High-income countries hosting displaced Syrians should avoid rushed or blanket withdrawals of protection status and instead develop a coordinated roadmap for return, reconstruction, and diaspora engagement, according to a new report by the Migration Policy Institute.
The report, From Exile to Return: Rebuilding Lives and States after Conflict, argues that the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 has opened a new and politically sensitive phase for governments that have hosted Syrians for more than a decade. While many states are now asking how and when temporary protection or asylum arrangements should end, the report warns that large-scale returns in the near term could destabilize both Syria and host countries.
The authors, Samuel Davidoff-Gore and Susan Fratzke, say Syria’s post-conflict environment remains too fragile for broad repatriation. The country still faces limited economic opportunity, damaged infrastructure, weak trust in governance structures, and a volatile security situation marked by insurgent attacks and foreign airstrikes, the report notes. Premature returns, it says, could strain scarce resources, fuel new displacement, and create wider instability.
The report places Syria alongside Ukraine as a major test case for how wealthy host countries should manage the transition from wartime protection to post-conflict mobility. It says governments face a political bind: public fatigue with refugee hosting is rising in some countries, yet many displaced people have become deeply rooted in their host societies and may be unable or unwilling to return quickly.
According to the report, several European governments suspended or reassessed Syrian asylum processing after Assad’s fall, while others began exploring returns for individuals with criminal convictions. Austria, for example, has deported Syrians with criminal convictions and offered return bonuses to those willing to go back voluntarily. Germany has also reviewed some Syrian cases and carried out at least one removal involving a person with a criminal conviction.
But MPI cautions that such steps should not substitute for a broader strategy. The report says there is still no EU-wide guidance on how to manage status transitions for Syrians, creating uncertainty for refugees and the risk that unilateral decisions by one country could affect others. It recommends that host governments avoid sweeping status cancellations, provide advance notice of policy changes, and develop differentiated approaches based on refugees’ circumstances, integration levels, vulnerabilities, and intentions to return.
The report also stresses that refugee status cannot end simply because fighting has declined or a regime has changed. Under international standards, conditions in the country of origin must be fundamental, stable, and durable before protection can cease. The UN refugee agency has said Syria has not yet met those criteria, the report notes.
The authors say voluntary return should remain the priority in the short and medium term. They recommend allowing Syrians to make exploratory visits to check homes, property, relatives, services, and security conditions without automatically losing protection status in host countries. Turkey already allows some Syrians to visit Syria temporarily, while Ukrainians can travel between Ukraine and the European Union without losing temporary protection, the report says. Similar arrangements for Syrians in Europe remain limited.
The report says nearly 1.5 million Syrians returned between December 2024 and February 2026, according to UNHCR estimates, but it notes that return intentions vary sharply. A UNHCR survey of Syrians in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon found that 18 percent intended to return within a year, up from 1.7 percent in a previous survey. Among those not planning immediate return, 83 percent said they hoped to return within five years.
MPI argues that the international community should think beyond a simple choice between permanent return and permanent settlement abroad. Many Syrians may move back and forth, contribute remotely, invest in reconstruction, or return temporarily to transfer skills. The report says diaspora communities can help rebuild Syria through human capital, remittances, technical expertise, health-care partnerships, and targeted investment in local reconstruction projects.
The report points to Germany’s Syria Hospital Partnerships programme as one example of how skilled diaspora members can contribute to rebuilding essential services. It also suggests that host countries create programmes that build skills useful in both countries of asylum and countries of origin, including vocational training, language programmes, and labour-market pathways that keep future return open without forcing it.
Reconstruction costs, the report notes, will be enormous. Syria’s long-term recovery is expected to require hundreds of billions of dollars, while Ukraine’s needs are estimated at $524 billion over ten years. In such a funding environment, diaspora contributions cannot replace international support, but they can help channel knowledge, capital, and community trust into recovery efforts.
The report warns that poorly planned returns could harm reconstruction, disrupt host-country economies, and push refugees into secondary movement across borders. It calls for coordination among European states, Syria’s neighbours, UNHCR, the EU Agency for Asylum, and Syrian authorities. Returns from Europe, it says, must be considered alongside the far larger refugee populations in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq.
“Ultimately, it will take time for people to return to their countries of origin, and not all will return in the end,” the report concludes, arguing that return should be supported only when it advances reconstruction and stabilization. If governments manage the Syrian and Ukrainian cases well, MPI says, they could establish a playbook for future post-conflict displacement crises.