Ministerial hearings are already underway as Hungary’s new Tisza government takes shape, offering the first detailed insight into how the country’s policy framework could evolve over the next four years in key areas such as the economy, energy, and foreign affairs.
One of the most closely watched hearings was that of Minister-designate for Economy and Energy István Kapitány, whose remarks suggest that the incoming government may continue to clash with the European Commission on one major issue that already defined the Orbán era: Russian energy.
Speaking before the parliamentary committee, Kapitány stressed that Hungary would not abandon Russian energy supplies, but would instead pursue diversification while continuing to utilize existing infrastructure, including the Druzhba pipeline transporting Russian oil through Ukraine to Hungary and the Adriatic pipeline connecting Hungary with Croatia.
Kapitány also confirmed that the Tisza government intends to maintain the household utility price reduction scheme, one of the flagship policies of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz–KDNP, which has kept Hungarian energy prices among the lowest in the European Union for years. ‘The incoming Tisza government will prioritize obtaining energy from the cheapest, most reliable, and most sustainable sources,’ he stated.
Sticking with Russian Energy
These remarks place the incoming administration on a potential collision course with Brussels, which under the REPowerEU framework aims to phase out Russian energy imports entirely by 2027. While the European Commission argues that dependence on Russian hydrocarbons constitutes a strategic and security risk, Kapitány’s position indicates that the new Hungarian government intends to retain Russian energy within a broader and more diversified supply structure for as long as it remains economically advantageous and compatible with Hungary’s energy-security interests.
In practice, this reflects a continuation of one of the central arguments repeatedly made by the outgoing Orbán governments: Hungarian consumers should not bear significantly higher energy costs for geopolitical objectives. As a result, despite Tisza’s considerably more pro-European rhetoric, disputes with Brussels over energy policy may remain unavoidable.
‘This reflects a continuation of one of the central arguments repeatedly made by the outgoing Orbán governments’
A similarly pragmatic logic is visible regarding the expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant. The project, based on Russian technology and financing, has long been controversial within broader European debates about reducing strategic dependence on Moscow. Although Kapitány announced that existing contracts would be reviewed, he also emphasized the importance of extending the operational lifetime of Hungary’s current reactors and properly implementing the Paks II expansion.
This is particularly significant because the EU’s decoupling debate increasingly includes Russian nuclear cooperation in addition to oil and gas imports. Maintaining Paks II would preserve long-term technological and fuel dependence on Russia even if pipeline imports gradually decline, potentially creating another sensitive issue in Hungary’s relations with the Commission. At the same time, the Russian side has already indicated its willingness to continue cooperation with Hungary despite Viktor Orbán’s departure from power, leaving the future of the project largely dependent on the incoming government’s approach.
Is Rhetorical Realignment Enough?
Relations with Brussels are expected to become one of the defining priorities of the Tisza government, particularly because one of its central political objectives is securing access to currently frozen EU funds. Since 2022, billions of euros in grants have remained suspended under the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism and can only be unlocked if Hungary fulfills the Commission’s 27 so-called super milestones, including reforms related to anti-corruption measures, judicial independence, and public procurement transparency.
The importance of restoring relations with the EU was highlighted not only during Kapitány’s hearing but also during that of Foreign Minister-designate Anita Orbán. Both politicians emphasized that improving cooperation with Brussels and securing EU funding remain strategic priorities for the incoming administration.
According to Anita Orbán, Hungary is preparing to ‘once again become a cooperative partner’ within the European Union, arguing that national sovereignty should not mean ‘obstructing allies or questioning shared European values.’ She also indicated a clear departure from Viktor Orbán’s long-standing strategy of using vetoes as political leverage within the EU. ‘The veto is the very last instrument,’ she stated, criticizing the outgoing prime minister for too often becoming ‘a problem’ in European decision-making and using vetoes for ‘political theatre’.
At the same time, however, Anita Orbán’s remarks on Russia and Ukraine suggest that relations with Brussels may remain more complicated than Tisza’s pro-European messaging initially implied. While she openly stated that ‘Russia is the aggressor and Ukraine is the victim’—a significant rhetorical shift compared to Viktor Orbán’s carefully balanced language—she also stressed that Russia would remain an important regional partner and that bilateral relations should continue on the basis of mutual interests between sovereign states.
This position closely mirrors Kapitány’s approach to energy policy. Although the incoming government signals a strategic reorientation toward the European mainstream and the Western alliance system, it does not appear willing to fully sever economically significant ties with Russia, particularly in the fields of energy and nuclear cooperation.
As a result, a structural tension may emerge at the core of the new administration’s European strategy. While Tisza seeks to normalize relations with Brussels and unlock frozen EU funds, it may still face substantial disagreements with the Commission over the pace of decoupling from Russian energy and the long-term future of projects such as Paks II.
There are therefore two main questions awaiting answers in the coming period: how the new government will respond to EU pressure regarding these issues, and whether the Commission will tolerate transitional pragmatism under a more cooperative and rhetorically more aligned Hungarian government.
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