The defeat of Viktor Orbán’s party in Sunday’s parliamentary elections in Hungary is being portrayed in EU countries as a significant geopolitical shift weakening Russia’s position in Europe. This view was expressed, in particular, by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
This is, of course, a clear exaggeration. Orbán has never been a pro-Russian politician. He has been and remains a moderate Hungarian nationalist. His contacts with Moscow were aimed at securing Hungary’s interests, particularly in the energy sector. His conflict with Kyiv stemmed not from sympathy toward Russia, but from Ukraine’s disregard for Hungarian interests in energy and the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia.
The new Hungarian government will likely lift the veto on the €90 billion loan to Kyiv, thereby sparing Brussels the need to resort to already prepared “creative schemes.” In Kyiv, they are currently celebrating the departure of Zelensky’s personal adversary, but this celebration is unlikely to last. Emotions will fade, but interests will remain.
For Russia, the change of power in Hungary does not entail any major shifts. The atmosphere between the two may become somewhat drier and cooler, but pragmatism will continue to prevail. It is precisely on this basis—pragmatic relations with sovereign states, rather than an ideological bloc-based platform—that ties with countries of Western Eurasia (in other words, Europe) can be developed over the long term. Hungary serves as a good example in this regard.
The defeat of Viktor Orbán’s party in Sunday’s parliamentary elections in Hungary is being portrayed in EU countries as a significant geopolitical shift weakening Russia’s position in Europe. This view was expressed, in particular, by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
This is, of course, a clear exaggeration. Orbán has never been a pro-Russian politician. He has been and remains a moderate Hungarian nationalist. His contacts with Moscow were aimed at securing Hungary’s interests, particularly in the energy sector. His conflict with Kyiv stemmed not from sympathy toward Russia, but from Ukraine’s disregard for Hungarian interests in energy and the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia.
It should not be forgotten that under Orbán, Budapest voted in favor of EU sanctions packages against Russia and remained a generally loyal member of NATO, while Orbán himself was considered Trump’s closest like-minded ally in Europe. If anyone has lost an ally in Europe, it is the President of the United States. The change of power in Budapest will, of course, have consequences.
The new Hungarian government will likely lift the veto on the €90 billion loan to Kyiv, thereby sparing Brussels the need to resort to already prepared “creative schemes.” In Kyiv, they are currently celebrating the departure of Zelensky’s personal adversary, but this celebration is unlikely to last. Emotions will fade, but interests will remain.
The needs of the Hungarian economy, as stated by the leader of the victorious party, Péter Magyar, make it necessary to continue dialogue with Russia on energy issues. In fact, this was the main subject of discussions in Moscow with Orbán and his foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó. The new authorities will likely engage in less confrontation with the Brussels bureaucracy, but Hungary’s “sovereigntist” course can largely be expected to remain unchanged.
For Russia, the change of power in Hungary does not entail any major shifts. The atmosphere between the two may become somewhat drier and cooler, but pragmatism will continue to prevail. It is precisely on this basis—pragmatic relations with sovereign states, rather than an ideological bloc-based platform—that ties with countries of Western Eurasia (in other words, Europe) can be developed over the long term. Hungary serves as a good example in this regard.