—Dr. Ashish Bharadwaj, Founding Dean, BITS Pilani’s Law School in Mumbai, writer on tech law, IP policy, and constitutional law through political history; and Agustín Ruiz Robledo, Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Granada, and Visiting Professor at BITS Law School, Views of the authors are personal.

India and Spain are two very different and distant countries, both geographically (they are about 7,000 kilometres apart) and culturally. The relations between the two countries have been cordial since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1956 and the first resident Ambassador of India was appointed to Spain six decades ago in 1965.

At first sight, comparing the constitutions of Spain and India may seem of little value. However, a closer look reveals striking similarities in their constitutional texts and in political developments. This is because both countries not only share important structural similarities, but also a common contemporary constitutional challenge: how to preserve democratic constitutionalism in plural societies when elected governments are tempted to stretch constitutional limits and exert growing control over state institutions.

This post argues that India and Spain, despite their different histories and political contexts, face a common test of maintaining constitutional order. Their experiences show both the strengths of inclusive constitutional design and the fragility of constitutional morality when political power seeks to dominate institutions meant to limit it.

Inclusive Constitutional Origins

The first comparison between Indian and Spanish democracies refers to the way in which they were established: both constitutions were born out of periods in which self-government had been suppressed. India emerged from British colonial rule; Spain transitioned from a long authoritarian dictatorship. In both cases, the restoration of political freedom triggered an ambitious constitutional project aimed at inclusion and stability.

The Indian Constituent Assembly of 1946–1949 laid the foundations for a pluralist democratic republic capable of integrating extraordinary linguistic, religious and cultural diversity within a democratic framework. Moreover, the Constitution sought not merely to organise government but to transform society. This ambition required such a detailed constitutional text that it became the longest sovereign constitution in the world.

In Spain, the elected Parliament of 1977–1978 broke with the tradition of partisan constitutions and produced a consensus-based constitution. It established a secular parliamentary monarchy with strong guarantees of fundamental rights, supported by all major political parties and approved by an overwhelming 87 per cent of voters in the referendum of 6 December 1978—almost seventeen million citizens. This broad agreement also led to a very extensive constitutional text, the longest in Spanish history (with the exception of the 1812 Constitution, which included the full regulation of the electoral system).

These origins matter. In both countries, constitutional legitimacy rested not on ideological victory but on compromise. Their constitutions were conceived as common frameworks for coexistence, rather than as instruments of domination by temporary majorities. So, both constitutions organise the state around a parliamentary system and establish a clear separation between public institutions and religious confessions.

Territorial Pluralism and Controlled Decentralisation

A second point of convergence lies in territorial organisation where both States share important similarities in the territorial distribution of political power.

The Indian Constitution created a federal state but granted such extensive powers to the central government that most scholars describe it as a semi federal system or quasi-federal system. Since some Indian states enjoy broader powers than others and the central government directly administer certain territories, this federalism is also described as asymmetrical.

The Spanish Constitution created a system of regional autonomy which, while not unitary, is not fully federal either. It distinguishes between “nationalities” and “regions” and allows for asymmetric self-government: greater powers for autonomous communities based on nationalities that communities based in regions. The authors call this “Autonomous State” or “State of Autonomies”.

As a result, both India and Spain have adopted quasi-federal systems in response to the diversity of their populations. The drafters of both constitutions also shared a concern that strong demands for self-government could lead to secessionist movements. The solution was a model that combines significant regional autonomy with clear constitutional mechanisms to preserve national unity.

In general, the territorial distribution of political power in decentralised states has two effects on their political systems. On the one hand, it creates tensions in the management of public affairs between the two levels of government; but at the same time, these tensions serve as a check on political power, complementing the general checks and balances, which were studied in detail by Daniel Elazar in his now classic 1988 work.   

These effects have been observed at different stages of constitutional development in both Spain and India, when different parties controlled different territorial governments. Recent examples include the Kashmir crisis in India, which saw the revocation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in that territory in 2019. In Spain,  in the current 15th Legislature, there is ongoing tension between the central (socialist) government and the conservative regional governments, especially that of Madrid.

These cases demonstrate that decentralisation can enhance democratic resilience while also exposing constitutional systems to centrifugal pressures requiring clear constitutional responses.

Spanish Influence on the Indian Constitution

There are not only similarities between Indian and Spanish constitutionalism, but also lesser-known lines of influence.

Spain’s 1931 Constitution went beyond protecting civil and political rights and included a wide range of social rights and guiding principles for public authorities, such as free and compulsory primary education, social legislation to protect workers, and the safeguarding of historical and cultural heritage. These principles influenced the Irish Constitution of 1937, which in turn inspired Dr. Ambedkar and the other architects of the Indian Constitution of 1950 when they introduced the ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’.

Constitutional Resilience Under Stress

History is full of beautifully written constitutions that collapsed shortly after their adoption due to political crises. By contrast, both the Spanish and Indian Constitutions have not only survived very difficult moments but have played a decisive role in preserving democracy in these two countries. To illustrate this point, we highlight two particularly difficult moments.

In India, the survival of constitutional democracy during the Emergency declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi between 1975 and 1977 was not accidental, but the result of several structural features of the constitutional system. Federal pluralism limited the reach of central power, as opposition parties continued to govern important states and preserved alternative centres of political legitimacy. An independent judiciary, although initially deferential, later reaffirmed its constitutional role by restoring judicial review and fundamental rights, most notably after the Emergency ended. At the same time, constitutionally protected freedom of expression and a vibrant civil society enabled political mobilisation and public debate, contributing to the eventual electoral defeat of the ruling party and the restoration of democratic normalcy.

In Spain, constitutional mechanisms similarly proved decisive in moments of acute constitutional crisis. Following the attempted military coup of 23 February 1981, the constitutional order was preserved through the firm assertion of civilian supremacy, parliamentary legitimacy and constitutional loyalty by key institutions. More recently, the unilateral secessionist challenge launched by Catalan authorities in 2017 was addressed through a combination of judicial review by the Constitutional Court, which annulled unconstitutional acts, and the temporary activation of Article 155 of the Constitution, allowing the central government to restore constitutional legality while maintaining democratic procedures. In both episodes, constitutional institutions functioned not merely as formal safeguards, but as effective instruments for defending democratic continuity under extraordinary pressure.

For these reasons, and without forcing comparisons, it can be said that the Constitutions of India and Spain share important structural and philosophical similarities, particularly in balancing central authority and regional autonomy within diverse societies. Both emphasise democratic governance through parliamentary institutions, the rule of law, and social welfare principles.

The Shared Contemporary Challenge: Constitutional Overreach

Despite their resilience, both democracies now face a similar risk. The most serious threat no longer comes from external enemies or revolutionary movements, nor from openly authoritarian governments, but from elected governments that seek to expand their power beyond constitutional boundaries.

India and Spain governments differ sharply in ideology: the Indian government is conservative and strongly influenced by religious nationalism, while Spain’s current government is left-wing and firmly secular. Yet in both countries, critics have raised concerns about the politicisation of independent institutions, pressure on the media, and attempts to reshape constitutional rules to fit partisan agendas. Independent international reports, such as the Democracy Report 2025 by V-Dem (University of Gothenburg) and the Human Freedom Index by the Cato Institute and the Fraser Institute,  reflect these worries.

In addition, governing political forces in both countries have shown a willingness to amend their Constitutions to reflect their own political visions, even at the risk of breaking the original constitutional consensus.

The danger is subtle but profound. When constitutional change becomes a tool of political convenience rather than a reflection of broad consensus, the constitution risks losing its role as a common framework and becoming instead an instrument of domination.

Despite these concerns, there are reasons for cautious optimism.  Both Indian and Spanish societies have demonstrated a strong capacity for democratic resistance and civic engagement. Their constitutional cultures are rooted in long traditions of pluralism and tolerance, traditions that in India can be traced back to of Emperor Ashoka, a symbol of early pluralism and respect for diversity; and in Spain to the Decreta of León of the twelve Century, the oldest documentary manifestation of the parliamentary system.

These traditions are essential for building a democratic state that respects constitutional supremacy, independent judicial control, and the effective protection of fundamental rights. Our optimism is grounded in the fact that both societies have developed, based on their constitutions, a democratic civic culture that is not easily dismantled.

Ambedkar would be pleased to see that his wise warning from 1948 has been heeded: “constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment; it has to be cultivated through education and adherence to the Constitution.”

Suggested citation: Dr. Ashish Bharadwaj and Agustín Ruiz Robledo, India and Spain: Two Democracies, One Constitutional Challenge, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Feb. 13, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/india-and-spain-two-democracies-one-constitutional-challenge/