Mark Krikorian is an immigration expert who has served as Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) since 1995, an organization that focuses on the economic and social impact of immigration in the United States. Recognized for his influential role in shaping the immigration policy debate, he is the author of several books, including The New Case Against Immigration: Both Legal and Illegal and How Obama Is Transforming America Through Immigration. Krikorian has testified frequently before Congress and has been interviewed by numerous media outlets, making him a key figure in the national conversation on immigration reform. He was a distinguished speaker at the Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC) Summit on Reclaiming the West, where he sat down with Hungarian Conservative to discuss the results of the Trump 2.0 immigration crackdown so far, as well as broader trends in Europe and Hungary’s role as a forerunner in border protection.

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The second Trump administration came to power a little more than a year ago with a clear mandate to dismantle mass migration and secure the borders. From your perspective, what results has this stricter immigration policy delivered so far?

I would start with the question of the mandate. The mandate, I think, was mainly about border control. I wish it were broader because my critique of immigration includes legal immigration as well—we simply have too much immigration. The president does not actually believe that. He is not an immigration restrictionist. He is a pro-law enforcement, anti-illegal immigration person, and that is what he talked about constantly. So in a sense, the mandate really was more limited, to be perfectly honest, even though I would personally welcome a broader one.

The first objective was stopping the uncontrolled movement of people across the border, particularly the Mexican border. That has happened almost instantly. Under Biden, roughly eight to ten million people crossed the border illegally, and most of them were simply released into the country by the administration. That stopped almost immediately. It is actually remarkable. The level of illegal crossings at the Mexican border now is probably lower than at any time since the 19th century. It is that complete. So that goal has been achieved almost immediately.

In a sense, that success also undermines the president’s broader ambitions because he has fixed the problem that was visible to everyone and constantly in the news. Now many people are asking: ‘What exactly is the remaining problem?’

‘The level of illegal crossings at the Mexican border now is probably lower than at any time since the 19th century’

The second part of the mandate—less clearly defined—was to undo the damage done under Biden and remove those eight or ten million people from the country. That is a much more difficult task. Progress there is incomplete, but there has been progress. On the other hand, the administration underestimated the political difficulties involved.

What we saw in Minneapolis illustrates this. The administration did not fully appreciate that people support immigration enforcement in principle—even now polling shows a clear majority of Americans want all illegal immigrants removed—but they do not necessarily want to see how it happens in practice.

I had a graduate school adviser who used to joke, in the context of foreign policy, that the American public supports every step short of actual action. People support a goal, but they do not necessarily want the difficult measures required to achieve it. That is more or less what we are seeing here.

After the backlash in Minneapolis, the administration adjusted its tactics somewhat, but the overall strategy remains intact. Progress will inevitably be slower in this phase. It is much easier to turn off the faucet than it is to mop up the floor after the bathtub has overflowed. But things are moving in the right direction.

If I had to grade the administration so far, I would give it a B+, perhaps. It is clearly better than anything we have seen before, although there is still much work to be done.

What should the next steps be?

The most important next step is employment-based enforcement. The president likes to focus on criminal illegal immigrants—going after the worst offenders. That is an important objective, and the administration is doing it.

But most illegal immigrants are not rapists or drug dealers or murderers. They have broken immigration laws, of course, but most of them are simply working people living their lives. Those people will not leave voluntarily just because the government is making a public show of arresting criminals.

I fully support going after violent offenders whom sanctuary cities have released back into the community. But employment-based enforcement is the only way to persuade ordinary illegal immigrants that the situation has changed—that the party is over and it is time to go home.

This includes worksite enforcement. If authorities have intelligence that a workplace employs a large number of illegal workers, they should raid the site, arrest those who are in the country illegally, and deport them. But enforcement can also happen through administrative measures.

For example, the Social Security Administration has hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions—of payroll records submitted by employers that do not match its database. That usually indicates the use of fake or stolen identification. Currently nothing is done with this information. That must change.

In other words, this is phase two of the effort to reverse the consequences of the Biden-era immigration policies: first addressing criminals and the most visible cases, and then enforcing immigration law in the labour market.

According to Mark Krikorian, the next phase to reverse the consequences of the Biden-era immigration policies is to enforce immigration law in the labour market. PHOTO: Tamás Gyurkovits/Hungarian Conservative

Is there a way to achieve that?

Yes, but it is more difficult politically. Securing the border against illegal crossings is comparatively straightforward. It requires resources and effort, but it does not generate major tensions within the president’s coalition.

Workplace enforcement is different. Republicans receive significant support from the business community, both large and small. Many businesses prefer to keep employing illegal workers—or sometimes temporary visa workers. That creates tensions and makes enforcement politically more complicated.

It is not impossible, but it will slow progress and make the results less clear-cut. Another complication is that the president himself has occasionally expressed ambivalence about worksite enforcement.

He has sometimes said that many illegal workers are ‘good people’ working on farms, in hotels, or in restaurants, and that some solution should allow them to stay. But many of his voters do not share that view, which creates political contradictions.

None of this means progress is impossible. It simply means it will be slower and more politically complex.

Going back to the issue of border security: Hungary was essentially the only European country to introduce strict border control in 2015, which was noticed by many Republicans in the United States as well. To what extent has Hungary’s anti-immigration policy influenced the Trump administration?

I think it has had an influence, though perhaps not among ordinary voters. Americans tend to be somewhat parochial—speaking as a proud, patriotic American myself. Most Americans know Hungary exists, but not much beyond that. That is simply the reality of living in a continent-sized country.

‘Hungary’s example…demonstrates that at least one EU member state has resisted the prevailing trend’

However, the conservative intellectual and policy elite are much more aware of developments in Europe and are familiar with Hungary’s experience. The government’s success in controlling the country’s borders and its insistence on national sovereignty have had a clear inspirational effect on conservative policymakers and intellectuals in the United States, even if the average voter does not closely follow European politics.

Hungary’s stance on migration has also influenced political movements across Europe, including leading opposition parties such as AfD in Germany and National Rally in France. Yet the European Union’s migration policy remains largely ineffective. Do you think meaningful reform is possible? Or are we bound to move toward the ‘civilizational suicide’ that JD Vance warned about in Munich?

You probably know Europe better than I do, but I think that eventually public demand for preserving national societies will prevail. The desire to defend Frenchness in France, Germanness in Germany, and similar national identities will ultimately shape political outcomes.

We are already seeing signs of this. For example, AfD has dramatically increased its vote share in regions such as Baden-Württemberg, where it historically had little support. Even voters in western Germany are beginning to recognize the scale of the problem.

Hungary’s example is important in that regard. It demonstrates that at least one EU member state has resisted the prevailing trend. Slovakia has taken similar steps to some degree, and governments in the Czech Republic and Poland also pursued stricter policies. Hungary shows that it is possible to defend national sovereignty within the EU framework. That example matters for voters across Europe.

Eventually policy will change. In a democracy, if people want something strongly enough for a long enough time, they will get it. The obstacle is that political elites remain deeply committed to multiculturalism and open borders and are often hostile to the idea of protecting their own societies and historical identities.

That makes change slower and more difficult. But eventually public pressure will prevail. I would describe my outlook as pessimistically optimistic: change will not happen tomorrow, but the direction is gradually shifting.

Mr Krikorian expressed hope that eventually public pressure will prevail and European elites break with the current flawed migration policy of the EU. PHOTO: Tamás Gyurkovits/Hungarian Conservative

It has now been more than ten years since the 2015 migration crisis. Some analysts warn that the war in Iran could trigger a similar migration wave toward Europe. If that happens, do you think European nation states—not the EU, but individual countries—have learned the lessons of 2015 and would introduce stricter border controls similar to Hungary’s?

I think the answer is yes. Of course, the first question is whether Iran will collapse in a way similar to Syria, producing civil war and mass displacement. That is a possibility. On the other hand, Iran is a more coherent state than some of the countries that previously collapsed.

But even if Iran did collapse in a manner similar to Syria or Afghanistan, a migration crisis would only occur if European political leaders allowed it. There are always two sides to such crises.

The 2015 migration crisis happened largely because of policy choices—most notably Angela Merkel’s decision to open Germany’s borders and the EU’s broader policy response. It was not inevitable.

‘A migration crisis would only occur if European political leaders allowed it’

Even if Iran destabilizes, it will only become a migration crisis if the EU or European governments permit it to become one. I believe that if such a situation occurs, far more countries than just Hungary will respond by tightening border controls.

We already see early signs of this. For example, Austria has become more cautious about migrants arriving through Italy and so on. If such measures already exist on a small scale, they will expand significantly if Iran produces another migration wave. In that case, Hungary will certainly not be alone in trying to prevent a repeat of the 2015 crisis.

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