Marybeth Collins

One of the things that makes environmental enforcement risk genuinely hard to manage is that most companies underestimate it in the abstract and only understand it clearly after someone else has already paid. 2025 generated a specific, documented record of what that cost looks like. The cases are worth knowing.

Not as cautionary tales. As operational intelligence.

The Numbers From 2025

Start with the biggest one. In January 2025, Hino Motors, a subsidiary of Toyota, settled with the EPA, the Department of Justice, and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) for more than $1.6 billion. The case involved falsified engine emissions data submitted to the EPA over more than a decade, covering more than 110,000 diesel engines sold primarily in heavy-duty trucks. The settlement included a $521 million criminal fine, $525 million in civil penalties, a $155 million mitigation program to offset excess emissions, and a $144 million recall program. Hino was also barred from importing any diesel engines it manufactures into the United States for five years.

The second largest Clean Air Act criminal fine in EPA history. For conduct that persisted for over a decade.

In March 2025, EPA reached a separate settlement with Manitowoc Company, a Wisconsin-based crane manufacturer, for $42.6 million. The company had imported and sold at least 1,032 cranes with diesel engines that were not certified under Clean Air Act standards between 2014 and 2018. The penalty represented roughly 13.5 percent of Manitowoc’s market capitalization at the time of settlement.

In May 2025, Costco Wholesale settled with EPA for violations under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act related to the illegal import and sale of antimicrobial gloves and misbranded air filters at one of its California stores. In July 2025, CEMEX paid $310,000 to resolve Clean Water Act violations from unpermitted wastewater and stormwater discharges at its Nevada sand and gravel mine, and agreed to restore riparian habitat in the Truckee River Watershed.

Outside the federal record, Minnesota’s Pollution Control Agency fined Central Bi-Products, a rendering facility in Long Prairie, $3 million for more than 900 documented hydrogen sulfide violations. The agency noted it was not the company’s first enforcement encounter.

Across Q3 2025 alone, EPA finalized 198 settlement agreements. A Texas energy company paid $459,000 for hydrogen sulfide and VOC emissions violations and permit failures. A Kentucky hazardous waste company paid $227,000. A Maryland steel manufacturer paid $212,017. A Tennessee battery manufacturer paid $180,000 for labeling violations and recordkeeping failures in its hazardous waste accumulation area.

By Q4, the pace slowed partly due to a federal government shutdown but still produced 74 settlements and $5.2 million in additional penalties.

On chemical reporting alone, EPA assessed its largest-ever TSCA penalty in 2025, $700,000, against a company that failed to report 334 imported chemicals for the 2024 reporting cycle.

The Pattern Running Through All of It

The cases above are not random. Read them together and a few things become clear.

The violations that produced the largest penalties were not accidents. Hino submitted falsified data for over a decade. Manitowoc sold noncompliant engines across four years. Central Bi-Products accumulated more than 900 hydrogen sulfide violations. These were not one-time failures caught on the first inspection. They were patterns that compounded over time under the assumption that the exposure was manageable.

That assumption is the problem. RCRA penalties, as of January 2025, can reach $93,058 per day per violation. The math on a multi-year, multi-violation pattern is not something most finance teams have modeled until after a settlement demand arrives.

The second observation is about the split between federal and state enforcement. From January through late June 2025, the Department of Justice filed only three new environmental civil enforcement actions in federal court, compared to 60 cases filed in all of fiscal year 2024. Federal court enforcement dropped sharply. Administrative enforcement at EPA, particularly for FIFRA and TSCA violations, actually accelerated. And state enforcement ran completely independently. Minnesota’s $3 million penalty against Central Bi-Products came from a state agency, not the federal government. California’s involvement in the Hino settlement added $236 million to a case that would have been large without it.

For companies that read a lighter federal enforcement posture as an overall reduction in enforcement risk, 2025 offered a correction.

The third observation is about what triggered the largest cases. Confirmatory testing. Import screening. Public databases. EPA discovered Hino’s noncompliance through confirmatory testing it conducted independently after Japanese regulators flagged the company. The TSCA penalty involved violations found through EPA’s own Chemical Data Reporting public database.

The enforcement mechanism increasingly starts with publicly available data and agency testing rather than with complaints or inspections. Companies whose compliance programs are built around managing the inspection process are playing a different game than the one currently being run.

What This Means for the Rest of 2026

The cases that settled in 2025 generally reflected violations that began years earlier. The cases that will settle in 2026 and 2027 are in some stage of investigation or administrative process right now. The window to self-correct before a formal action crystallizes is not unlimited, and it is not always clear from the inside how far along an external review actually is.

The penalties in 2025 did not stay inside one program area. When Manitowoc’s crane violation was investigated, the inquiry did not stop at the engine certification issue. When a Kentucky facility was cited for RCRA violations, the inspection covered labeling, records, contingency plans, and waste minimization documentation simultaneously. Regulators who find a violation in one area tend to look across adjacent areas. A compliance program that manages one program in isolation is exposed to the full audit that follows the first finding.

Multi-site companies that calibrate their compliance posture to federal enforcement trends are carrying a structural blind spot. State enforcement calendars do not align with federal policy cycles. Minnesota, California, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois are running their own programs with their own targets. A company with a manageable federal profile may have a very different picture at the state level, and the two records are rarely reviewed together until someone external does it first.

The Question for EHS and Compliance Teams Right Now

The companies that paid the largest penalties in 2025 were not universally small or careless. Hino is a Toyota subsidiary. Manitowoc is a publicly traded manufacturer with its own annual responsibility report. Costco is one of the most operationally disciplined retailers in the country. The violations they settled were not primarily failures of intent. They were failures of system, documentation, and the assumption that historical practice was still current compliance.

For EHS and compliance leaders heading into Q2, the useful question is not whether your company would pay $1.6 billion. It is whether your compliance program is built to catch the pattern before it compounds, and whether the record you would show a regulator conducting a confirmatory review of publicly available data looks the way you think it does.

Those answers are knowable before anyone asks for them.