LONG before phrases like “rules-based order” and “freedom of navigation operations,” which are US strategic messaging, dominated headlines, the relationship between the Philippines and China was shaped not by rivalry but by exchange, migration and shared struggle. Trade between Chinese merchants and precolonial Philippine polities flourished centuries before Western colonization. Cultural and familial ties were formed long before the United States annexed the archipelago or Japan occupied it during World War II.
This deeper history matters, especially at a time when extra-regional powers are increasingly inserting themselves into the South China Sea (SCS) disputes, often under the banner of security and order.
To understand where the Philippines stands today, one must recover and remember historical memory, particularly the under-narrated story of Chinese-Filipino resistance against Japanese occupation during World War II. That history clarifies simplistic geopolitical narratives and reminds us that the foundations of Sino-Philippine relations were forged not in rivalry, but in shared sacrifice and bloodshed.
Shared resistance against fascism
From a Philippine historical and societal perspective, the participation of overseas Chinese in anti-Japanese resistance during World War II is real, respected, yet insufficiently foregrounded in national memory.
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When Japan invaded and occupied the Philippines, overseas Chinese communities were explicitly targeted. Imperial Japan regarded them as extensions of Chinese resistance to fascism and its aggression in Asia. Many Chinese-Filipinos, already rooted in Philippine society, responded not as detached foreigners but as residents defending their homes, families and adopted country. This period is remembered in three key ways:
1. Proof of shared sacrifice, not divided loyalty. The participation of Chinese-Filipino fighters dismantles the stereotype that Chinese communities were perpetual outsiders concerned only with commerce. They fought, bled and died alongside Filipinos. This was solidarity in action.
2. A “quiet history” overshadowed by dominant narratives. Philippine WW2 memory tends to emphasize US-Philippine military cooperation and Japanese atrocities. Ethnic-specific guerrilla resistance stories, including those of Chinese-Filipinos, were absorbed into broader narratives rather than highlighted in their own right.
3. A counter-memory to present-day suspicions. In moments of geopolitical tension, this wartime history serves as a moral reminder: “Chinese” is not synonymous with aggressor. There was a time when Filipinos and Chinese stood on the same side of history, against fascist imperial violence.
The Wha Chi and integrated resistance
One of the clearest examples of Sino-Philippine wartime cooperation was the Wha Chi (Chinese Guerrilla Forces) in Luzon. Composed largely of overseas Chinese, Wha Chi units conducted sabotage operations against Japanese forces, gathered intelligence for Allied and Filipino guerrillas, and coordinated with Filipino resistance groups such as the Hukbalahap.
This was not an isolated ethnic militia operating in a vacuum. It was integrated resistance. Chinese-Filipino communities also organized support networks, raising funds, supplying food and medicine, sheltering guerrillas and maintaining underground communication lines. Civilian participation was often as dangerous as combat, given Japanese reprisals.
This shared history of resistance provides a non-transactional moral foundation for the long-held friendship between the Philippines and China. It is not about aid packages, infrastructure loans or diplomatic statements. It is about bloodshed endured together.
External powers
then and now
It is historically ironic that the Philippines, a country colonized by Spain, occupied by Japan and annexed by the US, now finds itself in a maritime dispute in which two former imperial powers, Japan and the US, play increasingly prominent roles.
Japan today frames its involvement in the SCS as support for international law and a “rules-based order.” It participates in joint military exercises, usually conducted by the Philippines and the US.
Yet Japan is not a claimant state in the SCS. It has no territorial or maritime entitlement in the dispute. Its actions, while framed as principled, functionally insert it into the balance-of-power equation. This external securitization risks internationalizing what is fundamentally a dispute among specific claimants.
Similarly, the US, though not even a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), has positioned itself as a primary defender of maritime order in the region. Washington conducts freedom-of-navigation operations, strengthens military alliances and, like Japan, deceptively emphasizes that the 2016 arbitration ruling is definitive, which in truth it is not.
The US invokes Unclos norms but has never ratified the treaty. It is not an SCS claimant, nor is it legally bound by the convention it champions. Its involvement is strategic rather than juridical.
While the Philippines is treaty-allied with the US, this alliance does not erase the fact that the US is an external actor with global strategic interests and geopolitical rivalry with China that extend beyond the immediate concerns of the regional claimants in the SCS dispute.
The problem with militarized ‘order’
Both Japan and the US justify their presence as a means of stabilizing. Yet increased and intensified joint military exercises, the deployment of missile systems (the Typhon missile system) and alliance signaling transform the SCS from a legal-diplomatic dispute into a strategic-military theater.
Military balancing may deter escalation in the short term. But deterrence is not dispute resolution.
Unclos itself emphasizes: delimitation by agreement, provisional arrangements pending final settlement and mutual restraint.
The 2016 arbitral ruling did not resolve sovereignty over features, nor did it delimit overlapping exclusive economic zones. It is not recognized by other SCS claimant-states. Treating it as a comprehensive settlement misrepresents its scope and its essence.
Thus, Japan and the US are trying to push the Philippines to externalize its security rather than invest in regional diplomacy. The more the SCS becomes a platform for great-power signaling, the further genuine settlement recedes.
The fundamental
path forward
The SCS dispute cannot be resolved through external pressure or legal absolutism. Durable peace requires four interlocking principles:
1. Claimant-led negotiations. Disputes must be resolved by those directly involved. Third parties should facilitate dialogue, not substitute for it.
2. Unclos as framework, not weapon. Unclos is process-oriented. Selective invocation undermines its integrity.
3. De-securitization: Prioritizing fisheries management, environmental protection and joint resource development reduces zero-sum dynamics.
4. Asean centrality. Regional ownership through a meaningful Code of Conduct and confidence-building mechanisms is essential.
External powers like Japan and the US should support Asean diplomacy rather than overshadow it.
Conclusion
Recovering the story of Chinese-Filipino wartime resistance is not about nostalgia or political instrumentalization. It is about reminding both societies that cooperation is not alien to their history. China and the Philippines interacted long before colonial intervention. The shared struggle against Japanese occupation further deepened these ties.
This does not erase present disagreements. Shared sacrifice does not mandate automatic political alignment. But it establishes a moral truth: Filipinos and Chinese once chose solidarity over fear in the face of imperial aggression. Remembering this history provides strategic clarity.
Durable peace and security in the SCS will not come from military alliances or deterrence. It will come from claimant-led compromise, Asean-centered diplomacy and a deliberate effort to insulate regional disputes from great-power rivalry.
And perhaps, if both Filipinos and Chinese remember that they once stood shoulder to shoulder against fascist violence, they may rediscover that solidarity, however imperfect, is not beyond reach again.