Before rushing toward a confrontation between the United States and Iran, it is worth pausing to consider the consequences — not only the conduct of the conflict itself, but the regional order that would emerge the day after.
Rather than being swayed by declarations and rhetorical noise, we should examine the underlying interests and the real diplomatic vectors at play. Even if Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia publicly express concern over Iran’s nuclear ambitions and support diplomatic arrangements, in practice they could emerge stronger from an Iranian defeat — potentially deepening their alignment with a Chinese or multipolar axis rather than with Washington.
This concern calls for careful strategic thinking: how to compel Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions without simultaneously strengthening rival camps to the United States.
To achieve this, Washington must rely not only on military power but also on diplomatic statecraft. Over the years, the United States has signed security, economic, and strategic agreements with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, while providing substantial economic support to Egypt. It should therefore use these levers of influence to ensure that regional outcomes serve its broader objectives. After the strike — if it comes — it may be too late to shape the reality.
Iran has indeed been weakened in the Mediterranean arena following the blows it absorbed from Israel and the United States, and its ties with China and Russia remain largely economic and commercial.
Yet in recent weeks, a regional dynamic has been taking shape that deserves close attention.
President Erdoğan’s visits to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the deepening security ties between Riyadh and Ankara, the reinforcement of Turkish forces in Somalia, and Egyptian involvement there — against the backdrop of tensions with Ethiopia and disputes surrounding Somaliland — all point to the emergence of a new center of interests in the Horn of Africa.
Qatar continues to play a central role, while the focus on Gaza’s reconstruction and other regional initiatives adds a political dimension linking multiple arenas.
Taken together, these developments raise the possibility of a regional axis — Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, and Somalia, with links to Pakistan and China — that does not necessarily align with American or Indian interests and may not support advancing IMEC in its original form.
At the same time, another axis appears to be consolidating, including India, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Israel, backed by the United States and the European Union.
One point should be clear: without Saudi Arabia, there is no IMEC — and Riyadh is expanding its room for maneuver, including closer ties with Qatar and deeper regional cooperation. Meanwhile, tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi remain a significant factor.
The UAE’s involvement in civilian initiatives in Gaza also reflects a desire not to leave the arena solely to Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt — and to strengthen an alternative alignment.
The comparison to the strategic mistake made after the Gulf War — when weakening Iraq indirectly strengthened Iran — is more than a historical lesson. Then, the focus was on unconventional weapons; today, the nuclear danger is more tangible.
The American–Israeli dilemma remains: how to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state without simultaneously strengthening the Turkish–Egyptian–Chinese axis and competing regional camps.
Rafi Glick is a writer, lecturer, farmer, and business executive with decades of experience at the intersection of academia, technology, agriculture, and international trade.
• He has served as a Senior Teaching Associate at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Ono Academic College, Ariel University, Ruppin Academic Center, and as a guest lecturer at Sofia University’s Faculty of Economics and Business Administration (FEBA). At Ben-Gurion University he also advised the BGU–NHSA Accelerator in the Faculty of Science.
• In business, Rafi was CEO of Bidsnet Ltd., a pioneer in deploying fiber-optic cables through unconventional infrastructure (in partnership with CableRunner), delivering high-speed connectivity to homes, enterprises, institutions, and cellular networks. Earlier he held senior roles at ECI Telecom and served on the board of RLF Venture Capital, working with partners such as Intel, Teva, and the Jerusalem Development Authority.
• He contributed extensively to Israel’s trade and investment ecosystem: he directed industrial and agricultural technology divisions at the Israel Export Institute, founded Israel’s AGRITECH as international exhibition, and served on the board of the Israeli Investment Center at the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
• In his early career, Rafi established and served as the first director of the Cargo and Aircraft Supply Security Department in the Security Division at Ben-Gurion Airport (1972–1976). He lived in Kibbutz Parod until 1974.
• Rafi has also been recognized for his writing: in 2008 he was named Best Economic Blogger by TheMarker, Israel’s leading business daily.
• Today he continues to publish essays and commentary—with a special passion for astrophysics, space exploration, technology, economics, and social issues.
From Kibbutz Parod to the global stage, Rafi Glick’s career reflects a lifelong commitment to building connections—between people, industries, and ideas.
Email: rafi.glick@gmail.com