Ken Jimbo is Professor of International Relations at Keio University and a former Special Advisor to the Minister of Defense. He earned his PhD in Media and Governance from Keio University. His fields of expertise include international security, Asia–Pacific security, and US defence policy. He has held his current position at Keio University since 2008 and concurrently serves as Managing Director of the International House of Japan and President of the Asia Pacific Initiative.
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The China–Japan relationship is at its lowest level in years. Who is to blame for that?
Well, the Japan–China relationship has indeed gone through a difficult period of time. It has been quite difficult for the new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, to manage the current dynamics of the relationship. But generally speaking, recently we have also had a period of win–win cooperation. If we go back to the 2018–2020 period, Prime Minister Abe was trying to reach out to China in a much more positive sense, and many forms of cooperation were possible. Back in 2020 we also sent an invitation to President Xi Jinping to come to Japan as a state guest. But now, I think we are at a very gloomy period in managing the relationship.
Where does the responsibility lie—on your side or the Chinese side?
Well, I think many negative, punishment-type reaching-out activities were done by China. Japan has been in a stable position on the One China principle and on its basic position on the Japan–China relationship. It has been agreed between the two sides in the so-called four basic documents since 1972. They came up with mutually acceptable terminology on how we try to see the essential questions on Taiwan, for example. But I guess there has been a huge mismatch between what has been agreed upon in diplomacy versus what is developing geopolitically surrounding the Taiwan Strait.
Because there is a ‘survival-threatening situation’, as Takaichi said. It is a legal terminology to apply Japan’s commitment to the exercising of collective self-defence. So if the United States decides to engage in the Taiwan contingency, even if Japan is not directly attacked by the adversary, we are able to support the US operation by jointly responding to the adversaries. For an expert like me, it is quite natural that we are preparing for that scenario too. And it is evidently clear in the power dynamics.
‘“Survival threatening situation”…is a legal terminology to apply Japan’s commitment to the exercising of collective self-defence’
Last November in the Japanese parliament, your Prime Minister suggested openly that Japan would activate the self-defence forces in case China attempted to invade Taiwan. Was it a surprise for you?
It was my surprise, because it was a protocol for the leader not to mention Taiwan. My interpretation of Takaichi’s statement is that it was very much accidental, in the sense that she wasn’t intending to deliver specifically on this. It was a statement made in response to a question from opposition parliamentary members who kept asking her about it. I don’t think that Takaichi anticipated such an escalation could happen in the Japan–China relationship.
But again, this comes down to Chinese political dynamics, because Takaichi is a conservative leader and she has a track record of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, which is a controversial religious facility. For China, it is a red line for prime ministers to visit, because of the association with the past glory of imperialism in Japan. But with that, it is my anticipation that the Chinese Foreign Ministry recommended to President Xi that this is the person he should meet, because she respects Prime Minister Abe and she can be the person who can really deliver the same format of the Japan–China relationship
And the meeting happened between them.
Yes, it happened in Korea, and they shook hands.
There was a tense meeting, but at least it happened.
That’s correct. But I think there were a lot of unfortunate developments since then. One is the photo-shooting opportunity between Takaichi and the Taiwanese representatives at APEC, which prompted quite a furious response from the Chinese counterpart. And then came the statement made by Takaichi on Taiwan.
Ken Jimbo PHOTO: Tamás Gyurkovits/Hungarian Conservative
I guess she can do it after just recently winning the snap election. She’s a very strong leader. She has a mandate to lead a brave foreign policy. And I guess she wouldn’t say this if there weren’t a strong army behind her. Is the Japanese defense force strong enough to deter the big Chinese army?
Well, we are in the process of enhancing our defence capability in a much more robust manner than previous developments in the history of the Japanese Self-Defence Force. This historic period began under Prime Minister Kishida.
At the time you were adviser to the Minister of Defence, right?
Not directly.
But you were involved in writing a new national security strategy, weren’t you?
You know, I’m an expert who offered recommendations that he wanted to be adopted in the components of the national security strategy. I indirectly knew the process of how it’s been created.
‘We are able to support the US operation by jointly responding to the adversaries’
There’s a courageous goal in this national security programme: by 2027, Japanese defence forces should be able to defend the country, with or without US military help. Can the army reach that goal next year?
Of course, we do have an aspiration to expand our capacity to enable us to defend ourselves as much as possible. How much we can really secure our own capability for defence and our capacity for escalation control is certainly the target we are aiming to achieve. But from the perspective that no one in Northeast Asia can actually defend its territory entirely on its own, we are still heavily reliant on the US security guarantee in this region. We really have to expand the portfolio of our capabilities, especially for grey-zone challenges. You know, like remote island defence. At low and medium levels, we are aiming to handle it by ourselves.
Ken Jimbo PHOTO: Tamás Gyurkovits/Hungarian Conservative
Are you on a good path to reach this goal?
I think we are on the right path, but we do have adversaries, and their pace is even faster than our own capability. It is not about matching the qualitative capability that China has, because they have already skyrocketed the number of fighter planes, vessels, and missiles. We cannot truly match China in terms of material balance between the two sides. But I think we are aiming to possess a capability sufficient to deny the Chinese any realistic prospect of operational success wherever they wish to alter the status quo by force. Taiwan is a different question, because it involves the United States to create an equilibrium context. But in other areas, like remote island defence, we should definitely have enough capability to make China think that it is not the time to change the status quo by force.
Are you still very dependent on the US military help in 2026?
Our own capability ultimately contributes to the Alliance, of course. If we have a better Air Force, improved intelligence, enhanced surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and a more integrated command and control structure—primarily for our own defence—it also contributes to the Alliance’s high-level interoperable response. You cannot simply separate what we do for ourselves from what contributes to the Alliance.
‘Taiwan is a different question, because it involves the United States to create an equilibrium context’
Many analysts say that in ten years’ time, the One China principle will be enforced by arms, by an attempt to unify Taiwan with mainland China by force. Do you expect that scenario soon?
It has already been officialized in Chinese terms that they are definitely pursuing some form of integration in the foreseeable future. They aim to use peaceful means, but the 2005 Anti-Secession Law also indicates that if Taiwan pursues its own path to independence, or if China perceives that peaceful integration is impossible, alternative measures may be taken, reflecting China’s determination to integrate Taiwan by force. This is embedded in Chinese strategic thinking and in its legal framework. We therefore have reason to prepare for that scenario, and we certainly hope that such a military operation does not occur. By maintaining sufficient capability to deter a Chinese scenario, I believe stability can be preserved.
What is the close connection between the Taiwan issue and Japanese security? Japan is many nautical miles away, you have naval capabilities, and can deter China.
I think, from a geographical perspective, Taiwan is very close to our remote islands. Yonaguni Island, our southwesternmost island, is only 100 kilometres from Taiwan. So whenever China conducts a full-scale operation against Taiwan, it is difficult to imagine that our islands would not fall within the scope of such military operations. One can therefore assume that a Taiwan contingency could also become a Japanese contingency, in terms of how airspace and territorial space might be violated during those operations.
Ken Jimbo PHOTO: Tamás Gyurkovits/Hungarian Conservative
Sanae Takaichi said that this was a ‘survival threatening situation’. What does it exactly mean?
We are a country that didn’t allow the exercise of collective self-defence. We have a peaceful Constitution, and Article 9 limits our operations to only what is necessary for territorial defence. That is the scope of exercising individual self-defence, which doesn’t really extend to collective self-defence.
Think about this: we have a missile defence system, and if a missile is coming into Japan and we shoot it down, that is individual self-defence. But what about a missile targeting US assets, or Guam, for example? We have the capability, but legally we can only defend ourselves; we cannot defend others, and people in Guam would die. That, I think, would threaten the alliance.
In that context, the Abe administration tried to extend self-defence to plausible scenarios surrounding Japan: if US forces are attacked, we have to strike back together within a limited scope of exercising collective self-defence. That is the terminology given for the ‘survival-threatening situation’, which China has interpreted differently.
There is a peace clause in your Constitution, which dates back to the end of the Second World War, but now it is a different geopolitical situation. Don’t you think that this peace Constitution has become an obstacle for the country to defend itself effectively?
From a candid point of view, constitutional reform is no longer needed. Coming back to Prime Minister Abe, in 2015 there was a comprehensive review of the legal basis of security legislation. We revised 11 existing domestic laws and created a new one to ensure the robust and dynamic operation of the SDF for defending Japan, including changes to the rules of engagement in the battle space, and to contribute to the alliance, including what I mentioned about the ‘survival-threatening situation’—this is the core.
‘If China perceives that peaceful integration is impossible, alternative measures may be taken, reflecting China’s determination to integrate Taiwan by force’
So that we can actually create a higher interoperable joint response to be taken by Japan and the United States. From my expert point of view, these measures are enough to ensure the capability, and I don’t think any kind of legal restraints can be found in connection with Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
Japan has made huge efforts to separate China from Russia, to separate India from China, to make ASEAN more political, to create alliances through participating in the Quad or promoting the FOIP strategy. Still, the geopolitical influence of China is just growing. How can you counterbalance that influence?
Sure, I think that Japan has been conscious that it is a competition of standards, a competition of influence, and how much of the economic space for the private sector can actually earn the credibility that they can operate business relationships under the rule-based international order. While China is also cultivating to create their own economic space under the new infrastructure developments and digital infrastructures, which create an ecosystem very much in favour of Chinese products and services, if fair competition takes place, it is a net benefit for any recipients. But if there is a competition to ask Southeast Asian, South Asian, or Middle Eastern countries to choose sides between Japan, China, or the United States, that will create a lot of tensions. So Japan wants to create a coalition of the willing, like-minded states, partnering together with sharing of the values and philosophical point of view about how free and open systems should generate business relationships for the future. At the same time, Japan tries to engage the Global South through the concept of the expanding Free and Open Indo-Pacific policy.
After Prime Minister Takaichi’s speech, China imposed restrictions on export and trade, as well as on tourism and culture. Don’t you think that if your trade relations with China went wrong, that would be a high price to pay?
I think this is the weaponization of economic transactions. The East Asian miracle and developments have been materialized through the expansion of production supply chains across Asia. China takes full advantage of being in the supply chain. But if you rely too much on China, on particular production schemes and materials, you expose yourself to vulnerability. We rapidly began to diversify the import sources of those materials to make ourselves more resilient to economic measures taken by China and even other countries. We also have the Economic Security Promotion Law, which tries to identify the choke points in our business activities and supply chains. These are some of the strategic measures Japan is now taking.
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