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India’s relationship with West Asia (Middle East) is entering a more complicated phase than at any point in recent decades. A once stable and predictable framework built on energy imports, diaspora welfare, connectivity and trade and investment, has now become a maze of competing alignments.
Traditionally, India’s engagement with the region rested on three pillars: the Gulf, Israel and Iran. Its deep ties with Gulf countries, especially the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait are anchored in energy security, remittances and trade. These countries also serve as critical logistics hubs and air corridors connecting India to Europe and Africa. Millions of Indians transit Gulf airports to the West, Africa and Latin America annually. At the same time, India’s partnership with Israel has become essential for defence technology, agriculture and intelligence cooperation. Meanwhile, connectivity through Chabahar Port in Iran provides access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan.
These relationships, however, no longer operate in isolation. The Abraham Accords have reduced some long-standing tensions by enabling cooperation between Israel and parts of the Arab world. But they have also introduced new dynamics that India must navigate carefully.
One such factor is the defence relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. While India expects Saudi Arabia to respect “mutual interests and sensitivities”, some analysts are worried that the Pakistan–Saudi defense axis may overshadow India-Gulf ties. While it retains historical significance, its practical impact is often overstated. Pakistan sees it as a source of political and financial support, especially in times of crisis. Saudi Arabia, however, treats it largely as a functional security partnership rather than a binding defence commitment.
Saudi Arabia remains a key swing player. In the past , it has aligned with the rhetoric of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on issues such as Kashmir, but its actual ground responses have been measured, as evidenced by its muted reaction to the abrogation of Article 370. Its economic transformation under Vision 2030 will depend on robust ties with India, including energy trade, investment and access to skilled manpower.
In fact, India’s economic importance to the Gulf today far exceeds that of Pakistan. Its trade, investment flows and large, skilled diaspora make it an indispensable partner. Gulf states are unlikely to jeopardize their well rounded ties with India.
The sudden exit of the UAE from OPEC, though surprising, signals that Gulf producers are prioritizing national interests over rigid group coordination, which creates greater room for bilateral engagement. The Iranian military strikes on Gulf states last month prompted a slight recalibration in how Gulf states view the United States. As a result, Gulf countries are diversifying their economies and partnerships, reducing dependence on traditional security providers like the United States. This opens space for India in areas such as infrastructure, technology and even selective defence cooperation. The Gulf states’ transition towards renewable energy and green hydrogen further strengthens India’s prospects for long-term energy partnerships.
These trends align with India’s strategy of multi-alignment, which is also reflected in platforms such as I2U2. If the Abraham Accords created new diplomatic openings, I2U2 (though it has gained little traction so far) provides a framework to convert them into practical cooperation in areas such as food security, clean energy and logistics.
If India is to contribute meaningfully to regional stability, frameworks like I2U2 and engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council must move beyond declarations to delivery. This means building India–Gulf food corridors with assured procurement, co-developing green hydrogen supply chains, and operationalizing the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor through pilot logistics routes linking Indian ports with Gulf and European hubs. Parallel efforts should include co-investment platforms with Gulf sovereign funds and mobility frameworks for skilled Indian professionals. India should move beyond labour and focus on next-gen diaspora in the Gulf by stressing on healthcare professionals, AI/Tech talent etc. Such initiatives would embed long-term economic interdependence across partners, making disruption costlier and cooperation more attractive. In this sense, stability in West Asia will depend less on diplomacy alone and more on the creation of shared economic stakes.
For India, the challenge is to sustain a balanced relationship with all Gulf states by treating each relationship independently. It must engage different partners on separate tracks—energy with the Gulf, defence with Israel and connectivity with Iran. Equally important, India should stay clear of regional rivalries, avoid over-militarizing partnerships in ways that create suspicion, and ensure it is not seen as part of any anti-Iran or sectarian bloc.
India’s advantage lies in its broad acceptability across the region. The Gulf needs markets, investment and manpower. Israel values a large, reliable partner. Iran seeks economic engagement. And the West sees India as a stabilizing force.
In a region defined by shifting alliances, India’s West Asia policy is no longer just about managing relationships, but about managing contradictions. Whatever happens in the ongoing Gulf crisis or even a future major regional conflict, India’s long-term trajectory of multi-alignment, economic interdependence and diversified partnerships in West Asia, is unlikely to change fundamentally. Because the logic underpinning this strategy is rooted in economic and geographic realities and the stakes are too high for India and the Gulf states.
