving its independence. The question of whether to restore limited engagement with Lukashenka will be one of the most difficult from the standpoint of various declared values, as such steps clearly involve a contradiction. But if these efforts make it possible to assess Minsk’s real degree of autonomy and, over time, slow or even halt the processes of integration with Russia, they are worth pursuing. At the same time, Kyiv should always retain the option of reverting to a pressure-based approach if the Lukashenka regime fails to comply with the agreements.

Finally, Ukraine should also work with a longer-term horizon in mind by preparing for a possible future change of power in Belarus. It is becoming increasingly evident that Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s political career is nearing its end, while the nature of the eventual transition remains highly uncertain. Developing instruments of soft power aimed at Belarusians both abroad and inside the country; identifying areas of common ground with Belarusian officials committed to preserving Belarusian statehood; and preparing Ukraine’s own political stakeholders drawn from pro-democracy activists and Belarusian veterans who fought on Ukraine’s side, would allow Kyiv to build a comprehensive toolkit and be ready for a transition of power in Belarus. This would be true whether Lukashenka opts for a managed succession or an internal struggle for power emerges among the country’s elites.

Pavlo Rad is an analyst with the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. He is a regular contributor on Belarus-related issues to Ukrainian media and international academic institutions, including the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen, and the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies.

belarus, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Sviatlana Tsikhanouksaya, Ukraine, Ukrainian-Belarusian relations, Volodymyr Zelenskyy