Iran Update, February 6, 2026

Toplines

Iran and the United States held talks in Muscat, Oman, on February 6 to establish a framework for future negotiations.[1] The Omani Foreign Affairs Ministry stated that the talks between the Iranian and US delegations, which were headed by Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, respectively, “focused on creating the right conditions for the resumption of diplomatic and technical negotiations” and gaining each party’s “commitment” to the talks.[2] US Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper also attended the talks, according to a video published by Omani media and a US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[3] Araghchi claimed that he discussed “Iran’s rights” in a “good atmosphere” with the US delegation and that the talks were a “good start.”[4] A political analyst close to the Iranian regime reported that the talks aimed to establish a framework for negotiations. He added that the talks were focused on “announcing positions, making demands, and presenting proposals” and that Iran and the United States “did not reach an agreement on generalities.”[5] Axios reported on February 6 that the United States and Iran will hold another round of talks in the coming days, citing a source with knowledge of the talks.[6] Israeli media, citing two sources familiar with the matter, reported that the United States told Iran that it expects Iran to make a “tangible and significant concession” regarding its nuclear program in the next round of talks.[7]

Iran remains unlikely to compromise on its red lines, which include uranium enrichment, its ballistic missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance, which reduces the likelihood that Iran and the United States will be able to reach a diplomatic solution during subsequent rounds of negotiations. Araghchi stated on February 6 that he conveyed during the talks that Iran would not agree to stop uranium enrichment or move Iran’s uranium stockpile abroad.[8] An Iranian journalist close to the regime similarly stated on February 5 that the regime decided in recent days not to agree to transfer its enriched uranium stockpile to a third country.[9] The Iranian regime’s English-language outlet emphasized on February 6 that Iran’s ballistic missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance have “no place” in Iran’s talks with the United States.[10] A Tehran-based Al Jazeera journalist separately reported on February 6 that the US demands also include curbing Iran’s energy exports to the People’s Republic of China.[11] Unspecified Iranian officials separately told Iranian state media on February 6 that Iran is prioritizing the lifting of sanctions.[12]

Hezbollah Liaison and Coordination Unit head Wafiq Safa resigned from his position on February 6, which marks the first time that a Hezbollah official of Safa’s rank has stepped down.[13] The Liaison and Coordination Unit is responsible for Hezbollah’s relations with the Lebanese government and foreign entities. Sources close to Hezbollah told Saudi media on February 6 that Hezbollah’s acceptance of Safa’s resignation is part of a plan to restructure the group in “both form and content.”[14] Hezbollah officials reportedly expressed discontent with Safa’s “poor relations” with Lebanese authorities in September 2025.[15] Saudi media reported that Hezbollah reduced Safa’s responsibilities in the months prior to his resignation in an attempt to “find a less provocative figure,” which suggests that Hezbollah may have pressured Safa to resign.[16] Safa led the Liaison and Coordination Unit for over a decade and long served as a prominent figure in Hezbollah’s security apparatus, overseeing the group’s smuggling and operations.[17] Safa was one of the few senior Hezbollah officials from former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s Shura Council who survived the late 2024 war, including a targeted Israeli airstrike in Beirut in October 2024.[18] Safa has issued provocative statements and threats toward Lebanese officials in recent years that have dampened Hezbollah’s relations with the state.[19] Safa, for example, directly threatened the Lebanese judge investigating the Beirut Port explosion in September 2021.[20]  

Sources close to Hezbollah told Saudi media that Hezbollah has tasked Ahmed Muhanna with communicating with state and foreign entities, although it is unclear if Muhanna will officially replace Safa as the head of the Liaison and Coordination Unit.[21] Muhanna has held several roles within Hezbollah, including adviser to the group’s Arab relations head, foreign relations official, and aide to Hezbollah Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc head Mohammad Raad.[22] Muhanna gained a significant amount of experience meeting and working with regional, international, and Lebanese officials in these roles. Muhanna recently met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s top adviser, Brigadier General Andre Rahal, on January 24, which followed a period of diminished communication between Hezbollah and Aoun.[23] 

Safa’s resignation suggests that Hezbollah may be attempting to reduce tensions and improve its relationship with the Lebanese state in order to try to counter US and Israeli pressure on the Lebanese government to disarm and weaken the group. Hezbollah likely seeks to increase dialogue and improve relations with the Lebanese state to counter US and international pressure on the state, rather than to cooperate on the group’s disarmament. The Lebanese government has taken several steps to constrain Hezbollah’s ability to operate in response to US and international pressure, including by reducing the group’s number of cabinet seats, intensifying counter-smuggling efforts, and restricting its financial institutions.[24] Gulf states reportedly pressured the Lebanese government to form and implement a plan to disarm Hezbollah in August 2025 in order to receive economic support, for example.[25] Hezbollah likely calculates that dialogue with the government can counter these pressures and, in turn, stall or even halt the state’s efforts to disarm and weaken the group.

It is also possible that Hezbollah accepted Safa’s resignation due to internal politics and discontent over Hezbollah’s, and specifically Safa’s, performance during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in the fall of 2024.[26] Hezbollah’s Shura Council sought to replace Safa in September 2025 due to his “failures.”[27] These “failures” may refer to Israel’s September 2024 pager attack, which Hezbollah officials have long called a “major security and military” failure.[28]

Key Takeaways

US-Iran Talks: Iran and the United States held talks in Muscat, Oman, on February 6 to establish a framework for future negotiations. Iran and the United States will reportedly hold another round of talks in the coming days, and Israeli media reported that the United States told Iran that it expects Iran to make a “tangible and significant concession” regarding its nuclear program in the next round of talks.

Hezbollah-Lebanese Government Relations: Hezbollah Liaison and Coordination Unit head Wafiq Safa resigned from his position on February 6, which marks the first time that a Hezbollah official of Safa’s rank has stepped down. Safa’s resignation suggests that Hezbollah may be attempting to reduce tensions and improve its relationship with the Lebanese state in order to try to counter US and Israeli pressure on the Lebanese government to disarm and weaken the group.

Iran

A policy analyst close to the Iranian regime reported on February 5 that the Defense Council will operate independently of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[29] The analyst added that the Defense Council will formally remain a sub-council of the SNSC but will “advance [Iran’s] defense policies” independently of the SNSC.[30] The SNSC, which is Iran’s highest national security decision-making body, established the Defense Council in August 2025 to streamline wartime decision-making.[31] Iranian media reported in August 2025 that the Defense Council would take “rapid, balanced, and coordinated” steps to confront threats to Iran.[32] The Defense Council’s autonomy could create new bureaucratic processes and thereby hamper decision-making during periods of conflict, however. This report comes after Iranian President and Defense Council Chairman Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Ali Shamkhani as the Defense Council’s secretary on February 5.[33]

Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh possibly warned Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during a meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan, on February 6 against allowing Israel to use Azerbaijan’s territory to conduct operations against Iran. Nasir Zadeh and Aliyev discussed bilateral cooperation and regional security issues, as well as the threat posed by “the intervention of regional actors,” almost certainly in reference to Israel.[34] Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan “will not allow any threat to Iran.”[35] Iranian media outlets and officials accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel to launch strikes against Iran from Azerbaijani territory during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[36] Iranian officials have also previously expressed concern about Israeli influence in Azerbaijan and deepening relations between Israel and Azerbaijan.[37] Nasir Zadeh separately met with Azerbaijani Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov on February 6 to discuss bilateral security cooperation.[38] 

The US State Department sanctioned 14 vessels and 15 entities, including four entities based in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, on February 6 for transporting and facilitating the sale and purchase of Iranian oil.[39] Vessels in Iran’s “shadow fleet,” including those that the US Treasury Department sanctioned on January 6, generate revenue that the Iranian regime uses to fund the Axis of Resistance, its weapons programs, and security services.[40] The United States has sanctioned over 180 vessels involved in transporting Iranian oil since January 2025.[41]   

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

Syrian army commanders and Defense Ministry representatives met with the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) General Command in Hasakah City on February 6 to discuss SDF-government cooperation and deployments in the province as part of the January 30 agreement.[42] Operations Department Head Brigadier General Hamza al Hamidi, 60th Division Commander Brigadier General Awad Mohammad, Head of Military Security Brigadier General Ali al Hassan, former Defense Ministry Spokesperson and current Syrian Border Guard Commander Brigadier General Hassan Abdul Ghani comprised the Syrian army delegation.[43] SDF General Command members Jia Kobani, Suzdar Derik, and Sipan Hamo represented the SDF.[44] Kurdish media reported that the parties discussed maintaining distance between SDF and army positions during the deployment of SDF brigades to Hasakah Province.[45] The Syrian army and SDF-affiliated forces, which will integrate into three distinct SDF-comprised brigades to operate within Hasakah Province, will need to closely coordinate and monitor unit deployments in Hasakah Province to ensure cooperation and avoid any possible inter-unit fighting or conflict. The Syrian army said that the parties agreed on “specific timeframes” to withdraw military forces from civilian areas to designated positions and demine and open roads.[46] The Syrian army and SDF delegations conducted a field tour of military positions around Hasakah City after the meeting.[47]

Kurdish National Council (KNC) officials appear to have traveled to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara on February 3 without the support or foreknowledge of the KNC’s political rival, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), possibly in an attempt to sideline the PYD.[48] The KNC is a coalition of Syrian Kurdish political parties. A KNC delegation met with Shara in Damascus on February 3 to discuss the Syrian government’s protection of Syrian Kurdish rights.[49] A KNC official told Syrian state media on February 5 that the KNC has started an “official dialogue” with the Syrian government and that the delegation presented Shara and Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani with the KNC’s political vision for the future of Syria.[50] The KNC and PYD unified in April 2025 in order to present a unified Kurdish front to demand decentralization from the central government.[51] The PYD is the political wing of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which dominates the SDF.[52] The PYD and KNC, along with other smaller Kurdish parties, formed a joint delegation to negotiate with the government and advocate for Kurdish rights as part of this effort.[53] Parween Yousef, who is both a PYD official and the co-chair of the joint Kurdish delegation, told Kurdish media on February 6 that the joint delegation was not aware of the KNC’s planned trip to Damascus.[54] Several of the KNC officials who met with Shara are also members of the joint delegation.[55] Yousef said that the Kurdish delegation is awaiting an official and explicit explanation from the KNC regarding the visit.[56]

The lack of communication between KNC and PYD officials about the KNC’s visit to Damascus may reflect a shift in the KNC’s willingness to work with the PYD to achieve discrete political goals, as both parties agreed to do in April 2025.[57] Unspecified sources told Syrian media that the KNC holds the SDF and PYD “responsible” for government-SDF fighting and instability in northeastern Syria, and KNC officials reportedly pressured SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi to disregard both the PYD and YPG during a January 25 meeting.[58] It is possible that KNC officials have concluded that building a direct relationship with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will be a more effective means to advance their agenda for Kurdish rights while simultaneously sidelining their political rival. The KNC has also historically aligned itself with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and its president, Masoud Barzani.[59] Barzani, who is acting as an interlocutor between the SDF and the Syrian government, may be encouraging the KNC’s engagement with the Syrian government in order to increase KDP influence in northeastern Syria at the expense of the PYD.[60]

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9.

Palestinian Territories & Lebanon

Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Rodolphe Haykal conducted his first visit to Washington, DC, between February 2 and 5.[61] Haykal held a series of high-level meetings with White House advisers, Department of Defense and State Department officials, members of Congress, National Security Council members, US Central Command (CENTCOM) officials, and other unspecified US military and security officials during his visit.[62] Haykal and the various US officials discussed enhancing military cooperation, US support for the LAF, regional security developments, and the LAF’s plan to disarm Hezbollah.[63] The US officials praised the LAF’s progress in disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River and reaffirmed the United States’ support for the LAF.[64] Haykal’s visit represents a positive step toward reassuring Lebanon’s partners of its commitment to disarm Hezbollah. The United States canceled Haykal’s scheduled visit to Washington, DC, in November 2025 due to its frustrations over the LAF’s lack of progress in disarming Hezbollah.[65]  

Hezbollah appears to be able to provide limited and temporary compensation to its supporters, but Hezbollah’s inability to sustain these payments for a long period of time presents an opportunity for the Lebanese state, with adequate economic support, to erode support for Hezbollah among the Lebanese population over time. Hezbollah’s main financial institution, al Qard al Hassan, announced that it will resume Hezbollah’s housing allowance on February 9 and will continue these payments for the next three months.[66] Al Qard al Hassan noted that the disbursements only apply to “new housing.”[67] The institution added that Hezbollah’s other compensation payments related to housing or restoration remain “frozen.”[68] Hezbollah reportedly needs between $250 and $300 million USD to fulfill these commitments but has largely struggled to obtain these funds.[69] The fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the Lebanese state’s crackdown on Iranian smuggling through Lebanese airports and border crossings have hindered Iran’s ability to smuggle funds to Hezbollah.[70] Hezbollah’s financial struggles have led the group to temporarily and permanently suspend a number of its financial commitments to its supporters and fighters on multiple occasions.[71] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia and position itself as a critical provider.[72]

Efforts by the Lebanese state to provide reconstruction funds to Lebanese civilians and begin reconstruction in southern Lebanon could help undermine Hezbollah’s ability to maintain its Shia support base. The Lebanese government needs and has received some economic aid that can support these efforts. The World Bank approved a $350 million USD reconstruction loan on January 27 to help the state’s economic recovery, reconstruction efforts, and ability to provide social services, for example.[73] International economic aid for the Lebanese state will need to be sustained. Prolonged economic support for the Lebanese government could help the Lebanese government reinstate itself as the primary social service provider in Lebanon, which would make it easier for the state to counter Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanese communities.

Endnotes

[1] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2019839146605330754?s=20; https://x.com/JenGriffinFNC/status/2019835583200166172?s=20
[2] https://x.com/FMofOman/status/2019707553408864408?s=20
[3] https://x.com/OmanNewsAgency/status/2019720276108623906?s=20; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-and-iran-gather-for-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-f4c6174e?st=s1ZsvS&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

[4] http://tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/11/17/3510261; https://t.me/iribnews/314161; ttps://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2026/02/06/763591/Iran%E2%80%93US-nuclear-talks-begins-in-Muscat; https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1138761/; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-and-iran-gather-for-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-f4c6174e?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfeYr2-CxrKnVYKCVi_k4eNbQzawK3KUevYWaIInpQnkxL0vTgmIQIBD68MU7I%3D&gaa_ts=69863c85&gaa_sig=fPVMmUCxAOXzm6dP-vFGfy91R4ZPanzxBPfTs23pR1XGcIKd8UnDFWPZ4NK5GBiY7X8UiubO-AjieM84qrESLQ%3D%3D
[5] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/2019786917672276149
[6] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2019768264218276271?s=20
[7] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/nuclear-talks-said-to-include-in-person-meeting-between-trumps-aides-and-iran-fm/
[8] http://tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/11/17/3510261; https://t.me/iribnews/314161; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-and-iran-gather-for-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-f4c6174e?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfeYr2-CxrKnVYKCVi_k4eNbQzawK3KUevYWaIInpQnkxL0vTgmIQIBD68MU7I%3D&gaa_ts=69863c85&gaa_sig=fPVMmUCxAOXzm6dP-vFGfy91R4ZPanzxBPfTs23pR1XGcIKd8UnDFWPZ4NK5GBiY7X8UiubO-AjieM84qrESLQ%3D%3D

[9] https://x.com/aghplt/status/2019525185360019833; https://x.com/aghplt/status/2017330419687907567?s=20
[10] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2026/02/06/763591/Iran%E2%80%93US-nuclear-talks-begins-in-Muscat
[11] https://aje dot news/oo2w92?update=4292778
[12] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2026/02/06/763591/Iran%E2%80%93US-nuclear-talks-begins-in-Muscat
[13] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-accepts-resignation-senior-security-official-wafiq-safa-2026-02-06/
[14] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/2019800434546745668?s=20
[15] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/2025/09/25/ارباك-وصراع-قوى-داخل-حزب-الله-وحدة-التنسق-نحو-الحل-

[16] https://almarkazia dot com/ar/رويترز-حزب-الله-يقبل-استقالة-مسؤول-التنسيق-1 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUhamF91X0I
[17] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/2024/10/10/-مهرب-ومفاوض-من-هو-وفيق-صفا-الذي-استهدفته-غارة-اسرائيلية-على-بيروت ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/treasury-targets-iranian-backed-hizballah-officials-for-exploiting-lebanons-political-and-financial-system ; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/07/11/sanctioned-hezbollah-security-chief-works-closely-with-lebanese-authorities/
[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/senior-hezbollah-figure-wafiq-safa-survives-israeli-strike-beirut-sources-say-2024-10-10/ ; https://israel-alma dot org/who-is-wafiq-safa
[19] https://almarkazia dot com/ar/رويترز-حزب-الله-يقبل-استقالة-مسؤول-التنسيق-1 ; https://www.aljadeed dot tv/news/محليات/553735/حزب-الله-يقلص-صلاحيات-وفيق-صفا-المدن
[20] https://almarkazia dot com/ar/رويترز-حزب-الله-يقبل-استقالة-مسؤول-التنسيق-1
[21] https://www.facebook.com/AlHadath.Lebanon/posts/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%91%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AB%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC/926048456741879/ ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5237982-استقالة-وفيق-صفا-من-حزب-الله-بعد-تقليص-صلاحياته
[22] https://mediarelations-lb dot org/post.php?id=19233 ; https://www.aljadeed dot tv/news/خاص-الجديد/542453/معلومات-الجديد-اللقاء-بين-مستشار-رئيس-الجمهورية-ديدي-رحال-وكل-من-الرئيس-بري-والمكلف-بالعلاقات-الخارجية-في-حزب-الله-أحمد-مهنا-لم-ينجح-في-تغيير-موقف-الحزب-من-مجريات-الايام-الماضية?src=rss&utm_source=TheWALL360&utm_medium=Rss-articles&utm_campaign=rss&utm_term=Rss#google_vignette ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DT_E2w7FFEp/
[23] https://www.mtv dot com.lb/news/محليات/1647394/معلومات-mtv–لقاء-مطو-ل-دام-أكثر-من-ساعتين-يوم-السبت-جمع-المستشار-الأول-لرئيس-الجمهورية-العميد-أندريه-رحال-مع-مساعد-النائب-محمد-رعد-أحمد-مهنا-بعد-توتر-العلاقة-بين-الرئيس-عون-وحزب-الله-والحملة-الشرسة-ع ; https://x.com/almarsadonline2/status/2015666895244993003
[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-pm-forms-new-government-2025-02-08/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-central-bank-bans-interactions-with-hezbollahs-al-qard-al-hassan-2025-07-15/ ; https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5128740-beirut-airport-security-moves-curb-hezbollah%E2%80%99s-influence
[25] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-09/us-gulf-pressure-to-fully-disarm-hezbollah-puts-lebanon-on-edge
[26] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/bjl689xdzx
[27] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/2025/09/25/ارباك-وصراع-قوى-داخل-حزب-الله-وحدة-التنسق-نحو-الحل- ; https://www.mtv dot com.lb/news/1651035
[28] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hezbollah-nasrallah-internal-probe-israel-attacks-nasrallah-vows-retaliation
[29] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/2019460296465953273?s=20
[30] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/2019460296465953273?s=20
[31] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/05/12/3368567 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/05/11/3367591
[32] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/238093
[33] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/273403
[34] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/810600
[35] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/810600
[36] https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1316033; https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/news/8974897; https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2084052 ; https://www.jpost dot com/opinion/article-859632
[37] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2100878
[38] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/810600
[39] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/02/sanctions-to-combat-illicit-traders-of-iranian-oil-and-the-shadow-fleet
[40] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0370
[41] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0341
[42] https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/196139;
[43] https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/196139; https://x.com/AbdoHamwi33/status/2019826094313210287; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1985765045070918014
[44] https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/196139; https://ronahi dot tv/ar/archives/326626; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02X5uY4Djm1iMjsZrqCc43WhESScVHVD4d1R7UMTH5fQ27nBs3jDyg6ovzq4UorFJol&id=100066442900211
[45] https://ronahi dot tv/ar/archives/326626
[46] https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/196178; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2019856969146700255/photo/1
[47] https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/196178; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2019856969146700255/photo/1

[48] https://ronahi dot tv/ar/archives/326617
[49] https://t.me/SyPresidency/2007
[50] https://alikhbariah dot com/المجلس-الوطني-الكردي-للإخبارية-اجتما
[51] www dot npasyria.com/211587
[52] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-ypg-pkk-connection/
[53] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/040620253
[54]
https://ronahi dot tv/ar/archives/326617 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TFPGP2HGGCE
[55] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5236892-الشرع-يستقبل-وفداً-من-المجلس-الوطني-الكردي-ويؤكد-التزام-الدولة; https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/040620253
[56] https://ronahi dot tv/ar/archives/326617
[57] www dot npasyria.com/211587
[58] https://www.syria dot tv/خاص-المجلس-الوطني-الكردي-لـعبدي-خيار-الحرب-مع-دمشق-كارثي-ولن-ندعمه
[59] https://newlinesmag.com/argument/syrias-kurdish-northeast-ratifies-a-new-constitution

[60] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-envoy-accused-sdf-chief-trying-drag-israel-internal-syria-matters-sources-say ; https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/193572; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/2013692342004228247
[61] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/article/538732/ ; https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/2019782265908146444?s=20 ; https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2026/01/30/lebanon-s-army-chief-to-make-first-us-visit-since-appointment
[62] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/2019782265908146444?s=20
[63] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/2019782265908146444?s=20
[64] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/2019782265908146444?s=20
[65] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5237792-top-us-military-officer-met-lebanese-counterpart ; https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/11/us-cancels-lebanon-army-chief-visit-amid-frustration-over-hezbollah-what-know
[66] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/news/lebanon/878419/جمعية–القرض-الحسن–تستأنف-صرف-بدلات-الإيواء-الجديدة
[67] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/news/lebanon/878419/جمعية–القرض-الحسن–تستأنف-صرف-بدلات-الإيواء-الجديدة
[68] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/news/lebanon/878419/جمعية–القرض-الحسن–تستأنف-صرف-بدلات-الإيواء-الجديدة
[69] https://www.terrorism-info dot org.il/en/spotlight-on-terrorism-hezbollah-and-lebanon-december-22-29-2025/
[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-25-2023 ; https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/03/the-transformation-of-the-iraqi-syrian-border-from-a-national-to-a-regional-frontier?lang=en&center=middle-east ; https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/life-returns-to-al-bukamal-after-iranian-militias-flee/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2025

[71] https://en.kataeb dot org/articles/hezbollah-delays-second-year-housing-payments-leaving-thousands-in-limbo ; https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5106700-hezbollah%E2%80%99s-qard-al-hasan-halts-payouts-technical-issues-or-cash-crunch ; https://israel-alma dot org/the-freezing-of-the-transfer-of-rehabilitation-funds-by-hezbollah/
[72] https://www.terrorism-info dot org.il/en/jihad-al-bina-association-lebanon-hezbollah-social-foundation-engaged-construction-social-projects-among-shiite-community-major-component-hezbollahs-civilian-infr/ ; https://ict.org dot il/hezbollahs-financing-ecosystem-crime-families-as-a-case-study/
[73] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/01/27/lebanon-world-bank-approves-us-350-million-financing-for-social-protection-economic-empowerment-and-digital-transformati