US President Donald Trump’s transactional diplomacy opens new pathways for cross-strait conflict resolution ahead of the 2028 Taiwan presidential election, despite Beijing’s demands for an end to Washington’s arms sales to Taipei

A breakthrough between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan could offer a valuable blueprint for the Korean Peninsula, where relations remain frozen amid North Korea’s shifting stance and increasing military isolationism

Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo*

The recent visit of US President Donald Trump to China has reignited the possibility of how the US can adopt its transactional diplomacy to resolve the potential conflicts between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan at a time when Beijing is asking Washington to stop its arms sales to Taipei. In the coming months leading to the 2028 Taiwan presidential election, the transactional diplomacy of the Trump administration will open the door to various possibilities of cross-strait conflict resolution. If cross-strait relations can take a turn for the better, both North Korea and South Korea will benefit from such experiences, even though recently North Korea has not only abandoned “reunification” as its long-standing objective but also seen South Korea as its “primary foe.”

The US has exhibited slight changes in the second Donald Trump administration’s policy toward both Mainland China and Taiwan. At the beginning of Trump’s return to presidential power in early 2025, his administration showed a publicly hostile attitude toward China and a consistently supportive policy toward Taiwan. Nevertheless, after Trump’s most recent visit to Beijing in May 2026, Washington has appeared to show at least its willingness to address the problem of Taiwan’s political future, firstly by reconsidering its arms sales to Taiwan and secondly by rejecting more strongly the Taiwan forces supportive of “independence” or separatism.

Arms sales and transactional bargaining

Yet, President Trump’s recent remarks that he may talk to the top leader of Taiwan, William Lai of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), raised the eyebrows of mainland Chinese leaders, who quickly warned the US against such a move. What is interesting is the demand from China that the US should not provide weapons to Taiwan. In December 2025, the US government approved a massive arms package of US$11 billion to be sold to Taiwan, including 82 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and 420 Army Tactical Missile Systems missiles (South China Morning Post, May 30, 2026). The Chinese Foreign Ministry criticised the US move of violating the one-China principle, undermining Beijing’s sovereignty and security, and interfering with Chinese domestic affairs.

At a critical juncture in which the US toys with the idea of “punishing” Iran by military force again, acting US Navy Secretary Hung Cao said that Washington was stopping the US$14 billion arms package to ensure that the US has the munitions for its operations against Iran. If the arms package to Taiwan can be reduced to shift some of its weapons to deal with Iran, then the Trump administration would kill two birds with one stone: reducing the size of US weapons to be sold to Taiwan to placate the Chinese Mainland and reserving more weapons for the US to tackle the Iranian war.

After President Trump’s recent visit to Beijing, he said that he would speak to Taiwan leader William Lai on the questions of arms sales and Taiwan’s future (Taipei Times, May 21, 2026). Lai remarked that he could speak directly with Trump, adding that Taiwan is committed to maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and continuing to enhance its self-defensive capability in response to China’s military threat. The Mainland Chinese side expressed its displeasure with Trump’s intention of speaking to Lai, maintaining that the Taiwan issue belongs to China’s internal affairs.

Navigating the routes of cross-strait leverage

However, once President Xi Jinping raised the American arms sales to Taiwan in his meeting with President Trump, the latter naturally intends to adopt his transactional diplomacy and to speak to Lai directly while preparing to bargain with Xi over any possible Chinese concessions on the Taiwan matter. It remains to be seen how President Trump deals with Taiwan from now to the visit of President Xi to Washington in September. But one thing is certain: by adopting a transactional approach to dealing with Taiwan, the US government under the second Trump administration is opening the door to bargain with China over the Taiwan question.

Washington remains the most influential actor in Beijing-Taipei relations and any rapprochement between North Korea and South Korea

Such bargaining would have several possible routes. First, the US may offer to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for China’s guarantee for something, arguing that the arms sales are in line with the Taiwan Relations Act while exchanging something that would perhaps protect Taiwan’s security. Such an exchange may, for example, involve a promise from the Chinese Mainland of not using force to deal with Taiwan – a demand that would likely be rejected by Beijing.

It is possible that Beijing demands something more than just an action of the US to reduce arms sales to Taiwan, like the Taiwan side accepting the 1992 consensus as a precondition for any breakthrough in cross-strait relations. If so, the US may have to consider an additional “incentive” for the Chinese Mainland to accept a reduction of US arms sales to Taiwan, such as lobbying the Taiwan regime to open the Kinmen and Matsu Islands to allow cross-strait visits and tourism as a temporary measure to improve cross-strait relations, or even persuading the DPP to abandon its platform of establishing “the Republic of China as a sovereign, independent and autonomous nation” (see DPP platform: Party_Platform.pdf (dpp.org.tw)).

Staged approaches and regional intermediaries

Yet, the DPP and its supporters would highly likely oppose any such US move, unless they may get the Mainland Chinese guarantee of abandoning the use of force against Taiwan. If this analysis is accurate, then a medium solution of a US lobby for Taiwan to relax its control over Kinmen and Matsu by allowing the islands to interact with mainland Chinese tourists can be a small but positive breakthrough in improving cross-strait relations. However, if China maintains that Taiwan has to accept the 1992 consensus (namely there is only one China) before closer contacts between Xiamen and Kinmen/Matsu, then the second route below may be more feasible.

The second route is to adopt a stage-by-stage approach to bargaining with the Chinese Mainland over the Taiwan issue. If the 2022 White Paper published by China on the Taiwan issue mentioned that a stage-by-stage approach can be adopted, then the transactional diplomacy of the Trump administration may offer to reduce the US arms sales to Taiwan in several stages. For instance, stage one would be characterised by a reduction of the planned US arms sales to Taiwan and Taiwan’s acceptance of the 1992 consensus. These double offers to the Chinese Mainland can perhaps be exchanged for the mainland’s concession of, say, renouncing the use of force against Taiwan while opening the door to more mainland tourists to visit Kinmen, Matsu and the entire Taiwan.

Taiwan opposition party KMT chairperson Cheng Li-wun attends a press conference at the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club in Taipei on March 23, 2026. (Photo by I-Hwa Cheng / AFP)

Such bargaining, if successful, would constitute an unprecedented breakthrough in cross-strait relations and US-China relations, but the crux of the problem is whether Beijing would allow Washington to function as a middleman who “interferes” with Chinese domestic affairs. If US intervention is deemed politically undesirable, then a third country’s mediation may be a third possible route.

Political alignments and the 2028 horizon

The third route is the mediation from a country friendly toward both Beijing and Taipei, like Singapore which adopts a “friend to all, enemy of none” diplomacy. Given that Singapore served as a neutral ground for President Xi Jinping to meet the former Kuomintang (KMT) President Ma Ying-jeou in November 2015, it will likely play a crucial role as an intermediary between the two sides in the future. But as long as the DPP is in power in Taiwan and so long as it rejects the 1992 consensus, it would be politically difficult and impossible for the mainland Chinese side to meet the Taiwan side unless the KMT returns to power in the 2028 Taiwan presidential election.

The fourth route is for the US side to use the reduction of its arms sales to Taiwan as a temporary step to improve cross-strait relations, and for Washington to wait for a possible KMT return to power in 2028. Yet, the likelihood of the KMT’s return to power will depend on two factors: whether it can form a coalition with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and whether Taiwan’s public opinion is shifting to a more pragmatic stance of accepting “peaceful reunification” with the Chinese Mainland.

Recent public opinion polls have shown that more Taiwan people have been accepting a model of “peaceful reunification” with the Chinese Mainland. If so, the KMT election platform will have to adopt a slogan that speaks to the reluctance of most Taiwan people to witness any conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Adopting a pragmatic platform would then heighten the chance of the KMT and its coalition with the TPP to grasp presidential power and to talk to Beijing directly.

Implications for the frozen Korean peninsula

The four routes above will perhaps have to be considered by Beijing, Washington and Taiwan’s political parties and their leaders if a breakthrough in cross-strait relations is seriously considered. Any cross-strait solution will likely have implications for the resolution of the currently frozen relations between North Korea and South Korea. Recently, North Korea has regarded reunification as politically impossible and seen South Korea as a “hostile” state. Still, if Beijing’s relations with Taiwan can have a breakthrough, as argued with several possibilities above, a rapprochement between North Korea and South Korea would perhaps be possible by adopting a stage-by-stage and gradualist approach.

Arguably, stage one in the process of warming the relations of South Korea and North Korea has to rely on the US as an intermediary. North Korea is keen to focus on self-reliance, economically and politically, and military deterrence against the military alliance composed of the US, South Korea and Japan (Channel NewsAsia, May 28, 2026). The US capture of former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January 2026 and the recent US-Israeli war against Iran have alarmed North Korea politically, militarily and technologically.

Hence, Pyongyang’s tendency of adhering to its economic self-reliance and nuclear deterrence is natural. On May 28, North Korea rejected the call of the QUAD (comprising the US, Japan, Australia and India) to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula, adding that the grouping represented US-led “unipolar domination” (The Korea Herald, May 28, 2026).

Limits of intermediaries amid isolationism

If the North Korean ideology of self-reliance and military deterrence remains resilient, the only effective intermediary between North Korea and South Korea is arguably the US, whose President Trump met President Kim Jong-un three times in 2018 and 2019. However, so far there is no sign showing that both will meet in the coming months. Given that China and North Korea are ideologically strategic partners, Beijing can still rein in Pyongyang’s actions. South Korea under the leadership of President Lee Jae-myung has recently seen China as a possible middleman that can improve relations between the two Koreas. Nonetheless, China’s intermediary role is limited as long as North Korea has not shown its eagerness to improve its relations with South Korea.

Any improvement in cross-strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan will have positive impacts on the relations between the two Koreas

North Korea under Kim Jong-un’s leadership has seen South Korea as having an agenda to turn it into a capitalist system and utilising denuclearisation to demilitarise and neutralise Pyongyang. As long as this perception persists, the relations between the two Koreas are destined to be constrained.

Compounding the ideological obstacle is the US arrest of Maduro in Venezuela and the US-Israeli “punitive” action against Iran, thereby making North Korea even more militarily isolationist and vigilant than before. The US intention of triggering a regime change in Cuba, which is deeply affected by an economic and energy crisis, makes North Korea more determined to counter any US-led “subversion.”

Resilience and the boomerang effect

The North Korean military that was sent to help Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian war showed not only a solid military alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow but also Pyongyang’s willingness to learn from the conflicts, technologically and strategically. As such, re-engaging North Korea will require the combined actions of the US, China and perhaps even Russia to incentivise the Kim Jong-un leadership to return to the diplomatic table with South Korea. Yet, such incentives, economically and politically, are virtually absent. The relations between the two Koreas therefore remain frozen.

Hence, if the relations between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan can and would improve further, such improved relations would perhaps trigger a boomerang effect on the relations between the two Koreas. At present, the two Koreas have no effective intermediary who can bring them closer than ever before. The US is preoccupied with its conflicts with Iran, and its actions in Venezuela and Iran have already heightened Pyongyang’s sensitivity and disincentivised it to discuss with the US over the issue of denuclearisation.

Every cloud has a silver lining: transactional diplomacy has room to be developed further by the Trump administration to achieve conflict resolution in East Asia

One scenario of the two Koreas is the model of the collapse of East Germany, which eventually led to German reunification in October 1990. Nonetheless, this German model will likely be extremely dangerous to the two Koreas, given the fact that North Korea is reportedly possessing the capability of producing nuclear warheads (The Guardian, April 15, 2026). In February 2026, the Workers’ Party in North Korea convened its Ninth Congress, articulating a vision of industrial development and domestic stability.

There is no sign showing that North Korea would follow the “collapse” scenario of the former East Germany, especially as Kim Jong-un appears to groom his sister Kim Yo-jong and also his daughter Kim Ju-ae as potential successors. Observers predicted the “collapse” scenario many years ago, but it has turned out to be wrong. The Kim dynasty continues to demonstrate both political resilience and robust ideological control in North Korea, unless unexpected political events arise. One of such unforeseen circumstances is how succession politics will evolve in North Korea.

Strategic calculations in cross-strait leverage

In conclusion, while cross-strait relations between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan demonstrate at least a window of opportunities for improvement, the current relations between North Korea and South Korea are more frozen than ever before. Any improvement in cross-strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan will have positive impacts on the relations between the two Koreas. If the socialist Chinese Mainland and capitalistic Taiwan can improve their relations stage by stage, as suggested constructively in this article, then the two Koreas may also consider a stage-by-stage and gradual approach of utilising intermediaries, including the US and China, to enhance dialogue and foster a trust-building process.

Practically, Washington remains the most influential actor in Beijing-Taipei relations and any rapprochement between North Korea and South Korea. In particular, the presidential diplomacy championed by Donald Trump can and will offer a glimmer of hope to break the political impasse between Beijing and Taipei, and between Pyongyang and Seoul. Nonetheless, Beijing’s objection to US interference in China’s internal affairs means that Washington’s mediation has its limits, while North Korea’s increasing isolationist approach is not conducive to any US mediation.

At the same time, Trump and his administration are preoccupied with the Iranian conflicts. If so, the two military flashpoints in East Asia – cross-strait relations between Mainland China and Taiwan, and the frozen relations between the two Koreas – remain practically difficult to solve. Still, every cloud has a silver lining: transactional diplomacy has room to be developed further by the Trump administration to achieve conflict resolution in East Asia.

Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of numerous books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China. He is also an honorary professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong.