For three hours on January 28th, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio testified in front of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, responding to senators’ crossfire questions ranging from drug-busting actions in the Caribbean Sea to the American military operation in Venezuela that captured Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. However, an exchange between Senator Brian Schatz of Hawaii and Secretary Rubio about the future of a perennial American adversary, Cuba, was particularly intriguing. Senator Schatz asked, “Would you make a public commitment today to rule out US regime change in Cuba?” and Secretary Rubio responded with, “Oh no. I think we would love to see regime change there.”
This response is consistent with a new brand of international politics implemented by the Trump Administration, branded “transactional realism.” President Trump and Secretary Rubio have sought to redefine the Monroe Doctrine by enacting policies focused on conditional, short-term hard power, coercing adversaries into compliance with American interests. Following this phenomenon, the US State Department seems intent on reshaping the US-Cuba relationship and has signaled potential support for the overthrow of the Díaz-Canel government. Nonetheless, up until January 29th, 2026, the political messaging has been more aggressive than the implemented policy measures, which had largely been the continuation of the existing economic embargo and the threat of tariffs on countries that sell oil to Cuba from the First Trump Administration. So, what is the crux of the Second Trump Administration’s new policy towards Cuba, and what are the potential outcomes?
American Strategic Isolation of Cuba:
In the summer of 2025, the Second Trump Administration resumed its positioning of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, as Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM). The NSPM reaffirmed the American economic embargo on Cuba and prohibited financial transactions through groups with any affiliation with the Cuban military. These policies reversed a more lenient approach to Cuba adopted by the Biden Administration and will surely further exacerbate Cuban economic turmoil. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean projects that the Cuban economy will have shrunk by 1.5% in 2025 and will only grow by 0.1% in 2026. This forecast indicates continuing stagnation of the Cuban economy, largely due to the decrease in tourism from the COVID-19 pandemic and the sharp decline in the sugar industry’s production.
A constant structural weakness of the Cuban economy has been a longstanding energy shortage. In fact, in 2025, Cuba was only able to generate half of its necessary electricity. The hourly electricity deficit has fluctuated between 1,300 and 1,600 megawatts, resulting in widespread blackouts nationwide. With an already existing institutional crisis, the complete halt of Venezuelan oil to Cuba will further cripple the island nation’s energy apparatus. Venezuela historically had been Cuba’s primary source of oil, supplying 70,000 barrels of crude oil a day until Maduro’s extraction. While the Cuban fuel crisis was initially collateral to the Venezuelan regime change, the US State Department and the Trump Administration seek to capitalize on the tenuous position Havana is in currently.
In the aftermath of the Venezuelan oil tap being turned off, Cuba looked towards Mexico, its second-largest supplier of oil, to pick up the demand. However, in a predictable transactional realist move, President Trump signed an executive order threatening any country that sells oil to Cuba with tariffs. As a result, Mexico announced on February 9th that it would cease oil shipments, pausing a relationship that in 2025 was worth $496 million. Cuba is left with only 15-20 days of oil reserves that can sustain the country’s existing system. Trump is exerting the might of the American political will on President Díaz-Canel and Foreign Minister Rodríguez, who have signaled a willingness to meet and negotiate an unspecified deal, though without “pressure.” What the Cuban government may be underestimating is that Trump’s power politics are no longer political theater. American unilateralism in the Western Hemisphere has been unsheathed, backed by the threat of military force and economic starvation. As the United Nations warns of an impending humanitarian crisis in Cuba, the US shows no sign of relenting in its strangulation of the Díaz-Canel government.
Potential Outcomes:
There are three feasible outcomes, each in line with the current American foreign policy paradigm. The first, and most unlikely, is American direct military intervention in Cuba. While this is certainly a policy that would be in accordance with the phenomenon seen in Operation Absolute Resolve, having to rebuild two governments would echo reminders of Afghanistan and Iraq in many Americans’ minds. Also, any direct military engagement without Congressional approval is bound to garner condemnation from both the left and right, too large a political risk for the Trump Administration to take, especially with the 2026 midterms looming.
The second, and most likely, outcome is that the Cuban government requests a bilateral meeting that President Trump accepts. The Cubans, desperate to strike a deal to lift the oil blockade, are almost forced to pursue this route. Historically, the Second Trump Administration has jumped at these meetings, presenting a list of stringent demands and bending their counterparts’ will, as seen through the attempted strategy of the US-Russia Summit of 2025. The Cubans will likely ultimately concede to some of the stipulations, possibly an oil deal favorable to the US. Like the first possibility, this outcome would establish Washington’s power and control over the Cuban economy, undermining its standing in liberal, multilateral institutions focused on self-determination, though asserting a defined sphere of influence.
The last, and potentially most catastrophic possibility, is that the Cuban government refuses to negotiate with the American delegation. This could result in a dire humanitarian crisis and intense political turmoil. In this scenario, Cuba could become dependent on the United Nations and foreign aid, resembling Haiti’s crisis that started in 2018.
How Cuba fits exactly into the current American grand strategy isn’t clear-cut, but it is apparent that President Trump is moving to reach an agreement favorable to the US or install a new regime, replacing the existing communist state in Cuba. As pressure mounts on the Cuban regime, American power politics and oil tactics will continue to steer the geopolitical future of the Western Hemisphere.