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lediplomate.media — imprimé le 02/04/2026

François Souty, PhD
Intervenant en géopolitique à Excelia Business School, La Rochelle et Paris-Cachan
Intervenant en droit et politique de la concurrence de l’UE à la Faculté de droit de Nantes

European Union's Trade PolicyRéalisation Le Lab Le Diplo

By François Souty, PhD. Lecturer, Excelia Business School Group, La Rochelle and Paris-Cachan, Geopolitics and EU Institutions Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Nantes University, M2 Competition and Consumers Law, M2 Law of Enterprise, EU Competition Law and Policy, Head of the Economic Department of Le Diplomate Media

Executive Summary

The European Union’s external trade policy, as conducted under the Commissions chaired by Ursula von der Leyen, is part of a historic tipping point in the international economic system. Long structured around a paradigm of regulated openness and the promotion of multilateralism, it is now faced with an environment marked by the reaffirmation of the logic of power, the fragmentation of trade and the growing instrumentalization of trade for geopolitical ends.[1] In this context, the European Union has undertaken a significant doctrinal shift, based on the notion of  » open strategic autonomy « , which has resulted in the deployment of new instruments – the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, the Anti-Coercion Instrument – aimed at better protecting the internal market and restoring a level playing field. These developments reflect a real realization: trade can no longer be thought of in isolation from power relations.

However, these advances remain incomplete and, in part, contradictory. Mario Draghi’s diagnosis highlights a worrying stall in the European economy, characterised by insufficient investment, persistent fragmentation and difficulty in transforming normative objectives into effective industrial capacities.[2] The Union thus tends to multiply the instruments of regulation without always having the economic and political means to ensure their effectiveness. This fragility becomes even more apparent when confronted with the strategies deployed by the other major powers: the United States, in the wake of the turning point under Donald Trump, has reaffirmed a strategic approach to trade, based on the use of economic instruments as levers of power, in continuity with a contemporary reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.[3] This orientation has been extended and rationalized by contemporary analyses such as those of Steve Miran, notably in his lectures at the Hudson Institute, which highlight the articulation between trade, security and international monetary architecture.[4] At the same time, China is pursuing a ramp-up trajectory based on long-term industrial planning and coordinated mobilization of economic instruments in the service of strategic objectives.

In this new environment, European trade policy comes up against a central contradiction: it simultaneously aims to regulate globalisation and correct its effects without fully equipping itself with the necessary instruments of power to control its dynamics. This tension is manifested in particular in the inconsistencies between climate objectives, industrial policies and competitiveness constraints, often noted in the literature on the limits of the European normative model. [5]The article therefore argues that the European Union must undertake a further doctrinal evolution, consisting of explicitly assuming a logic of commercial power adapted to its institutional characteristics, without naïve imitation of the American or Chinese models.

In the short term (2026–2027), the Union has immediate room for action, in particular through a more systematic use of its existing instruments (SRF, anti-dumping, anti-coercion), and above all the strengthening of the principle of reciprocity as well as better protection of strategic sectors, in a political context marked by major deadlines such as the French presidential election in 2027. In the medium term, a more coherent articulation between trade policy, industrial policy and energy strategy seems necessary, in line with the findings of Mario Draghi’s report. In the longer term, a reform of European economic governance should allow the emergence of a real doctrine of power.

Ultimately, the challenge is no longer just to adapt the Union’s trade policy, but to determine the extent to which it could evolve towards a model capable of combining openness, protection and power in a long-term competitive international environment. Europe will only be able to preserve its model if it accepts that trade is now fully part of the strategic field. It is up to the European Parliament, the EPP, the main support group for President von der Leyen, to take the initiative, as a matter of urgency. 

Introduction

Beyond the implementation of the EU-MERCOSUR agreement scheduled for 1 May 2026 – without waiting for the outcome of a referral to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) – by the President of the European Commission von der Leyen, the European Union is now faced with a profound change in its economic and strategic environment, which is testing the very foundations of its foreign trade policy. Long conceived as an extension of the project of internal integration and consolidation of the single market, this policy was part of a vision according to which the opening of trade, framed by multilateral rules, constituted a vector of shared prosperity and the stabilisation of international relations.[6] In this context, the normative dimension of European action — based on the promotion of standards, rules and legal mechanisms — appeared to be a sufficient substitute for an explicit logic of power.

However, this intellectual and institutional architecture is today weakened by the profound transformations of the international system. Over the past decade, and even more so following the accelerated restructurings following the COVID-19 pandemic, global economic dynamics have been characterized by a strong return to strategic rivalry, a fragmentation of value chains, and a reintegration of trade into national security policies. International trade no longer appears only as an instrument of pacifying interdependence, but as a lever of influence and constraint in the service of geopolitical objectives. The world economy is now being reconfigured in the light of the balance of power.

In this context, the European Union has gradually embarked on a doctrinal evolution aimed at adapting its instruments to these new realities. Under the impetus of the Commission chaired by Ursula von der Leyen, the notion of   » open strategic autonomy  » has been mobilised in order to reconcile trade openness and the protection of the Union’s essential interests. It was indeed a creation from scratch on the initiative of the President of the Commission.[7] This has resulted in the adoption or strengthening of instruments such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and the Anti-Coercion Instrument, which demonstrate a desire to rebalance the playing field and respond to exogenous distortions.

However, this inflection remains partial and raises important questions about its coherence and effectiveness. Mario Draghi’s diagnosis highlights a worrying stall in European competitiveness, marked by insufficient investment, persistent fragmentation of economic policies and structural difficulty in transforming normative objectives into tangible industrial capacities.[8] This analysis highlights the limits of a model that tends to favour regulation without always mobilising the resources necessary for the effective implementation of its ambitions.

These limits become all the more apparent when confronted with the strategies deployed by the world’s major economic powers. The United States, in particular, has made a turning point under the presidency of Donald Trump consisting of reaffirming the use of trade instruments as levers of power, in a logic of assumed confrontation and rebalancing of international economic relations. This evolution is part of a doctrinal continuity that can be compared to a contemporary reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, extended to the economic sphere and projected on a global scale.[9] It has also been extended and explained in contemporary analyses, notably those of Steve Miran, whose lectures at the Hudson Institute highlight the growing link between trade policy, national security and international monetary architecture.[10]

At the same time, China is pursuing a strategy of ramp-up based on long-term industrial planning, massive public support and close integration between economic objectives and geopolitical priorities, with a very strong asymmetry in access to its gigantic national market (of nearly one and a half billion consumers) by non-Chinese operators. This combination gives its economic players a capacity for expansion and adaptation that accentuates the asymmetries of competition on a global scale.

In this context, the European Union appears to be confronted with a fundamental tension between, on the one hand, its attachment to a rules-based trade order and, on the other hand, the need to equip itself with instruments that enable it to act in an environment where these rules are increasingly circumvented, instrumentalised or in competition with the logic of power. Between the norm and the powerful, Europe is still in a position of unstable equilibrium.

The purpose of this article is therefore to question the capacity of the European Union’s trade policy to evolve towards a coherent model, capable of meeting the requirements of an international system marked by strategic competition. In particular, it is a question of analysing recent inflections, assessing their limits in the light of the diagnosis established by Mario Draghi’s report, and comparing this trajectory with the competing doctrines of the main economic powers. In the light of this analysis, the article finally proposes avenues for rebuilding aimed at articulating regulation, competitiveness and capacity for action more closely, from a realistic perspective and adapted to the institutional constraints of the Union.

The problem can thus be formulated in these terms: is the European Union’s trade policy able to go beyond its traditional normative logic to move towards a doctrine of power compatible with its own characteristics, while responding to the contemporary challenges of globalisation? The answer to this question presupposes a doctrinal, instrumental and prospective analysis, which this article intends to develop in a structured way.

I. A real but incomplete doctrinal inflection: from the norm to strategic autonomy

The European Union has historically been part of a trade tradition based on openness, regulation and the primacy of multilateralism. However, recent transformations in the world economy have led to a gradual reconfiguration of this doctrinal framework, marked by the emergence of the concept of open strategic autonomy. This evolution, which is still incomplete, testifies to a growing tension between fidelity to the founding normative principles and the need to adapt trade policy to contemporary power dynamics. This tension is manifested both in the structural legacy of European trade policy (A) and in the current attempts to redefine its strategic objectives (B).

A. The normative legacy of a trade policy based on multilateralism and openness

Before analysing the recent changes, it should be remembered that the European Union’s trade policy has been built on a doctrinal foundation deeply marked by the primacy of norms and the attachment to multilateralism. This orientation is the anchor point from which the Union’s current trajectory can be explained, as well as the constraints that still weigh on its ability to evolve.

The European Union’s trade policy has historically been built around a profoundly normative paradigm, closely linked to the process of European integration and the consolidation of the single market. From this perspective, trade opening was both an economic objective and a political instrument, designed to promote prosperity, strengthen interdependence between economies and contribute to the stabilisation of international relations.[11]

This orientation has been reflected in a constant commitment to the multilateral trading system, particularly within the framework of the World Trade Organization, as well as in a proactive policy of reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers. The Union has thus asserted itself as an essentially normative power, whose influence is based less on the projection of coercive means than on the ability to produce and disseminate legal rules, standards and governance frameworks that can be adopted by its trading partners, provided that the EU is able to enforce its trade defence measures without crippling retaliatory measures by the countries to which they apply (cf.  case in 2024-2025 of the attempt to implement the FSR against Chinese electric vehicles).[12]

In this logic, trade policy has long been perceived as a technical extension of the European integration project, rather than as an autonomous instrument of strategic power. It was part of a conception according to which the legal regulation of trade was sufficient to guarantee a level playing field and to control the effects of globalisation.

B. The gradual emergence of  » open strategic autonomy« : a European doctrine under construction

On the basis of this normative foundation, the European Union has gradually begun to restructure its trade doctrine, under the combined effect of changes in the international context and the awareness of certain structural vulnerabilities. This evolution does not break with the previous legacy, but reconfigures its purposes, by introducing a more assertive strategic dimension. This asserted strategic dimension is reflected in all the trade agreements concluded by the EU since 2024, as summarised in the table in Appendix 6.

Faced with changes in the international system, the Commission has embarked on a doctrinal evolution aimed at adapting its trade policy to the new economic and geopolitical realities. This evolution is reflected in the emergence of the concept of  » open strategic autonomy « , already mentioned, which seeks to reconcile openness to international trade with the preservation of the Union’s essential interests.

Under the impetus of the Commission chaired by Ursula von der Leyen, this notion has gradually structured the political discourse and strategic orientations of the European Union. It is based on the idea that trade openness can only be maintained in a sustainable way if it is accompanied by resilience, protection and adaptation to external shocks. From this point of view, the various trade policy speeches of the President of the Commission (see summary table in Appendix 4) reveal a gradual but constant evolution, ranging from a vision of trade as a vector of openness towards 2017-2019 to a conception explicitly integrating the challenges of power, resilience and economic security since 2023-2024. The notion of   » open strategic autonomy  » appears to be the common thread of this transformation, although its content remains evolving and sometimes ambiguous.

This doctrinal change has been accompanied by an evolution of trade policy instruments, reflecting an increased consideration of international competition issues and distortions likely to affect the internal market. It thus marks a gradual transition from a purely normative logic to a more hybrid approach, integrating elements of economic defence and reciprocity, as shown again by the evolution of Ursula von der Leyen’s speeches (see Appendix 1). However, this doctrine remains under construction and does not yet constitute a fully stabilized framework. It presents certain ambiguities, particularly with regard to the articulation between its different dimensions — openness, protection, autonomy — as well as its concrete implementation. Between normative continuity and strategic adaptation, the European Union is moving forward by successive adjustments rather than by rupture.

II. Strengthened but insufficient instruments in the face of power dynamics

The doctrinal evolution of European trade policy has been accompanied by a significant enrichment of its legal arsenal. However, this increase in normative power cannot be assessed in isolation, insofar as the effectiveness of the instruments depends on their articulation with the economic, industrial and institutional capacities of the Union, which has been clearly dispersed for almost a decade. The analysis of the recently adopted measures thus reveals a double reality: on the one hand, a significant strengthening of regulatory tools (A); on the other hand, structural limits that restrict its effective scope (B).

A. An expanding legal arsenal in the service of more protective regulation

The European Union has gradually supplemented its trade arrangements with instruments designed to respond to new problems, linked in particular to asymmetric international competition and public intervention by third countries. These developments reflect a desire to better regulate the external impacts and conditions of competition within the internal market, without renouncing the principles of openness that structure European trade policy.

In this respect, several recent instruments illustrate this dynamic. The Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR already mentioned) makes it possible to address distortions of competition resulting from public support granted by third countries to companies operating on the European market. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) aims to prevent carbon leakage by re-establishing a form of equivalence between the environmental constraints applicable to European producers and those imposed on imports. Finally, the anti-coercion instrument gives the Union the capacity to react to economic pressure exerted by third countries with the aim of influencing its sovereign choices.

These measures reflect a significant evolution of European trade policy, which is no longer limited to trade liberalisation, but now includes correction and defence mechanisms. The Union thus recognises that the opening up of markets must be accompanied by safeguards to ensure a level playing field and to safeguard its essential interests. This approach is part of a more demanding regulatory logic, in which the standard also becomes an instrument of protection.

However, this extension of the legal arsenal does not in itself constitute a complete transformation of the Union’s capacity for action. Rather, it marks a gradual adaptation to the constraints of the international system, without fundamentally calling into question the existing institutional balances.

B. Structural limits revealed by the gap between standards and economic capacities

Despite the enrichment of its instruments, the European Union is still confronted with structural limits that affect their effectiveness and, more broadly, the coherence of its trade policy. As illustrated by the proliferation of trade defence instruments listed in Annex 3, the question is no longer that of their existence, but of their coherence and their effective mobilisation. These limitations relate to the way in which the instruments are implemented, the institutional organisation of the Union and its economic environment. This table in Annex 3 highlights a rapid and significant densification of the European Union’s legal arsenal in the field of trade and the economy. This evolution reflects an awareness of the challenges of international competition and economic security. However, the whole remains marked by a fragmentation of instruments, procedural complexity and dependence on institutional balances, limiting their mobilisation in a fully strategic logic. It can be said without much margin of error that the central issue lies less in the creation of new regulatory or normative tools, than in their more coherent, proportionate, politically determined articulation and effective activation.

Firstly, European decision-making processes, characterised by the need to reconcile the positions of the Member States and the institutions, can lead to significant delays in the adoption and application of trade measures. This relative slowness can be a disadvantage in an international context where responsiveness is a determining factor.

Secondly, the fragmentation of public policies within the Union limits the ability to articulate the different levers of action in a coherent manner. The lack of full integration between trade, industrial and energy policies prevents the emergence of comprehensive strategies capable of effectively supporting the objectives pursued.

The analyses developed by Mario Draghi highlight these structural difficulties. Its report on European competitiveness highlights in particular the shortcomings in terms of investment, the dispersion of efforts between Member States and the difficulty of transforming strategic orientations into effective productive capacities.[13] From this perspective, trade instruments, however sophisticated, cannot compensate for deeper imbalances affecting the European economy as a whole. Thus, a gap appears between the growing sophistication of the legal framework and the Union’s real capacity for strategic mobilization. This discrepancy constitutes a major limit to the effectiveness of European trade policy in an international environment marked by competition between economic powers. The EU has a rich legal arsenal, but its scope remains conditioned by structural constraints that go beyond the strictly commercial field. Clearly, Europe is not disarmed, but insufficiently coordinated. 

Ultimately, European trade policy is faced with a persistent tension between the accumulation of instruments and the ability to mobilise them in a coherent, rapid and effective manner. This situation highlights the need for a more integrated approach, articulating the trade, industrial and macroeconomic dimensions of European public action, as recently observed in our article on the foreign anti-subsidy regulation.[14] However, for several decades, particularly under German influence and certain Anglo-Saxon doctrines that were hostile in principle to the idea of industrial policy, a very strong tendency to deny the usefulness of an industrial policy was affirmed in Brussels, France often being the only one to advocate the development of such a policy likely to enter into frictional conflict with competition policy. Such a development is only very real.

Box 1

Key Lessons from the Analysis of Trade Defence Instruments and the SRF 

by the Von der Leyen I & II Commissions (see Annex Table 5)

An examination of the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy procedures and the implementation of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) reveals a profound transformation of the European Union’s trade policy, which goes beyond its traditional function of correcting market distortions.

1. An increase in trade defence instruments Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures have multiplied and have been concentrated in strategic sectors (steel, energy, technology, mobility). They show an increased willingness to protect European value chains from practices deemed unfair, in particular from China.

2. Broadening the scope of action towards hybrid instruments. With the introduction of the RSF, the Union is no longer limiting itself to the traditional instruments of international trade, but is mobilising tools for internal market regulation. This evolution marks the transition from a reactive to an anticipatory logic, focused on the conditions of access to the European market.

3. A shift in the centre of gravity towards a geo-economic approach. The instruments are no longer just aimed at restoring fair competition, but are now part of the Union’s economic security. The control of foreign subsidies makes it possible to act upstream on potential distortions, particularly in public procurement and mergers.

4. A strong strategic sectoral dimension. The cases analysed concern key sectors for European sovereignty: energy, digital, heavy industry, green technologies. Trade policy thus becomes an indirect lever of industrial policy.

5. A systemic response to international asymmetries. All the instruments reflect the Union’s adaptation to an international environment marked by differentiated economic models, where public subsidies play a structuring role. The EU is thus seeking to re-establish a more balanced playing field without giving up its trade openness.

6. A growing link between trade, competition and sovereignty. The convergence between trade (anti-dumping), competition (merger control) and internal regulation (FSR) instruments illustrates a hybridisation of European public policies, which are now geared towards controlling strategic dependencies.

The analysis highlights a structural change: the European Union’s trade policy is evolving towards an instrument of economic power, combining targeted protection, regulation of the internal market and securing strategic interests in a context of increased international competition.

III. Towards a European doctrine of commercial power: constraints, inspirations and room for manoeuvre

Faced with the limitations highlighted both at the doctrinal and operational levels, the question is no longer only that of adapting existing instruments, but that of defining a genuine doctrine of commercial power specific to the European Union, since the EU does not have the concentrated institutional tools of the United States. Such a development presupposes that European trade policy must be situated in its international environment, taking into account its own institutional system: the EU must take into account the fact that the international environment is dominated by strategies explicitly oriented towards power (A), in order to identify the room for manoeuvre that would allow it to build a credible European response, in the short and medium term (B).

A. An international environment structured by explicit doctrines of economic power

The evolution of European trade policy cannot be fully understood without being placed in an international context marked by the assertion of increasingly explicit doctrines of economic power. This transformation is particularly evident in the strategies deployed by the major economic powers, first and foremost the United States and China.

In the United States, the turning point under President Donald Trump in 2025 marked a significant break with the traditional approach to international trade.[15] Trade policy is now conceived as an instrument for rebalancing economic power relations and defending national interests, fully assuming the use of unilateral measures and coercive instruments. This orientation is part of a doctrinal continuity that can be compared to a contemporary reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, extended to the economic sphere and projected on a global scale.[16]

This approach has been extended and rationalized in contemporary analyses, notably those of Steve Miran, whose intervention at the Hudson Institute in April 2025 highlights the growing link between trade policy, national security and international monetary architecture.[17] The idea that the United States provides « global public goods » — security, reserve currency, market access — justifies, from this perspective, an increased demand for reciprocity and a more offensive use of economic instruments.

At the same time, China is developing a power strategy based on long-term industrial planning, massive public support for its companies and a close integration between economic objectives and geopolitical priorities. This approach gives its economic players the capacity for rapid expansion, while accentuating the asymmetries of competition with European economies.

In this context, the European Union appears to be an actor in transition, whose trade doctrine remains marked by a strong normative dimension, even though its partners are fully integrating the logic of power into their economic policies. The contrast between these approaches underlines the gap between a regulatory Europe and strategic powers. It should also be noted that for the EU, the Turnberry trade agreement between theEuropean Union and the United States is a defensive and non-binding agreement aimed at stabilising trade relations, whereas the agreements with Mercosur, India and Australia are indeed genuine structuring free trade agreements aimed at opening up markets and securing economic and strategic interests.

B. The conditions for a European refoundation: towards an assumed capacity for influence

Faced with this environment, the central question becomes that of the conditions under which the European Union can develop a doctrine of commercial power compatible with its institutional characteristics and economic constraints. Such a refoundation cannot be based on an imitation of the American or Chinese models, but must be part of its own trajectory, adapted to the nature of the European project.

In the short term (2026–2027), several margins for action can be identified. The EU could, in the first place, strengthen the use of its existing instruments, by adopting a more systematic and faster approach to the implementation of trade defence measures. The principle of reciprocity could also be mobilised in a more assertive way, in order to make access to the European market conditional on equivalent requirements on the part of trading partners. From this point of view, the entry into force in 2023 of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) marked an important, if not decisive, inflection point that still needs to be consolidated: the European Union is no longer content to correct the effects of international trade, but is now seeking to control the conditions of access to its market upstream, thus enshrining a fully geo-economic and more geopolitical approach to its trade policy.

This development is part of a particular political context, marked in particular by major national events such as the French presidential election in 2027, which are likely to influence European economic and trade policy orientations. It requires an increased capacity for coordination between Member States, in order to prevent internal divergences from limiting the scope of the initiatives undertaken.

In the medium term, the overhaul of European trade policy implies closer coordination with industrial and energy policies. Mario Draghi’s findings in this regard underline the need for an increased effort in terms of investment and economic coordination.[18] Without productive capacity building, trade instruments may remain insufficient to support a coherent power strategy.

More fundamentally, the European Union must clarify its doctrine and explicitly assume the strategic dimension of its trade policy. This implies recognising that regulation, however essential it may be, cannot replace a capacity for action based on economic, industrial and financial resources. The objective cannot be to renounce the normative dimension of the Union, but to articulate it with a more assertive capacity for influence.

From this perspective, the construction of a European doctrine of commercial power is based on a delicate balance: preserving the principles of openness and cooperation on which the European project is based, while integrating the requirements of an international environment marked by strategic competition. It is not a question of the Union becoming a power like the others, but of becoming a power capable of acting as quickly as the United States or China. 

As shown by the gradual structuring of a network of diversified trade agreements (see Annex 4), the question is not so much that of openness as that of the ability to transform this openness into a strategic lever. From this point of view, the agreement concluded with Chile illustrates the need for a major change – which has undoubtedly taken a long time to be defined and implemented – towards a trade policy oriented towards the security of critical resources, revealing a gradual shift from a normative logic to a logic of economic power. The same applies to the EU’s agreements with MERCOSUR or India. The EU is also beginning to use its trade policy as a tool to secure critical resources (lithium, energy transition), which marks a shift from a logic favouring the development of standards as a model (which by the way is a German approach dating back to the fifteenth century), towards a logic of material power. Conversely, the transatlantic Turnberry arrangement introduces a major analytical break: it is not based on a classic logic of reciprocal liberalization, but on a pragmatic management of an asymmetrical balance of power. The entire table in Appendix 4 thus highlights a double dynamic: on the one hand, strategic diversification (Chile, Mercosur, India) aimed at reducing dependencies, and on the other hand, forced adaptation (United States) in the face of a dominant economic power. Thus, in contrast to the agreement concluded with Chile, the Turnberry arrangement with the United States reveals, implicitly, the limits of this European strategy when it comes up against asymmetrical power relations. This tension therefore reveals a rather profound transformation of European trade policy, which is rarely highlighted, which is tending to become an instrument of economic and geopolitical security, beyond its traditional function of promoting standards and rebalancing trade.

Conclusion 

The European Union’s trade policy is now at a pivotal moment in its evolution. Long structured around a normative paradigm based on the opening of markets and the promotion of multilateralism, it is now confronted with a profoundly transformed international environment, in which the logics of power, strategic rivalry and the instrumentalization of trade have imposed themselves as structuring factors. This change is not a simple cyclical adjustment, but a change in the nature of the world economic system, to which the Union cannot remain indifferent.

The analysis carried out in this article highlights a double dynamic. On the one hand, the European Union has embarked on a real doctrinal evolution, embodied in particular by the notion of open strategic autonomy and by the development of instruments aimed at correcting distortions of competition and protecting its internal market. Under the impetus of the Commission chaired by Ursula von der Leyen, trade policy has thus begun a gradual shift in its objectives, integrating considerations of resilience, economic sovereignty and reciprocity.

On the other hand, this evolution remains incomplete and comes up against important structural limits. The gap between the growing sophistication of legal instruments and the Union’s effective ability to mobilise them in an integrated strategic logic constitutes a major obstacle to the assertion of a genuine policy of commercial power. In this respect, Mario Draghi’s analyses highlight the fragilities of the European economic model, marked by insufficient investment, persistent fragmentation and difficulty in transforming normative ambitions into tangible industrial capacities.

This observation is all the more worrying because it is part of an international environment dominated by actors who fully assume the link between trade and power. The United States, in the wake of the turning point initiated under Donald Trump and extended by contemporary analyses such as those of Steve Miran, is mobilizing its economic instruments in an explicit strategic logic. At the same time, China is pursuing a ramp-up trajectory based on long-term industrial planning and close integration between economic and geopolitical objectives. In this context, the European Union cannot be satisfied with an intermediate position in the long term, oscillating between regulation and adaptation.

From then on, the central challenge no longer lies in the accumulation of additional instruments, but in the Union’s ability to define and assume a coherent doctrine of commercial power. Such a doctrine cannot be conceived as an imitation of the American or Chinese models, but must be part of its own trajectory, compatible with the institutional and political specificities of the European project. It presupposes, firstly, a closer articulation between trade policy, industrial policy and energy strategy, in order to strengthen the overall coherence of public action. Secondly, it implies an increased effort in terms of investment and economic coordination, which is an essential condition for the transformation of strategic objectives into effective capabilities.

In the shorter term, the Union nevertheless has significant room for action, which it can mobilise in the near future, particularly in the run-up to major political events such as the French presidential election in 2027. A more systematic and responsive use of existing instruments, combined with a clearer affirmation of the principle of reciprocity, could help to strengthen the credibility of its trade policy in a context of increased competition. To move from words or articles of analysis to action, given the considerable institutional cumbersomeness to move any cursor or regulatory text, the initiative for the suggested reforms probably belongs to the European Parliament, in particular to the MEPs of the European People’s Party (EPP), the main party in this assembly, from which the President of the Commission also comes. 

In short, the question posed to the European Union Trade Policy is of a fundamental nature: it is no longer just a question of knowing how to regulate globalisation, but of determining whether it is able to exert an effective influence on it beyond words and resolutions. Between norm and power, Europe is now called upon to choose not against each other, but the conditions of their articulation. This capacity will depend, to a large extent, on its place in the world economy of the twenty-first century, as well as the preservation of its economic and political model.

Appendix 1

Summary of the main trade policy speeches of the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen

DateLocationSpeech FrameworkGeneral themeSpecific points raisedJuly 16, 2019StrasbourgSpeech of candidacy for the presidency of the CommissionRedefining the EU’s geopolitical role« Geopolitical Commission », trade-power link, need for reciprocity27 November 2019BrusselsPresentation of the Commission’s programmeStrategic DirectionStrategic autonomy, industrial policy, protection of the internal marketSeptember 16, 2020BrusselsState of the Union AddressEconomic resilienceIndustrial sovereignty, value chains, strategic dependenciesSeptember 15, 2021StrasbourgState of the Union AddressOpen strategic autonomyTrade diversification, securing suppliesSeptember 14, 2022StrasbourgState of the Union AddressTrade and energy transitionCBAM, industrial competitiveness, response to US policiesSeptember 13, 2023StrasbourgState of the Union AddressEuropean Economic DefenceAnti-coercion instrument, investment control, economic security2024 (various speeches)Davos / BrusselsInternational Economic ForumsGlobal positioning of the EUSustainable trade, systemic rivalry, the EU’s role in global governance

Appendix 2

Summary table of the trade policy guidelines carried out by the European Commissioner for Trade (2019–2025 term, successive Commissioners: Phil Hogan, Valdis Dombrovskis)

DateLocationFrameGeneral themeSpecific points raised2020BrusselsCommunication  » Trade Policy Review « Trade Policy ReviewOpen strategic autonomy, resilience, WTO reform2021BrusselsPresentation of the new commercial strategyTrade and sustainabilityIntegration of environmental standards, trade defence instruments2022Washington / BrusselsTransatlantic DialoguesEU-US relationsResponse to the Inflation Reduction Act, industrial coordination2022–2023BrusselsAdoption of the RSFFair competitionControl of foreign subsidies, protection of the internal market2023BrusselsPresentation of the Anti-Coercion InstrumentEconomic DefenseResponse to external pressures, decision-making sovereignty2024Various international forumsOverall business strategyEconomic securityExport controls, investments, critical technologies

Appendix 3

Summary table of the main trade policy and economic defence instruments of the European Union

InstrumentLegal basisDate of adoption / entry into forceMain objectiveScope and mechanismLimitations identifiedCarbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)Regulation (EU) 2023/9562023 (transitional phase 2023–2026)Tackling carbon leakageImposition of a carbon cost on certain imports (steel, cement, etc.)Complexity of implementation, risks of trade tensionsForeign Subsidies Regulations (RSF)Regulation (EU) 2022/25602023Ensuring fair competitionControl of foreign state aid in government procurement and procurementAdministrative burden, scope still under constructionAnti-coercion instrumentRegulation (EU) 2023/26752023Responding to economic pressures from third countriesPossibility of retaliatory measures (tariffs, restrictions)Politically sensitive activation, dependent on Member States’ consensusAnti-dumping measuresRegulation (EU) 2016/1036 (recast)2016 (subsequent revisions)Tackling dumping practicesImposition of Countervailing Duties on Imported GoodsLong procedures, variable effectiveness in the face of complex strategiesAnti-subsidy measuresRegulation (EU) 2016/10372016Correcting the effects of foreign subsidiesPost-Investigation Countervailing DutiesDifficulty of proof, information asymmetriesScreening of foreign direct investment (FDI)Regulation (EU) 2019/4522020Protecting strategic sectorsCooperation mechanism between Member States and the CommissionShared competence, heterogeneous applicationInternational Government Procurement Instrument (IPI)Regulation (EU) 2022/10312022Ensuring reciprocity in access to public procurement marketsPossible restrictions for non-open third-country companiesUse still limited, impact uncertainExport control (dual-use goods)Regulation (EU) 2021/8212021Preserving international securitySupervision of exports of sensitive technologiesComplex coordination between Member StatesEconomic Security Strategy (Global Framework)Communication from the Commission (2023)2023Reduce strategic dependenciesCoordination of commercial, industrial and technological instrumentsLack of binding legal forc

Appendix 4

Comparative table of the main EU trade agreements and their strategic content

PartnerType of agreementDate/StatusMarket accessServices / investmentsStandards & SustainabilityStrategic interest for the EUMercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay)Association AgreementPolitical agreement 2024, signature in progressMassive reduction in customs duties; Access to an enlarged marketAccess to public procurement and servicesStrengthened environmental clausesDiversification; access to raw materials; Geopolitical counterweightJapanEconomic Partnership Agreement (EPA)In force since 2019Elimination of the majority of tariffsOpening up public procurement and servicesHigh standardsPartnership with a technological powerhouseSouth KoreaFree Trade AgreementIn force since 2011Near-total elimination of tariffsStrong liberalisationAdvanced standardsIntegration into Asian value chainsIndiaAgreement under negotiationCompletion expected in 2026Progressive tariff reductionAccess to services and mobilityStandards in BargainingStrategic market; alternative to ChinaNew ZealandFree Trade AgreementSigned 2023Almost total elimination of customs dutiesWide access to servicesVery high environmental levelModel agreement; Normative laboratoryCanada (CETA)Comprehensive Economic and Trade AgreementProvisional in force since 2017Elimination of 98% of customs dutiesAccess to public procurementHigh standardsStrengthening the transatlantic bondVietnamFree Trade AgreementIn force since 2020Gradual reduction of tariffsAccess to investmentsSocial and environmental clausesPositioning in Southeast AsiaMexico (modernized)Global AgreementModernization in progressIncreased market openingEnhanced access to servicesBuilt-in sustainable standardsExpanded North American footholdChileAdvanced Framework AgreementSigned 2023, ratification in progressExtensive trade liberalizationEnhanced access to services, investment and public procurementAmbitious chapter on climate and raw materialsStrategic access to lithium; securing energy value chains; Key partnership for the green transitionUnited States (Turnberry)Political-commercial arrangement (non-binding)2025Conditional and sectoral access (energy, green industry)Targeted cooperationImplicit norms, strategic alignmentManagement of transatlantic dependency; response to American industrial policies; structural asymmetry

Appendix 5

Summary table of trade defence procedures and foreign anti-subsidy instruments initiated by the European Union under the Von der Leyen Commission I (2019 -2024) and II (since the end of 2024)

Product / sectorTarget countryInstrument mobilizedOpening dateStatusStrategic issueSteel (flat, rolled)ChinaAnti-dumping + anti-subsidy2020–2022Measures in forceFight against overcapacity; Protection of the European steel industryExtruded AluminumChinaAnti-dumping2020Final measures (2021)Defense Intermediate Industry KeyFiberglassChina, EgyptAnti-subsidies2020Measures in forceFight against indirect subsidies via BISSolar panelsChinaAnti-dumping (review)2022Adjusted measurementsTension between protection and energy transitionWind turbinesChinaAnti-subsidy investigation2024OngoingRisk of technological dependencyElectric vehiclesChinaAnti-subsidies2023Ongoing / interim measuresAutomotive industry protection; Industrial sovereigntyBiodieselIndonesiaAnti-dumping2019–2021Measures reinstatedDefense agro-industrial sectorStainless steelIndonesia, IndiaAnti-dumping2021Measures in forceMetallurgical value chain protectionCeramicsChinaAnti-dumping2022Extended measuresProtection for manufacturing SMEsChemicals (citric acid, etc.)ChinaAnti-dumping2021–2023Measures in forceDefense chemical industryFiber optic cablesChinaAnti-dumping2020Measures in forceDigital sovereigntyForeign subsidies (FSR regulation)Multi-country (including China, Gulf)Anti-foreign subsidy instrumentSince 2023First investigations openedControlling distortions in the internal marketPublic procurement (IPI instrument)Multi-countryInstrument of reciprocitySince 2022Gradual activationFair access to public procurementMedical DevicesChinaIPI (threat of activation)2024OngoingReciprocity and health security

Specific block – Implementation of the FSR Regulation (since 2023)

Sector/OperationActorInstrument (FSR)Type of procedureDateStatusStrategic issueRailway infrastructure (Bulgaria)CRRC (China)FSRPublic procurement survey2023Withdrawal of the offerDeterrent effect of the FSRTelecommunicationsChinese companiesFSRPublic procurement survey2024OngoingSecurity of critical infrastructureTelecommunicationsUAE Companies FSRPublic procurement survey2024OngoingRisks of sovereign financing in sensitive infrastructureEnergy (wind, solar)Chinese actorsFSRSector inquiries2024OngoingGreen Industry ProtectionInfrastructure / concessionsUAE Companies FSRPublic procurement survey2024OngoingDistortions related to sovereign financingLogistics / PortsSovereign Wealth Funds (UAE)FSRMerger control2023–2025Ongoing / first decisionsStrategic influence in European infrastructureAcquisition (tech / logistics sector)Miscellaneous (including China, Gulf)FSRMerger control2023–2025First decisionsControl of subsidized investmentsPublic tendersMulti-countryFSREx-ante reviewSince 2023Phased applicationFairness in access to the internal market

Appendix 6

Structural comparison of EU trade agreements negotiated and signed since 2024*

DimensionEU – AustraliaEU – MercosurEU – IndiaEU – ChileMain objectiveStrategic (Supply Chains, Indo-Pacific)Market access + agricultureMarket Access + GrowthModernisation + strategic partnership resources & green transitionType of partner economyResource-rich developed economyEmerging agro-export economyEmerging economy in industrializationStable emerging economy, rich in minerals (copper, lithium)Tariff liberalizationHigh (≈90–95%)Very high (≈90%+)Very high (≈90–97%)Almost total (~99.9% of EU exports)Key gains for the EUServices, public procurement, industryIndustrial exportsIndustry + high value-added productsMarket access + energy/industry equipmentMain gains for the partnerAgriculture + Critical MineralsAgricultureTextiles, labour-intensive sectorsCritical minerals (lithium, copper) + agricultureStrategic Resources Dimension CentralSecondary EmergingVery important (lithium, copper, energy transition)Geopolitical roleIndo-PacificSouth AmericaCounterweight to ChinaSecuring Latin America + Green TransitionPolitical sensitivity (EU)Agriculture, GIVery highModerateLow to moderateStatus of negotiations (2026)Not concludedSigned, not ratifiedPolitical agreementPartially in force (ITA since 2025)

* Note: The agreements concluded by the EU with Japan, South Korea or New Zealand are not included in this table because they are mainly based on a logic of optimising existing trade between already integrated economies, with an emphasis on the reduction of non-tariff barriers and regulatory convergence. Conversely, the more recent agreements led by the European Union (India, Australia, Chile, Mercosur) are part of a more strategic  logic as defined by the President of the Commission: diversification of partners, securing supply chains (particularly in critical raw materials) and adaptation to geopolitical restructuring. They thus reflect the transition from a trade policy focused on economic efficiency to an approach of power and resilience, with the original institutional means, without major institutional changes for the time being.

[1] Baldwin, R., The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 12 ff.; H. Farrell, A. L. Newman, « Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, » International Security, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2019, pp. 42-79.

[2] Draghi, M., The Future of European Competitiveness, report submitted to the European Commission, 2024, p. 5 ff.

[3] On the reaffirmation of the logic of power in American trade policy and the contemporary rereading of the Monroe Doctrine, see RUSI, Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: Crisis or Opportunity?, 2025, available online: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/trump-corollary-monroe-doctrine-crisis-or-opportunity.

[4] Miran, S , Remarks at the Hudson Institute, 7 Apr 2025, American Presidency Project, available online: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-cea-chairman-steve-miran-the-hudson-institute.

[5] Piris, J.-C., The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 87 ff.; A. Sapir, « Europe’s Economic Challenges », Bruegel Policy Contribution, 2020.

[6] On the role of trade in the construction of the European project and the inclusion of the single market in a logic of regulated openness, see Pelkmans, J., European Integration: Methods and Economic Analysis, 3rd ed., Harlow, Pearson, 2006, p. 45 ff.; Porter, Michael E., The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990), p. 73 ff.

[7] On the notion of « open strategic autonomy« , v. European Commission, Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy, COM (2021) 66 final, Brussels, 18 Feb. 2021, esp. p. 4 ff.; see also speech by Ursula von der Leyen, « State of the Union Address », 16 Sept. 2020; Dombrovskis, V., Speech on EU Trade Policy, 2021. In a very significant way at the political level, it should be stressed that the notion does not proceed from an isolated academic doctrinal development, but from a progressive institutional construction aimed at articulating trade openness, economic resilience and the strategic affirmation of the Union.

[8] Draghi, M., The Future of European Competitiveness, report submitted to the European Commission, 2024, p. 5 ff.

[9] On the contemporary reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine from an economic power perspective, as already noted, see RUSI, Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: Crisis or Opportunity?, 2025, op. cit. 

[10] S. Miran, Remarks at the Hudson Institute, 7 Apr. 2025, op. cit. .

[11] On the normative dimension of European trade policy and its articulation with the integration project, see J. J. Pelkmans, European Integration: Methods and Economic Analysis, 3rd ed., Harlow, Pearson, 2006, p. 45 ff.; M. E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York, Free Press, 1990, p. 73 ff.

[12] F. Souty, op. cit.

[13] Draghi, M., The Future of European Competitiveness, report submitted to the European Commission, 2024, p. 5 ff.

[14] Souty, F., « The geopolitical limits of the European anti-foreign subsidy regulation », Le Diplomate Média, 21 January 2026.

[15] See Souty, F., « The EU-US Turnberry Agreement (July 2025) and the Reconfiguration of Tariff Risks: Trade Stabilization, Geopolitical Coercion and Effects on Consumer Markets, » Le Diplomate Média, January 26, 2026.  

[16] On the contemporary reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine from an economic and strategic perspective, see RUSI, Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: Crisis or Opportunity?, 2025, op.cit. 

[17] Miran, S., Remarks at the Hudson Institute, 7 Apr. 2025, op.cit.

[18] Draghi, M., The Future of European Competitiveness, report submitted to the European Commission, 2024, p. 5 ff.

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