United Kingdom: The Downfall of Starmer and the Rise of Burnham, Seventh Premier in a Decade
The Return of Iranian Crude: The 60-Day Licence and the Fall of Brent
Vance’s Move: A Show of Authority and a Sword of Damocles for the Republican Party
Sudan: The Barbarism of the RSF against El Obeid, the Forgotten Conflict
Brief Introduction
The day possesses a single centre of gravity — the Bürgenstock table — around which almost everything else revolves: the price of crude, the keys to the Strait of Hormuz, real power in Tehran and, in a less visible but no less decisive manner, the internal warfare that the Iranian conflict has unleashed within the ranks of the Republican Party.
Orbiting around it are two satellites demanding our attention, which no honest analysis can simply dismiss: the political earthquake in London, where Sir Keir Starmer has fallen and Andy Burnham is emerging; and the complicit silence surrounding the slaughter being prepared in El Obeid.
Five news items, one common thread: the fragility of an order sustained by the will — and the temperament — of a handful of men, and by a memorandum of understanding (MoU) bereft of verification. As always, it is best to look at them head-on and without anaesthetic.
United Kingdom: The Downfall of Starmer and the Rise of Burnham, Seventh Premier in a Decade
The Facts
On Monday 22 June, before the cameras outside Number 10 Downing Street, Sir Keir Starmer announced his resignation as leader of the Labour Party. This followed months of internal pressure that culminated when his major rival, Andy Burnham, Mayor of Greater Manchester, returned to Parliament by comfortably winning the Makerfield by-election — securing nearly 25,000 votes and a majority exceeding 9,200 — which had been called for the express purpose of obtaining a seat from which to contest the leadership.
Starmer, who informed King Charles III that same morning, will remain as caretaker Prime Minister until the new Labour leader is chosen. Nominations open on 9 July and close on 16 July; if uncontested, Burnham could take office within weeks, whereas a contest would delay the outcome until Parliament returns in September.
The former Health Secretary Wes Streeting, who was expected to challenge him, has chosen to endorse him. This would make him the seventh occupant of Downing Street in a single decade. This is no minor detail: President Trump himself, whose relationship with Starmer has soured in step with the Iranian conflict, took the liberty on Monday of predicting his downfall and reproaching his immigration and energy policies.
Andy Burnham, the newly elected MP for Makerfield and former Mayor of Greater Manchester, walks through Manchester Piccadilly station on his way to London, in Manchester, Great Britain, on 22 June 2026 – REUTERS/TEMILADE ADELAJA
Implications
This dizzying turnover — seven heads of government in ten years — betrays the deep crisis of governance corroding one of the world’s oldest and most admired parliamentary democracies.
The transition shifts Labour’s centre of gravity away from Starmer’s dull technocracy towards a more instinctive and communicative populist and municipalist profile, amidst a struggle to contain the rise of the nationalist Reform UK, which has drained votes from the governing left’s flank.
For a Europe starved of reliable partners, the unknown is of the highest order: will London sustain the seamless Atlanticism and firm support for Ukraine that have characterised its foreign policy, or will it succumb to the temptation of naval-gazing just when the continent needs leadership most? Burnham arrives with domestic credit, but his domestic profile does not guarantee competence on the international stage.
Perspectives and Scenarios
Scenario A (45%): An orderly transition and the coronation of Burnham with virtually no opposition before the summer recess, ensuring a line of Atlanticist continuity.
Scenario B (40%): A genuine contest — featuring a candidate from the Starmerite wing — that strains the debate over NATO, defence spending, and Ukraine, prolonging the interim period until September.
Scenario C (15%): The leadership crisis becomes entrenched, opening the door to greater upheaval within a disorientated Labour Party. The real question is not who, but what: Burnham’s first messages regarding the Atlantic Alliance and Kyiv will need to be gauged, as that is where it will be decided whether we are witnessing a change of face or a change of course. A shift towards ambiguity in defence commitments would be terrible news at the worst possible time.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer reacts during the debate on the King’s Speech in the House of Commons in London, Great Britain, on 13 May 2026 – House of Commons via REUTERS
Iran–United States: The First Round at Bürgenstock and the Vahidi Factor — The Paradox of Decapitation in Action
The Facts
The inaugural round of high-level talks concluded in the early hours of Monday at Bürgenstock, overlooking Lake Lucerne, under the protection of the fourteen-point memorandum of understanding signed the previous week by President Trump and his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian, to extend the fragile ceasefire by at least sixty days.
The mediators — the Emirate of Qatar and Pakistan — spoke of “encouraging progress” and a roadmap towards a final agreement within sixty days. Vice-President J.D. Vance proclaimed four achievements: a communication line to prevent incidents in Hormuz, a “conflict management or de-escalation cell” to sustain the truce in Lebanon, a schedule of technical rounds, and the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.
However, it would be wise not to claim victory too soon: Tehran has expressly denied agreeing to this return, and President Pezeshkian reiterated on Sunday that Iran “will never renounce” uranium enrichment. Above all, one must not lose sight of who truly commands in Tehran: since 1 March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been led by General Ahmad Vahidi, sought by Interpol under a Red Notice since 2007 for the AMIA Jewish community centre bombing in Buenos Aires — 85 dead in 1994 —, sanctioned by Washington and Brussels, and designated by Milei’s Argentina, which, like most of the world’s democracies, has declared the IRGC a terrorist organisation. The Institute for the Study of War maintains that Vahidi and his circle currently control not only the military response but also the regime’s negotiating strategy.
The Vice-President of the United States, JD Vance, speaks alongside the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shehbaz Sharif, and the Prime Minister of Qatar, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani, at the start of a four-way meeting between the United States, Iran, Pakistan and Qatar at the luxury Burgenstock hotel complex overlooking Lake Lucerne, Switzerland, on 21 June 2026 – PHOTO/ FABRICE COFFRINI via REUTERS
Implications
It is here that our category of the “paradox of decapitation” must be activated, which we have explained so many times and which current events confirm day by day.
The paradox does not lie in the attacks eliminating moderates — there were no moderates to eliminate within the leadership of the jihadist oligarchy — but rather in the fact that the survivors, all of whom are hardliners, lack the ideological authority, rank, and dominant personality required to impose their will on their peers and force the acceptance of concessions.
The late Ali Khamenei could enforce internal discipline; his successor, Mojtaba, does not possess it, and the IRGC triumvirate — Vahidi leading the Guard, General Zolghadr as Secretary-General of the Supreme National Security Council and former commander of the Quds Force, and General Rezaee as military advisor to the leader of the revolution — are equals without an arbiter, although the serial terrorist Vahidi is gradually acquiring all the levers of power.
This is a paradox of governance, not of moderation, and it explains Tehran’s erratic slowness at the table. We are, in short, facing a contained systemic fracture that is not being resolved, merely managed. This is the authentic absurdity threatening these talks: entrusting the management of Hormuz — one of the planet’s vital energy arteries, through which nearly a fifth of the world’s oil and over 25% of its natural gas circulates — to the fiefdom of a man with pending international terrorism charges is not realism, but reckless irresponsibility.
Regarding the nuclear promise, this house has been repeating it since February: a memorandum is not a treaty, and a promise of inspection — which Tehran does not even acknowledge — is not an inspection. To believe otherwise is wishful thinking. Providing financial oxygen to the jihadist oligarchy, even under the pretext of American wheat, is to bail out the world’s largest central exporter of terrorism, the backer of Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, pro-Iranian terrorist militias in Iraq, and Hamas.
Perspectives and Scenarios
Scenario A (35%), Fragile Consolidation: The truce holds for sixty days, Hormuz remains open, and a tortuous but active negotiation begins regarding the nuclear programme.
Scenario B (40%), Zombie Truce: The framework does not break but becomes hollowed out; Iran does the bare minimum in the strait and delays everything else, while Washington claims victory and looks the other way.
Scenario C (25%), Relapse: An incident in Hormuz, a blocked inspection, or cross-retaliation in Lebanon blows up the armistice ahead of schedule. The probability of the latter is not negligible, precisely because the agreement lacks a robust verification mechanism and because, in the logic of variable-temperature wars, none of the actors can win nor afford to lose.
Ahmad Vahidi – PHOTO/ Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) vía REUTERS
The Return of Iranian Crude: The 60-Day Licence and the Fall of Brent
The Facts
The first practical effect of the memorandum: on Monday, the US Treasury authorised, via a general sixty-day licence valid until 21 August, the production, transport, and sale of Iranian-origin petroleum and petrochemicals, even permitting imports into the United States with payment in dollars — something unprecedented in decades. The market reacted instantly: Brent closed with a 3.31% drop at $77.90 — its lowest level since early March — after hitting $82.30 at the opening due to Trump’s threats to resume strikes; West Texas Intermediate slid to $74.82.
Tanker traffic through Hormuz is rebounding strongly; Iran has raised its shipments to the highest level since the start of the conflict — offering discounts to China and dispatching over thirty million barrels in a single week — and Gulf producers are preparing to expand supply: Kuwait has lifted its force majeure, and the Emirati firm ADNOC is resuming operations, with nearly eighty million barrels awaiting exit if the strait reopens fully.
Implications
The relief at the petrol pump is real and welcome for a convalescing global economy, but logistical thawing must not be confused with peace. Much of the current abundance stems, as warned by Quantum Strategy and ANZ, from the liquidation of inventories and crude stored on vessels, rather than a solid recovery in production: once those reserves are depleted, the market will tighten again, and it is worth remembering that the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve itself hovers near its lowest levels since 1983, meaning Washington’s cushion is narrower than it appears.
Then remains the uncomfortable trade-off, which we have no intention of ignoring: every dollar the regime earns through this avenue is a dollar that will not go to hospitals or schools, but to ballistic missiles, internal repression, and the rearming of its terrorist proxies.
Perspectives and Scenarios
Scenario A (25%): An incident in Hormuz or a new outburst revives the war premium and pushes Brent back above $80.
Scenario B (40%): A well-supplied market and contained prices for months, with Brent fluctuating between $72 and $80 as logistics normalise.
Scenario C (35%): Oversupply and the exhaustion of the war premium, combined with weak Chinese demand, puncture the floor of $72.
In all cases, the permanent risk — and the one that matters most to us — is that Tehran exploits this economic breathing room to rebuild its military muscle and its network of terrorist proxies. Hence, the actual destination of the released funds must be monitored with maximum and non-negotiable vigilance.
A pumping station near Bakersfield, California – REUTERS/ LUCY NICHOLSON
Vance’s Move: A Show of Authority and a Sword of Damocles for the Republican Party
The Facts
That the Vice-President, rather than a technical negotiator, is personally steering the rudder is a clear show of authority. The American press is already dubbing the pact “the Vance agreement”, not always as a compliment. Internal numbers are smiling on him: he is the undisputed favourite for 2028 — scoring 36% in The Center Square / Noble Predictive Insights poll from 1 to 4 June, more than double his closest pursuer, and an overwhelming 43% among those under thirty.
The problem, however, appears as soon as one leaves the perimeter of the Republican primaries: the war he is now managing remains deeply unpopular, and the parallel with the burden that Biden’s legacy imposed on Kamala Harris in 2024 is already being drawn, without disguise, by quite a few of the party’s own strategists.
Senator Lindsey Graham called on him, as the “architect of the deal”, to defend the memorandum before Congress — only to soften his tone days later after speaking with envoy Steve Witkoff; Senator Bill Cassidy described it as the “worst foreign policy mistake in decades”; and Ted Cruz, a potential rival in 2028, has aired his misgivings. Trump himself, with his customary humour, is already joking about sharing the credit — or the blame —, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio looks on in silence.
White House Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Vice-President J. D. Vance attend a joint press conference held by US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the State Dining Room at the White House, Washington, D.C., USA, on 29 September 2025 – REUTERS/KEVIN LAMARQUE
Implications
The Iranian war has not fractured the Republican Party once, but twice and from opposing flanks, leaving Vance precisely in the middle of the divide. On the more nationalist side of the MAGA movement, he accused the White House of betraying its promise of “zero wars” — a bill that figures like Megyn Kelly have presented to him live on air.
On the side of the neoconservative hawks, the memorandum now infuriates supporters of the hard line, who read it as inexplicable concessions from a victor to the vanquished. Notice the subtlety: the hawks are no longer targeting Trump, but his political heir. Vance has become a voluntary lightning rod: by taking on the negotiation, he has hitched his wagon to an agreement whose outcome he does not control. If the war resumes, he bears the failure; if peace is sealed on concessions, he faces the accusation of appeasement.
The man who did not want the war ends up owning the peace: success and failure point to the same individual. Yet it is undoubtedly a show of authority, for the person truly risking his future in the November 2028 elections is JD Vance. He has taken command to ensure there are no further derailments, as Witkoff and Kushner will do whatever President Trump tells them. Vance will do whatever best suits the Republican Party as a whole.
Perspectives and Scenarios
Scenario A (30%), Consecration: The truce holds, crude oil remains cheap, and Vance sells “peace through strength”, surviving both flanks.
Scenario B (40%), A Zombie Truce that Exacts a Toll: Neither side forgives him for the ambiguous outcome, the Republican Party risks the House in November, and Vance arrives in 2028 as a wounded favourite.
Scenario C (30%), Catastrophic Relapse: The armistice shatters, and the Vice-President is saddled simultaneously with a failed agreement and a reopened war. Even the best-case scenario does not hand him a cost-free victory: that is, in essence, the sword hanging over his throne.
JD Vance, Vice-President of the United States – Depositphotos
Sudan: The Barbarism of the RSF against El Obeid, the Forgotten Conflict
The Facts
Far from the spotlight, Sudan is agonizing. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), heirs to the sinister Janjaweed, are concentrating troops and multiplying drone attacks around El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, while the Sudanese army launched pre-emptive bombardments on Saturday to thwart the assault.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, and Secretary-General António Guterres warned on Thursday of an imminent risk of atrocities, reminding everyone, without euphemisms, that “we have seen this script before,” in allusion to the slaughter in El Fasher — qualified as genocide by the UN — and the Zamzam camp after its fall in October.
Around thirty countries, led by Norway, signed a joint declaration of alarm on 18 June; the Security Council demanded the cessation of the assault on the 19th. Ten days of drone attacks have killed at least fifty civilians, and today 33.7 million Sudanese — 60% of them children — require humanitarian assistance: the largest crisis in the world.
The head of the Sudanese Army, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan – REUTERS/FLORENCE LO
Implications
We stand against barbarism of any colour, and we will not remain silent before this. The situation in Sudan is yet more proof of the moral mediocrity of an international political class incapable of moving from warnings to action, with a Security Council paralysed by geopolitical rivalries.
There is also an uncomfortable actor in the background that consistency obliges us to name: the persistent and documented finger-pointing at the United Arab Emirates as the financial backbone of the RSF, just when Abu Dhabi is a key interlocutor in the Gulf matrix and in the Iranian file itself. One cannot condemn the terror brewed in Tehran while looking away when it is financed in Darfur and Kordofan; a double standard is, here too, the beginning of complicity.
Perspectives and Scenarios
Scenario A (45%): The consummation of a new ethnic massacre in El Obeid following the pattern of El Fasher — siege, starvation, and targeted executions against non-Arab communities —, currently the most feared outcome precisely due to international inaction.
Scenario B (40%): A prolonged siege, without a definitive assault, suffocating the city in a slow, sustained humanitarian catastrophe.
Scenario C (15%): Real pressure — effective sanctions, guaranteed humanitarian corridors, and cutting off the flow of weapons to the combatants — alters the course. Meanwhile, the world looks the other way, and indifference becomes complicity.
Displaced and injured Sudanese who fled the violence in Al-Fasher are receiving treatment at a makeshift clinic run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), amid ongoing clashes between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Army in Tawila, North Darfur, Sudan, on 3 November 2025 – REUTERS/MOHAMED JAMAL
Media Rack
Reuters, Time, and Al Jazeera consecrate the handover at Downing Street, reading it as a symptom of the British crisis of governance, with Burnham already profiled as an almost inevitable successor following his victory in Makerfield.
Bloomberg, NPR, and CNN report the “encouraging progress” and the sixty-day roadmap from Bürgenstock, without hiding Saturday’s episode, when a threat from Trump nearly derailed the table; The New York Times, true to its scepticism, augurs difficult progress — a useful, if calculated, counterpoint.
CNBC, Reuters, and Trading Economics focus on the Treasury licence and the fall of Brent below $78 with a tone of relief, though they qualify — via Quantum Strategy and ANZ — that the abundance responds more to the liquidation of inventories than to a real recovery in supply.
The Globe and Mail, The Hill, NBC News, and The Center Square provide the best political synthesis of the day: Vance’s risk is inheriting both sides of the divide — the war that alienated isolationists and the agreement that infuriates hawks — while retaining a comfortable lead in internal 2028 polls. This is the key insight to retain.
OHCHR, UN News, Middle East Eye, and Al Jazeera maintain, almost alone, the focus on Sudan and the risk of a massacre in El Obeid; the silence of the rest is, in itself, the news.
Al Jazeera, Israel Hayom, and Fox News illuminate General Vahidi from opposing angles — an unyielding hawk to some, a pragmatic manager to others — while the Institute for the Study of War underlines that the Revolutionary Guard has taken control of both the military response and Tehran’s negotiating strategy.
The thread stitching the day together is the growing dependence of the international order on the temperament of a handful of men. We applaud without reservation the pragmatic foreign policy of the Trump administration when it bears fruit — and it has, from Cambodia and Thailand to the Caucasus, from the ceasefire in Gaza to the capture of the tyrant Maduro which has decapitated the Chavista narco-dictatorship, and now in braking a war that threatened to set the Gulf ablaze —, especially when exercised with the restraint provided by Marco Rubio.
However, we will remain unashamedly critical when decisions become erratic, transactional, and dictated by outbursts, as when a social media post nearly shattered the Bürgenstock table over the weekend. Bombing Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy was legitimate; lacking a plan for the day after — for when the regime folds or implodes — remains the true strategic sin, the very one we have denounced since day one.
While Washington negotiates, Europe once again turns its back on its own destiny. There is no need to revisit the already consummated shipwreck of the sixth-generation European fighter to see this: one need only observe the chronic lethargy with which the continent that most needs strategic autonomy — with the Ukrainian war on its eastern border and an increasingly transactional American ally — takes its own defence and security seriously through the priorities of the European Council.
The Franco-German engine is seizing up once more at the worst conceivable moment, and integration is repeatedly confused with the mere rhetoric of communiqués. Atlanticists at heart and convinced Europeans, we say it once more: faced with the fanaticism of Tehran, the barbarism of Darfur, and European apathy itself, neither equidistance nor silence is an option. Today, as yesterday, the only reliable compass is the unashamed defence of freedom, liberal democracy, and the security of the West.