Taiwan has evolved into a vibrant democracy, and an economic powerhouse, dominating the global semiconductor industry
“The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.”
When President Trump arrives in Beijing next month for a high stakes summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping − a meeting that might be delayed by the war with Iran − he may find those words ringing in his ears.
On February 28, 1972, they were part of the historic Shanghai Communique, a document that established a diplomatic framework in which relations between the People’s Republic and the United States could evolve. A subsequent passage referenced how the U.S. government would like to see “one China” come about: “It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.”
For their part, the Chinese eschewed any reference to peaceful intent. The PRC’s part of the communique made clear that “the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere.”
These conflicting statements were a compromise negotiated by President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, with Communist party Chair Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai. But speaking privately, Nixon told Chou he knew the positions could not ultimately be reconciled. When it came to Taiwan, he told the premier, “The problem here is not in what we are going to do, the problem is what we are going to say about it.”
He meant the language of the communique could not arouse the opposition of American conservatives who viewed the island as the legitimate Republic of China. Nixon told Chou he could not give this faction “the opportunity to gang up and say in effect that the American president went to Peking and sold Taiwan down the river.” He hoped the platitudinous reference to a “peaceful settlement” would be enough.
Nixon and Kissinger’s timetable saw full normalization of relations coming about by 1976. And if Taiwan was not completely sold down the river by the final deal, Washington and Peking (Beijing) would no doubt have presented Taipei’s leadership with a harsh fait accompli.
Watergate and Nixon’s 1974 resignation put a hold on the Sino-American relationship, but President Jimmy Carter revived it. On December 15, 1978, he surprised the world by announcing the end of the “two China” policy and the January 1, 1979, recognition of the People’s Republic as the sole government of China.
Hawks in Congress and the Taipei government were furious. But, like disco, China fever was in the air. Mao had passed away in 1976, and the PRC’s newly emerged leader Deng Xiaoping had announced major economic reforms − and would even be named Time’s 1978 Man of the Year. Carter appeared to have history on his side.
The agreement with Deng required America abrogate the U.S. – Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty, signed into law in 1955 by President Dwight Eisenhower. The United States would no longer pledge to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack by Beijing. That treaty was replaced by the Taiwan Relations Act.
Echoing the Shanghai Communique, the Act says that recognition of the People’s Republic “rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means” and that any action to the contrary would be “of grave concern to the United States.”
A more hawkish Senator Charles Percy (R-IL) proposed stronger language: any military coercion of Taiwan should be seen as a threat to the “security interests” of the United States. That amendment lost in a close 50 to 47 vote, with both Florida senators, Democrats Lawton Chiles and Richard Stone, voting no with the majority. Carter signed the Act into law in April of 1979.
In any event, left unsaid in the final draft was exactly how America’s “grave concern” might translate to action vis a vis Chinese aggression. The only concrete security pledge was a promise to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” (phrasing that, ironically, might describe American military aid to Ukraine today).
From its inception, the limits of U.S. commitment in the Taiwan Act have been justified by optimism: a hope that some degree of political liberalization, and a softening of demands surrounding Taiwan, might follow China’s extraordinary economic transformation.
But Xi Jinping’s 2012 accession to general secretary of the party changed everything. He has introduced a more militant posture regarding Taiwan, authorized provocative air and sea violations of Taiwanese territory, and has demanded Chinese forces be capable of invading or blockading the island by 2027.
In the meantime, Taiwan has evolved into a vibrant democracy, and an economic powerhouse. Its dominance of the global semiconductor industry has led Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang to describe it as the “center of the world’s computer ecosystem.” Beijing’s control of that ecosystem would give it enormous leverage over the global economy.
On February 4, Trump and Xi conducted a “long and thorough conversation” in preparation for the summit. Xi voiced his displeasure with the December announcement of an $11 billion U.S. arms sale to Taiwan and underlined that Taiwan remains the “most important and sensitive issue” in China-U.S. relations. He could well propose a timetable for a Chinese annexation of the island as a precondition to discussions of anything else.
For his part, Donald Trump sees himself as a successor to Richard Nixon: a deal-making president who recasts America’s relationship with China. Like Nixon, he is ambivalent about providing guarantees for the future of Taiwan − seeing it as an obstacle to his vision of rapprochement with Beijing. In a similar vein, when China in 2020 crushed the last elements of democracy in Hong Kong, Trump imposed token sanctions but said little about the lost freedoms of Hong Kong’s citizens.
In January, the Pentagon released the 2026 National Defense Strategy. It declares the American strategy to “Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation.” Citing Trump’s “visionary and realistic approach to diplomacy with Beijing,” it argues that “a decent peace, on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under, is possible.” Taiwan is not mentioned in the 24-page report.
Will Trump’s “realistic approach” demand concessions from Taipei that result in a scenario that replays the tragedy of Hong Kong? Will it someday be said that this American president “went to Beijing and sold Taiwan down the river?”
Paul Atkinson of Bonita Springs is a member of the Naples Council on World Affairs and lectures on Taiwan for the FGCU Academy.