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The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cannot verify whether Iran has suspended “all enrichment-related activities,” according to a confidential IAEA report seen by the Associated Press on February 27.[i] The report states that the IAEA does not know the location, size, or composition of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile.[ii] Iran had over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[iii] The IAEA has observed “regular vehicular activity” around the entrance to the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), where at least part of Iran’s enriched uranium is reportedly stored.[iv] The United States and Israel struck the ENTC during the Israel-Iran War.[v] The Institute for Science and International Security reported on February 9 that Iran has covered the ENTC’s middle and southern tunnel entrances with soil to protect them from potential US or Israeli airstrikes.[vi] The IAEA has also observed activity at Natanz and Fordow but cannot verify the purpose or nature of this activity, according to the February 27 IAEA report.[vii] Iran has covered the anti-drone cage at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz with panels.[viii] The Institute assessed in December 2025 that the panels indicate that Iran is attempting to explore the rubble at the site discreetly.[ix] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi announced on February 26 that Iranian and IAEA officials will meet in Vienna on March 2 and that both sides are preparing documents for the meeting.[x] The upcoming Iran-IAEA meeting coincides with the start of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on March 2.[xi]

The IAEA report comes amid US officials’ concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. US Vice President JD Vance stated on February 25 that the United States has “seen evidence” that Iran is trying to rebuild its nuclear weapons program.[xii] Vance met with Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi in Washington, DC, on February 27 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[xiii] Busaidi stated after the meeting that Iran has agreed to dilute its enriched uranium stockpile to the “lowest level possible” and convert it into fuel.[xiv] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio separately stated on February 25 that Iran is “not enriching now” but is trying “to get to the point where [it] ultimately can.”[xv]  

Iranians continued to hold anti-regime protests during 40-day mourning ceremonies across Iran. CTP-ISW recorded four protests, including two large protests, at 40-day mourning ceremonies across four provinces on February 27.[xvi] CTP-ISW defines large protests as protests with over 1,000 participants. The 40th day of mourning marks the end of the initial mourning period and is often observed with public commemorations and gatherings in Shia Islam. Numerous anti-regime protests have taken place at 40-day mourning ceremonies in recent weeks.[xvii]

CTP-ISW did not record any protests at Iranian universities or schools on February 27.[xviii] There are no classes at universities and schools on Fridays since Friday is part of the Iranian weekend, which may have contributed to the lack of protest activity on February 27. Many students live in university dormitories and would therefore presumably still be able to organize protests on the weekend, however. Multiple Iranian universities have also moved instruction online until late March 2026, likely in an effort to reduce opportunities for protests.[xix]

Key Takeaways

Iranian Nuclear Program: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cannot verify whether Iran has suspended “all enrichment-related activities,” according to a confidential February 27 IAEA report. The IAEA report comes amid US officials’ concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Iranian Protest Activity: Iranians held at least four anti-regime protests at 40-day mourning ceremonies across four provinces on February 27. CTP-ISW did not record any protests at Iranian universities on February 26, which marks the second consecutive day that CTP-ISW has not observed protest activity at universities.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

The Syrian government is reportedly planning to lessen Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s executive authority by delegating some of his responsibilities to other government officials in the coming weeks.[xx] The Syrian government will likely remain highly centralized and under Shara’s control despite these reported changes. Shara will reportedly appoint a prime minister to head the transitional government, according to New Lines Magazine on February 27.[xxi] Shara has been serving as the “de facto” prime minister since coming to power. One of the front-runners for the premiership is current Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, who is one of Shara’s closest advisers.[xxii] Shaibani has wielded enormous influence within the Syrian transitional government as Foreign Minister and supervisor to the General Secretariat of Political Affairs, which oversees government institutions and bureaucracy.[xxiii] Shara will also reportedly transfer his role as chair of the National Security Council to current Interior Minister Anas Khattab, another close Shara ally.[xxiv] Shara’s reported “reshuffle” does not constitute a meaningful devolution of Shara’s central authority given that his closest advisers would assume positions in his place. Shara would therefore be able to continue to exert close personal control over key Syrian government and security structures. 

The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continue to take steps to implement the January 30 agreement but some of the agreement’s clauses remain unfulfilled ahead of the agreement’s February 28 deadline. The 14-point January 30 agreement outlines four phases of implementation to be completed before the end of February 2026.[xxv] The Syrian Interior Ministry assumed control over the SDF internal security directorate in Kobani, Aleppo Province, on February 27.[xxvi] An Interior Ministry delegation met with the SDF internal security forces (known as Asayish) commander for Kobani to discuss integrating SDF internal security forces into the Interior Ministry.[xxvii] Syrian government internal security forces will reportedly jointly deploy with Asayish forces to checkpoints at the entrance of Kobani on February 28 after Syrian army and SDF units withdraw from them, according to a source.[xxviii] The source added that the Syrian government will likely open the roads to Kobani on March 2.[xxix] This step would effectively end the government’s “siege” on Kobani, which has faced food, water, and electricity shortages since January 20.[xxx] The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) and Asayish also jointly deployed to checkpoints in Jalabiya, Aleppo Province, on February 27.[xxxi] The GSS and Asayish first deployed joint checkpoints in al Shouyoukh, Aleppo Province, southwest of Kobani, on February 4.[xxxii]

The SDF appears to be taking steps to integrate four brigades into the Ministry of Defense (MoD). These brigades include three in Hasakah Province and one in Kobani, as stipulated by the January 30 agreement.[xxxiii] A Kurdish journalist published photos of SDF commander Mazloum Abdi with four commanders.[xxxiv] These commanders may be the commanders who will lead the SDF brigades in the MoD.[xxxv] Neither the SDF nor the Syrian government has commented on the four brigade commanders at the time of this writing, however.  

Hasakah Province Internal Security Commander Brigadier General Marwan al Ali and proposed Deputy Internal Security Director Siamand Afrin continued to hold meetings with local leaders in northeastern Syria. Ali and Afrin met with Shammar tribe leader Sheikh Maan Hamidi al Daham and the Sanadid Forces Bandar al Daham commander in Tall Kojer, Hasakah Province.[xxxvi] The Shammar Tribe and Sanadid Forces defected from the SDF to the Syrian government on January 20 during the MoD’s offensive against the SDF.[xxxvii]  

The SDF and Syrian government still disagree on certain clauses of the January 30 agreement, however. These disputes include disagreements over Kurdish language policy and the SDF’s handover of energy infrastructure to the government. The January 30 agreement stipulates that the Education Ministry and the SDF will discuss the educational curriculum for Kurdish communities.[xxxviii] The SDF reportedly demanded that the Education Ministry provide full Kurdish translations of the Syrian curriculum and that the curriculum be taught in Kurdish in predominantly Kurdish areas.[xxxix] President Ahmed al Shara declared on January 22 that the Kurdish language would only be taught as an elective class twice a week in predominantly Kurdish areas, however.  The January 30 agreement also stipulates that the SDF must hand over its oil fields to the government.[xl] The director of the Syrian Petroleum Company told Syrian state media on February 26 that the SDF has not handed over the Rumaylan oil field to the Syrian government.[xli]

The January 30 agreement requires the Syrian government and the SDF to conduct a prisoner swap in the third phase of the agreement.[xlii] The government and the SDF have not conducted a prisoner swap as of February 27. The continued cooperation between the Syrian government and the SDF on all the other requirements of the third phase suggests that the January 30 agreement’s February 28 deadline will not prevent both parties from fulfilling this phase, however.

The SDF continues to pursue Kurdish political representation within the Syrian government to secure Kurdish rights and maintain its political influence. A delegation from the SDF’s political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), met with Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry representatives on February 26, including American Affairs Director Qutaiba Idlibi and Latin American Affairs Director Ali Qara.[xliii] The SDC stated that these meetings aimed to enhance communication between the two sides and explore prospects for political dialogue and joint coordination.[xliv] Idlibi emphasized the importance of increasing the SDC’s communication with the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s General Secretariat for Political Affairs.[xlv] Shara established the General Secretariat for Political Affairs under the Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry in March 2025 to “oversee domestic political activities.”[xlvi] Each province in Syria has a General Secretariat for Political Affairs director who serves as a direct line of communication to Shara and enables Shara to monitor political activities at a local level.[xlvii]

AANES Foreign Affairs Co-Chair Ilham Ahmed separately told Kurdish media on February 26 that Syrian Kurdish groups are considering forming a unified political bloc to coordinate efforts before re-engaging with the Syrian government.[xlviii] SDF commander Mazloum Abdi similarly announced on February 16 that the Democratic Union Party (PYD), Kurdish National Council (KNC), and other smaller parties had come together to create a “Kurdish political body.”[xlix] Ahmed likely calculates that a unified Kurdish party in Syria would help advance Kurdish policy and rights in Damascus ahead of the planned Syrian constitutional referendum in 2030.[l] Ahmed may also consider Kurdish political unity as a necessary defensive measure against Syrian government attempts to divide Kurdish parties. KNC officials reportedly traveled to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara on February 3 without the support or foreknowledge of the PYD, which possibly reflected an effort by Shara to divide Kurdish political parties.[li]

 

A pro-government Suwaydawi Druze commander met with Trump administration officials and US congressional members in Washington, DC, on February 26, likely to rally US political support for the Syrian government’s campaign to re-integrate Suwayda Province into the state.[lii]  Suleiman Abdel Baqi held “high-level security meetings” to discuss Suwayda Province with officials close to US Vice President JD Vance, other unspecified White House officials, and US congressional members in Washington, DC, on February 26.[liii] Abdel Baqi is a Druze militia leader who currently serves as the Interior Ministry’s commander for Suwayda City, even though Suwayda City is currently outside of government control.[liv]  The United States is currently mediating negotiations between the Syrian government, the anti-government Druze coalition that controls Suwayda Province, and other Druze leaders within the province.[lv] Abdel Baqi likely seeks US support for the re-integration of Suwayda Province into the Syrian state because he appears to be one of several officials overseeing these efforts in Suwayda.[lvi] The Syrian government likely seeks to leverage its current relationship with the Trump administration to advocate and build support for the Syrian state’s objectives regarding Suwayda Province.

The Syrian GSS thwarted an attempted Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) attack targeting a GSS checkpoint in Deir ez Zor Province on February 27. This attack follows the Islamic State’s (IS) recent call for increased attacks against Syrian government targets.[lvii] ISIS fighters on a motorcycle attempted to attack a GSS checkpoint near al Kasrah, Deir ez Zor Province, on February 27.[lviii] GSS forces killed one of the ISIS fighters while the other fighter fled the scene.[lix] IS-affiliated social media accounts recently called on fighters to intensify attacks against the government using motorcycles and firearms on February 22.[lx] The Syrian government banned motorcycles in Tabqa and Raqqa cities, Raqqa Province, on February 23 after ISIS attacks in both cities but has not yet implemented a similar ban in Deir ez Zor Province.[lxi] The GSS separately arrested an alleged ISIS fighter in Jarablus, Aleppo Province, on February 27, who has conducted three improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against military and civilian targets since 2022.[lxii]

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its Yemen coverage starting on January 9.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a series of airstrikes targeting eight Hezbollah Radwan Force camps in Baalbek and Hermel districts, northeastern Lebanon, on February 26 as part of the IDF’s campaign to curb Hezbollah’s reconstitution efforts.[lxiii] The IDF reported that it struck a “large quantity” of Hezbollah weapons, including rockets, stored at the camps.[lxiv] The IDF published a video of secondary explosions at one of the camps, indicating the presence of ammunition at the site.[lxv] The IDF said that Hezbollah used the camps to train fighters to increase “emergency preparedness” and conduct attacks against the IDF and Israel.[lxvi] The Radwan Force is Hezbollah’s special operations forces unit created to conduct offensive operations into Israeli territory.[lxvii] Syrian media reported on February 26 that Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, which is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran to Hezbollah, also used the camps to smuggle weapons and funds from Iran to Lebanon via Syria.[lxviii] Israel previously targeted members of Hezbollah’s missile array, including at least three commanders, in Baalbek District on February 20.[lxix] Israel has prioritized striking Hezbollah infrastructure, including multiple Radwan sites, north of the Litani River in recent months.[lxx]

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