The Bucharest Nine’s expansion could reshape Europe’s security and economy – if Poland leads, the U.S. engages and members overcome political fragmentation.
April 26, 2023: Ministers of defense of the Bucharest Nine group meet in Warsaw, Poland. The Bucharest Nine was founded in 2015 by the presidents of Romania and Poland to counter the threat of Russian aggression. © Getty Images
The Bucharest Nine militaries could shape NATO’s eastern flank
A united voting bloc in the European Parliament could shift policy outcomes
U.S. interest hinges on the group delivering concrete, not symbolic action
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One of the major geostrategic debates of our time is Europe’s future direction. Will countries continue to move toward greater political, defense and economic integration, ultimately realizing the vision of a Europe that is whole, free, prosperous, secure and at peace? Or have we reached a point of “peak European Union,” with fragmentation and competition taking hold instead?
What is clear is that some governments are hedging their bets – either by forming a bloc capable of wielding influence in Brussels or by building enough security, economic power and geopolitical strength to act independently as major players in Europe, and possibly on the global stage. The Bucharest Nine emerges as a potential key player in this strategic shift. Much of this initiative’s success will hinge on Poland’s leadership and U.S. interest in pursuing new partnership opportunities.
A coalition of the willing
The Bucharest Nine is a relatively young and evolving multinational format that was established in 2015, thanks to the initiative of the then presidents of Romania and Poland, Klaus Iohannis and Andrzej Duda. The initiative arose in response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2014. The group comprises Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. President Duda leveraged this format to rally support for Ukraine and advocate for its NATO membership.
Although the group never reached consensus on security issues such as NATO’s eastern front, it continued to hold annual meetings. In 2023, the Bucharest Nine, along with U.S. President Joe Biden and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, signed a joint declaration opposing Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
In 2025, the Bucharest Nine endorsed raising national defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product for NATO members. This decision was significant, though not unique, as almost all European countries had already endorsed similar increases.
The next summit is scheduled for May 13, 2026, in Bucharest. Recent reports indicate that the group may vote to extend membership to Norway, Sweden and Finland, which have previously made joint declarations with the Bucharest Nine, as well as Denmark. If these Nordic countries join the coalition, it will bring together all NATO members on the eastern flank, stretching from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea. With the exception of Norway, every country involved would be part of the EU.
The rationale for expansion encompasses both security and economic factors. Beyond the defense of the eastern flank, people from Eastern, Northern and Southern Europe have increasingly advocated for deeper economic integration among their regions. This includes investments in shared infrastructure, energy projects and digital connectivity improvements.
Bucharest Nine military spending as a percentage of GDP, 2025
Enduring challenges
As with other regional coalitions, securing long-term political alignment remains a primary challenge. Take the Visegrad Group, for example, which comprises the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. This coalition is relatively small and exhibits strong coherence in terms of national interests, geography, tradition, history and cultural ties. However, in recent years, the political agendas of these four governments have never aligned enough to foster the trust and confidence necessary for unified and decisive geopolitical action. The Bucharest Nine faces even greater hurdles, as it is a larger and more diverse group.
The group’s size and the strength of its members – including some of Europe’s most formidable militaries – give it substantial geopolitical influence. However, this potential can only be realized if participating governments can successfully create a bold and cohesive agenda. Such alignment could greatly strengthen NATO, showcasing a united front to secure its eastern flank and possibly setting the agenda for the next NATO summit in Ankara in July. Moreover, there is potential to establish a common voting bloc that could wield considerable power within the European Parliament.
Warsaw’s leadership ambitions
Poland plays a crucial role in shaping the agenda and future of the Bucharest Nine format, given its status as one of Europe’s fastest-growing economies and one of its strongest militaries. At present, the country is caught in a power struggle between a conservative president and a center-left governing coalition, each steering its foreign and defense policies in different directions. Despite this internal divergence, both factions are united in their desire to elevate Poland’s standing as a more influential power within Europe. In part, this push for a stronger Bucharest Nine underscores Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s ambition to forge a key initiative that will define his leadership.
One of the major hurdles in elevating the Bucharest Nine as a prominent platform for Poland lies not just in the struggle to create a unified and influential agenda, but also in the reality that the group is relatively unknown and not yet taken seriously.
Sep. 3, 2025: U.S. President Donald Trump and Polish President Karol Nawrocki at the White House in Washington, D.C. During their meeting, President Trump emphasized that he had no plans to withdraw troops from Poland and expressed his commitment to standing by Warsaw “all the way.” © Getty Images
Poland must also determine its role in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), a multinational effort to invest in infrastructure, energy and digital connectivity, which includes many of the same member countries as the Bucharest Nine. This was a presidential initiative and priority under the previous conservative administration, and initially, the current government showed little interest. However, some officials within the administration suggest that this stance may be changing, and Warsaw is prepared to reassert its leadership role in 3SI.
Indeed, the priorities of the Bucharest Nine and the 3SI could complement each other, especially if their combined efforts lead to projects that enhance energy security and develop dual-use infrastructure. Such projects could contribute to economic growth while reinforcing NATO’s forward defense logistical framework. Some have even suggested merging the two initiatives. However, the 3SI has had less impact than the Bucharest Nine, and merging the two might dilute and distract from the Bucharest Nine’s established reputation.
Another challenge is that Poland’s emergence as the region’s natural leader should not be presumed. The country’s military buildup is not proceeding as rapidly as hoped. The president and prime minister are locked in a debate over future funding for defense procurement. Moreover, Poland will face an acute challenge in further economic growth, as it tries to determine how to obtain reliable and cost-effective energy supplies to meet skyrocketing electricity demand for manufacturing, data centers and other commercial uses.
Poland is approaching its national elections in 2027, the outcome of which could significantly alter the political landscape. It seems likely that any more decisive leadership from Warsaw will be on hold until Polish voters cast their ballots and voice their preferences at the polls.
More by national security expert James Carafano
Washington’s strategic calculus
There is no doubt that the U.S. would welcome a coalition of conservative, center-right European nations that are focused on strengthening their conventional deterrent forces. Such a bloc would prioritize realistic policies that emphasize reliable and affordable energy over a green agenda.
The U.S. administration has generally taken a pragmatic approach toward Europe, showing a willingness to collaborate with anyone open to working with Washington. It is unlikely that the U.S. would prioritize the Bucharest Nine over other groups. Instead, Washington will partner with those who can advance American interests. The U.S. would be ready to engage meaningfully in this format – provided it proves itself to be more than just a platform for issuing declarations.
Scenarios
Unlikely: Bucharest Nine’s quick rise to prominence
The prospects for an expanded Bucharest Nine could be achievable. However, even if a new format is introduced before the NATO summit, it is unlikely to have much impact on discussions within NATO or in Brussels anytime soon.
The Bucharest Nine risks remaining merely a useful discussion forum, rather than a geopolitical power player. This could leave NATO’s eastern-flank efforts less coordinated, regional economic and infrastructure initiatives under-resourced, and the collective voice of Eastern and Northern Europeans less influential in NATO summits and European Parliament voting. Washington would likely continue to deal bilaterally or through established channels rather than invest political capital in a relatively unproven coalition.
Likely: A larger role in the medium term
Once a resolution to the Russian aggression in Ukraine is reached, the group may, in the near future, find itself in a position where taking on a significant role as a European power player becomes both possible and attractive. The following 18 months will likely be formative in shaping the next iteration of the format.
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