„Moscow is desperate to convince the White House that Russia is winning—even if in reality it is not” – said gen. Philip Breedlove in interview by Jędrzej Graf, Editor-in-Chief of Defence24.pl
Photo. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78712/photos/84493
Jędrzej Graf, Defence24.pl: General, let us start with the situation in the Middle East. In the public debate we see very different assessments. At this stage of the conflict, who is actually winning?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: „Winning” is a very interesting concept in this case. If we try to answer the question of who is best achieving their goals in this war, I can say one thing: Iran is not currently able to defend itself effectively.
That is quite obvious. Iran is, at this moment, largely exposed, and its military potential is being systematically dismantled. In that sense, Iran is not winning this war.
The question, however, is whether the United States and Israel are winning. That is a much more difficult question, because we are still publicly debating what exactly the goals of this operation actually are.
The debate on this has evolved. First there was talk of regime change, then of eliminating the nuclear program, and then of limiting Iran’s ability to attack its neighbors.
Today, those goals are still not fully clearly defined. Some leaders use the word „war,” others do not. Therefore, it is still not fully defined what exactly the United States and Israel want to achieve.
I do not say this in a critical sense. I am convinced work is being done on that. But I believe we need one clearly defined set of objectives that will be understandable to everyone, and then consistent action in that direction.
However, if we look purely at the military aspect, the armed forces of Israel and the United States are achieving very significant successes.
If, however, the goal were to win the hearts and minds of Iranian society and bring about internal political change, that would be much more difficult to achieve.
Jędrzej Graf: Did the United States underestimate Iran’s ability to respond?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: No. From a military point of view, we knew perfectly well that Iran possessed significant retaliatory capabilities.
Jędrzej Graf: And today Iran is using those capabilities.
Gen. Philip Breedlove: Yes, exactly. Iran is using those capabilities.
In my opinion, Iran’s strategy is quite interesting. The Iranian leadership fully understands that it is not capable of militarily defeating the United States or Israel.
As a result, what we are observing are actions aimed at striking states in the region and threats to block traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
In practice, Iran has not closed the strait. It is the insurance market—Lloyd’s of London—that has stopped insuring shipments through that area. And if there is no insurance, ships simply will not sail through it.
That is why I believe Iran fully understands that it cannot militarily defeat the United States or Israel. So it is trying to make this war so costly for the entire world that the international community will begin pressuring the United States and Israel to withdraw.
That is probably their basic strategy.
Jędrzej Graf: How can Russia benefit from this conflict?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: In the short term, higher oil prices are very beneficial for Russia.
One can check the data independently. Russia needs a certain level of oil prices for its economy to function stably. For some time, prices were below that level.
The Russian economy was suffering. Its industrial potential was also suffering. Three of Russia’s largest sources of income are in a very difficult financial situation.
That is why Russia was in serious trouble. The rise in oil prices may help it in the short term.
In the longer term, however, I am increasingly inclined to the view that Russia has already passed the point from which it will be very difficult for it to fully recover from what it has done to itself in this war.
Jędrzej Graf: Could arms deliveries for Europe be redirected to the Middle East?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: I want to make sure I understand the question correctly.
Do you mean the concern that weapons systems that have already been ordered and that European countries are waiting for could be redirected to the Middle East?
Jędrzej Graf: Yes.
Gen. Philip Breedlove: So far, I have not seen any data indicating such actions on a large scale.
That does not, of course, mean that this cannot happen in the future. But at this moment, I have no information confirming such a phenomenon.
Jędrzej Graf: What are Moscow’s goals today in the war against Ukraine? Do you see a chance for a quick end to the war?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: Let me begin with a disclaimer: what I am about to say is solely my personal opinion. It is not the position of my government or of any institution.
In my opinion, Moscow is beginning to understand that it is not able to break through the Ukrainian defence and seize all of Donbas.
The Ukrainians have conducted several offensives and retaken areas that Russia had been capturing for months, and even for more than a year.
That is why I believe Moscow understands that it cannot simply roll through Ukraine and win this war in the classic military sense.
The most important thing, however, is something else. Moscow is desperate to convince the White House that Russia is winning—even if in reality it is not.
If we look at the scale of Russian human losses and the state of the Russian economy, it is hard to speak of victory.
That is why Russia is currently trying to convince the West, and above all the United States, that it is winning. It is counting on the West eventually agreeing to hand over territories that Russia itself is unable to capture.
Jędrzej Graf: How deeply should NATO change its approach to drone warfare?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: I agree with the premise of the question, but first we need to say one very important thing.
We must be careful not to draw the wrong conclusions from the war in Ukraine.
For decades, the West prepared to wage maneuver warfare. The essence of such warfare is the ability to conduct deep maneuver and penetrate the enemy’s lines.
The first condition for conducting modern maneuver warfare is to gain and maintain air superiority over the battlefield.
Air superiority enables maneuver by ground forces and limits the enemy’s ability to attack from the air, including with drones.
In Ukraine, neither side has managed to achieve air superiority.
We know why. Ukraine has a small and largely outdated air force. At the same time, the Russian air force—which we considered the second, third, or fourth in the world—failed completely.
Russia was unable to carry out effective SEAD operations, meaning the suppression of Ukrainian air defences.
As a result, a situation emerged in which neither side can use aviation in a decisive way.
In my opinion, that is why this war began to resemble World War I—a linear front, trenches, and an attritional positional war.
It was only under such conditions that drones began to play such an enormous role.
But the West does not want to wage war in that way.
Jędrzej Graf: Why did the United States not agree to GMLRS production in Poland?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: That is a difficult question. I do not want to get too deeply into politics, but I will say how I assess it.
I think the real problem is that part of the current political leadership is very afraid of providing states with the capability to strike deep targets on Russian territory.
We saw this in the war in Ukraine as well. The West, and especially the United States, repeatedly had the opportunity to provide Ukraine with long-range strike capabilities. Sometimes such capabilities were indeed provided, but almost immediately restrictions were imposed regarding whether and against which targets in Russia they could be used.
For a military man, that is particularly frustrating, because Russia has fired thousands and thousands of long-range missiles against Ukraine. Please imagine that the same number of missiles were falling on Moscow.
And yet the West largely accepted a situation in which Russia could strike targets across all of Ukraine, while Ukraine was given only a limited ability to respond— a little here, a little there, one target yes, another no.
In my view, some of those same fears also influence decisions regarding the sharing of certain technologies with other states.
But let us return to the most important point, because it is a positive one.
Relations between Poland and the United States are good. The President of the United States points to Poland as an example of a country that understands the meaning of allied commitments.
In the Atlantic Charter and more broadly in alliance logic, everyone very often talks about Article 5 — that if one is attacked, all will come to its aid.
Much more rarely does anyone talk about Article 3. And Article 3 says that every state should develop its own defensive capabilities and the capability to support the defence of other states.
Poland understands this perfectly and has taken this obligation very seriously. In my opinion it is doing excellent work in this regard.
Jędrzej Graf: Should Europe primarily rely on its own defence industry?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: I am a supporter of Europeans having their own capabilities and their own production capacity in the field of armaments.
I fully understand that in some cases Europe will want to buy European equipment. Some European systems are truly very good.
At the same time, there are areas in which the United States is currently doing things better than anyone else in the world. And I do not believe Europeans should be automatically cut off from the possibility of purchasing such solutions.
I do not support policies that say in advance: this cannot be bought.
Take aviation as an example. The United States is currently the only country in the world that actually produces flying fifth-generation aircraft. Europe has not yet created such an aircraft.
The Americans have also launched a sixth-generation aircraft program, which will bring very significant new capabilities.
The same applies to certain technologies that enable, for example, attack helicopters to operate — these are areas where the United States has an advantage.
Therefore I fully support the development of the European defence industry, because in the event of a major war we need depth and we need more countries producing weapons.
That does not worry me. On the contrary — it is necessary.
But it should not mean automatically cutting ourselves off from the best available American technologies where they are simply the best.
Jędrzej Graf: Could the conflict in the Middle East quickly escalate into a broader war?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: No, I see it differently.
I believe the situation in the Middle East will settle much faster than the Russian problem.
If a major war occurs in Europe, its source will be Russia, not the Middle East.
And that is where we should focus our attention.
This is, of course, my opinion, but from the perspective of European security, the most important issue remains what may come out of Russia.
Jędrzej Graf: How does China view the current situation?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: I do see a connection, although perhaps not exactly in the way the question suggests.
In my opinion, the entire world is watching what is happening in Ukraine today.
And in fact a very large part of foreign policy in many countries now revolves around how the issue of Ukraine will end.
The Middle East is a different problem, more separate from the geopolitical essence of the war in Europe.
We have policy toward Taiwan, policy toward North Korea, and some kind of policy toward China.
We also have the 1994 agreement concerning Ukraine — the Budapest Memorandum.
And I think the whole world is watching how the West deals with Ukraine.
Other states are asking themselves: will the United States honor its commitments toward Taiwan? Will it honor its commitments toward Korea? Will it honor other security declarations?
It comes down to a very simple principle: people care less about what you say and more about what you do.
You can make many declarations, but today others are watching what the West actually does in Ukraine and in the Middle East.
That is where real policy is being written.
In my opinion we have not fulfilled the commitments we accepted in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.
We assured Ukraine that its territorial integrity and sovereignty would be respected.
Meanwhile Russia invaded Ukraine and occupies nearly one fifth of its territory.
If I were a professor grading our actions, I would give us an F — perhaps even an F minus.
Jędrzej Graf: Could a ceasefire in Ukraine give Russia time to prepare pressure or even an attack on NATO’s eastern flank?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: There is a lot to say here, but the basic answer is yes: the Russian army is currently very heavily battered.
Before Russia could realistically confront NATO, it would have to go through a process of rebuilding.
It would need to restore equipment, replenish losses, train new soldiers, expand units, and restore the functioning of structures that have been seriously damaged in this war.
How long would that take?
Your crystal ball is as good as mine.
I have heard forecasts saying two years, but I do not believe Russia could rebuild in two years.
I have also heard five years, seven years, and even nine.
In my opinion, the truth lies somewhere in between.
I do not want to attach myself to one specific number, because it will certainly prove wrong.
But I am convinced it will take much longer than two years and at the same time probably not as long as nine.
There is, however, a second issue that is even more important, in my opinion.
At the beginning of the full-scale phase of the war Russia presented the West with two documents.
They called them treaties, while we tended to refer to them as documents.
In essence Putin said: sign this, or there will be other means.
In other words: sign it, or there will be war.
We did not sign those documents, and Russia then invaded.
If someone has not read them, I truly encourage them to do so — preferably in the original Russian, but good English translations are also available.
In those documents Putin wrote very clearly what he wants.
He wants, in practice, to rebuild something resembling the former sphere controlled by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
So we do not have to guess about his intentions.
He described them himself.
That is why we should already be preparing.
In my opinion, we have lost deterrence outside NATO.
And my concern is that if we give Putin five years or more to rebuild and restore his potential, the question will arise whether NATO deterrence will truly hold.
Jędrzej Graf: What role will the Baltic region play?
Gen. Philip Breedlove: It will be absolutely crucial.
When I took the position of SACEUR in 2013, the Polish Chief of Defence was General Mieczysław Gocuł.
Even then he spoke very clearly and very convincingly about how important it was to shift greater attention to the Baltic region — not only the sea itself, but the entire region.
At that time Finland and Sweden were not yet members of NATO, but they cooperated very closely with us.
They trained according to NATO standards and were better prepared than some alliance members.
Today, they are part of NATO and I can say it directly: they are excellent allies.
Very strong.
This is excellent news for NATO, because even if they had not formally been members, in the event of war they would have been involved anyway.
If you look at the map of the Baltic region, it is difficult to imagine Russian military operations there without violating at least Finnish, and probably also Swedish, airspace.
Now they are full allies and they are strong.
I believe Poland, Finland, and Sweden today form a very strong security anchor in the north.
I am not saying this to please Polish readers, but the Polish army and Polish air force are very capable formations.
And I do not think Putin would ignore the possibility of an attack through Poland.
As for Finland, its air force has a very, very offensive potential.
With JASSM missiles and other capabilities, it can strike deep into Russian territory.
Now F-35 aircraft are also entering the equation.
Combined with strong land forces in the north, this creates a very serious balance of power.
I am not saying anyone can feel completely safe, but these are capabilities that will certainly make Putin think very seriously.
At the same time we must constantly remember that Putin has a plan.
He gave us two documents and wrote in them what he wants.
We must read them — and we must prepare.
Jędrzej Graf: Thank you, General.
Gen. Philip Breedlove: Thank you.