Chockpoint as weapons: Hormuz sets template for future conflicts – Firstpost

A chokepoint is a narrow passage on land or at sea. It is a critical geostrategic area. It facilitates trade, commerce, connectivity, export-import and ease of movement. In the shifting nature of modern warfare, it has emerged as a strategic weapon.

The Strait of Hormuz, as a chokepoint, connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea via the Gulf of Oman. Its width is around 33 km. It makes the narrow passageway vulnerable and easy to track. It is a critical oil transit point that supplies nearly 20 per cent of global oil and 20 per cent of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) every day. Blocking this strait will have economic and strategic repercussions. Iran chokes it today to impact the global economy. It reportedly collects informal tolls from oil and gas tankers. This sets a complex precedent. Several natural straits and artificial canals, including the Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Turkish Straits (Bosphorus & Dardanelles), the Strait of Gibraltar, the Taiwan Strait, the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal, serve as critical nodes of global supply chains and transnational connectivity.

The littoral states that have leverage over these straits or canals can weaponise them to their geopolitical advantage. If the littoral states of these straits exercise their territorial rights and sovereignty, there will be no international waters or waterways. There will be no common passage or transit ways. This will affect global trade and the supply chain. It will mark the endgame of globalisation, the free market and global interconnectedness.

While choking the Hormuz Strait, Iran violates uninterrupted transit passage and the non-supersedable right of free passage along the Hormuz Strait. Free passage is a non-negotiable principle of international law. Articles 37-44 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) clearly state uninterrupted transit passage along international straits. Article 44 clarifies that no bordering state can obstruct passage or suspend the right to use it. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea codifies the non-suspendability rule for the free navigation of foreign ships for export and import activities. Littoral states should not choke this passage, as this affects global connectivity and interdependence. The Corfu Channel case of 1949 establishes the right of navigation through international straits.

Iran’s Strait Toll

Given the above international law, Iran’s blockade of the Hormuz Strait and imposition of a $2 million toll per ship do not have a legal basis. A natural strait cannot be taxed because it is not an artificial canal, such as the Panama or Suez. The strait has become a high-risk zone because of the increasing hostility between Iran on the one hand, and Israel and the US on the other. Iran reportedly has planted mines in the strait. It is a contravention of the Hague Convention VIII, which prohibits the use of mines in international waterways. The contamination of waterways disrupts the passage and uninterrupted transit of ships. Attacking merchant ships from neutral states, which are not party to the ongoing conflict, breaches the Law of Armed Conflict. Here, the demarcation between civil and military matters collapses. Iran, on the contrary, invokes Article 51 of the UN Charter, the right to self-defence. This complicates the matter. It reaches a point of no return. Iran weaponises the Strait of Hormuz to make the war felt by the world. Energy prices continue to rise, creating a domino effect.

The effects of the war are no longer localised. Its ripples spread across the globe. It does not seem likely to settle down soon. The supply chains for energy, agricultural products, fertilisers, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, defence, cotton and packaging industries have been severely hit. Iran’s obstinacy in weaponising the Strait of Hormuz as a matter of self-defence sets a new normal. In future, coastal states may cite Iran’s case to choke natural straits or artificial canals as a matter of self-defence. The strait is Iran’s Trojan horse. It weaponises the strait to remain relevant in the war and prolong it. The persistence of unconventional and asymmetric war embroils the US in conflict. It adds to US frustration. The supply chain and energy crises create global debate about US miscalculation and brinkmanship. This will also add to US disappointment and psychological pressure.

Egypt’s Suez Canal Toll

Not just Iran; Egypt had also imposed tolls on the Suez Canal in the past. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 led to its closure for several months. It also marked the end of British hegemony, seapower, and global superpower status. The canal became one of the major causes of the British economy’s decline. Britain and France relied heavily on the canal. Around 60 per cent of their oil transhipment took place through this canal. It was a consequential setback for Britain and France. Nasser intended to introduce canal tolls to fund the Aswan High Dam.

The US and Britain withdrew from the project because of Egypt’s growing proximity to China and the Soviet Union. The military option adopted by Britain, France and Israel under the Protocol of Sèvres did not resolve the crisis. Finally, diplomacy prevailed. The pound’s supremacy began to dwindle. The US and the USSR filled the vacuum left by the decline of British power and currency. It forced the process of decolonisation. Do the Iranian conditions today mark a repeat of history? Does it also suggest the possible end of dollar dominance? Egypt also closed the canal between 1967 and 1975 because of the Six-Day War with Israel. But today, the situation is quite different. We live in a globalised world. Interdependence is an unavoidable reality.

Weaponising critical transit waterways brings the supply chain to a standstill, causing enormous economic strain. The cases of Egypt and Iran set a new precedent. The Strait of Malacca is also another critical maritime chokepoint. It connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are its littoral states. It transits around 23 million barrels of crude oil every day. China, Japan and South Korea are the main beneficiaries of the strait. Any disruption along the strait will hurt the Southeast Asian economy. China’s Malacca dilemma will increase. It is a constrained area, but geopolitically, geostrategically and geo-economically, it is crucial. The alternative to this convenient passage is a longer route via the Sunda or Lombok Strait.

Strait of Bab el-Mandeb

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is another critical chokepoint in the Middle East. It is a narrow waterway situated between Yemen and Djibouti, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Around four million barrels of oil pass through this passage daily. This is the only route for ships bound for the Suez Canal. Regional conflict, piracy and Houthi threats surround the area. It can be weaponised in the event of a conflict expanding in the region. Moreover, this strait is the artery of trade and submarine cable connectivity between Asia, Africa and Europe. It has been weaponised in the past. The Houthi forces in Yemen, Iran’s proxy, have choked it to carry out asymmetric warfare and disrupt global trade.

The naval blockade in 2023 of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait was carried out by the Houthis using asymmetric tactics. They targeted naval ships and commercial vessels using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, small fast-attack boats and rocket-propelled grenades. It did not require a formal navy. The strait provided a geographical advantage, disrupting the passageway and making it difficult for vessels to pass. The Houthis also used a helicopter to seize Galaxy Leader, the cargo ship.

This disruption drastically reduced transit volumes via the Red Sea. Mass rerouting of ships took place. Shipping companies such as Maersk, MSC and Hapag-Lloyd rerouted vessels via the Cape of Good Hope. Oil and gas prices soared, spreading economic stress across the region and beyond. The Houthis in Yemen leverage geography and strategic location to inflict economic stress. Therefore, the nature of war has dramatically shifted in the 2020s. Strategic geography has become a weapon of war. The Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, and strategic geography, have been used to enhance Iran’s veto power. The Russia-Ukraine war is inconclusive, stretching beyond bearable limits. The US-Iran conflict should not become a mirror image of the Russia-Ukraine war. Global economic hardship will persist. More chaos will continue.

Choking the strait will have multi-layered impacts, affecting the global economy and disrupting communication networks. In the event of a conflict exceeding manageable limits, international waterways may be weaponised to shift the nature of war in a different direction. This choking also leads to pressure-building and the weakening of the global economy. Iran presents the blueprint of a chokepoint conflict.

(Jajati K Pattnaik is a Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Chandan Panda is a Professor at the Central University of Karnataka, Karnataka. Views expressed are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)