Hungary’s Israel Policy in a Fragmented Europe: A Model for Reliability

The silence on injustice is the bedrock of all wrongdoings. Having to witness and remain vigilant on unfolding contemporary antisemitism in the same continent where, not even a century ago, the Nuremberg statutes were legitimized to segregate and implement the final solution on the Jewish question is the testimony of Europe’s failure to walk on the path of its troubling past. The fragility of the line between humanity and evil may become evident, as people start to question whether discrimination and double standards inadequately apply to everybody, in spite of their ethnic, racial and economic status.

One of the most formative lessons of my youth came during a discussion on racial discrimination with my international human rights professor, David Jarvis, at the University of Hull. He argued that if discrimination is left unchallenged, it can ultimately culminate in atrocities such as the Holocaust (Shoah). At the time, I wondered whether such crimes could still occur under the modern rules-based international legal order, which was established in part to prevent horrors like the Shoah.

That question became painfully relevant on 7 October 2023, when Hamas terrorists breached the Gaza border, violated the existing ceasefire, and killed more than 1,200 people, Jews and non-Jews alike. The attack marked the deadliest day in Israel’s history and the largest single-day murder of Jews since the end of the Holocaust.

Following the 7 October attacks and the start of the war in Gaza, the reactions of the international community not only configured the landscape of the realities of the Middle East, but also functioned as a cynically critical reflection of various internal and external coercion of pivotal political actors like the European Union (EU). What first appeared to be a rational European approach, to be anchored in Israel’s inherent right to self-defence under the United Nations (UN) Charter Article 51, gradually shifted to be more fractured due to the operationalization of the conflict.[1]

The paramount fragmentation of the EU’s division on the State of Israel derives from numerous factors, ranging from normative commitments to strategic interests. These disagreements over the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Commission are based on the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon, which dispute supranational coordination and member-state sovereignty, as well as legalistic discourse or lingo and geopolitical pragmatism.[2]

Hungary’s position on Israel stands out as an example of an independent foreign policy rooted in the principles of national sovereignty. Sharing historical experiences and strategic interests, Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has approached Israel through two complementary lenses: a shared security outlook focused on Islamist terrorism, regional instability, and migration, and a sovereigntist doctrine that challenges what it views as the increasingly globalist orientation of EU institutions.

‘Hungary’s position on Israel stands out as an example of an independent foreign policy rooted in the principles of national sovereignty’

As scepticism towards Israel has grown across parts of Europe, Budapest has argued that international law is often applied selectively. Rather than adapting to the prevailing European consensus, Hungary has maintained a consistent and supportive policy towards Israel. This well-calculated approach transformed the Central European nation into a reliable partner, signalling a form of strategic autonomy and a values-driven approach.

Hungary’s position differs markedly from the CFSP and the policy trajectories of other European actors—including non-EU members such as the United Kingdom and Norway, as well as Spain, France, Ireland, and Slovenia—whose diplomatic recognition of the so-called ‘State of Palestine’ rewarded the Islamic terrorist organizations Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and altered the diplomatic tone. This pattern single-handedly illustrates a broader reorientation in parts of Europe toward privileging a humanitarian framing over security-centric judgment. Despite the ‘scampish’ behaviour of several European countries, the sustained political engagement of Hungary with the Jewish state, even in the face of legal and diplomatic coercion complemented with reputational and institutional costs in defence of what it articulates as a principled foreign policy, is testimony to both the moral and political foundation of Hungarian traditions.

Corrosion of European Solidarity for Its Only Natural Ally in the Levant

As much as it does not seem to be the case these days, Israel was once the EU’s most natural ally in the Middle East, given its similarity to what one would define as a liberal democracy. The architecture of EU–Israel relations is also a long-defined and instrumentized framework, defined and instrumentized in numerous trade and cultural covenants, most notably the EU–Israel Association Agreement (signed in 1995), which solidified Jerusalem’s position in Brussels, making it a primary partner for Brussels.

The economic backbone of this strategic partnership is embedded in the European Union’s leverage as Israel’s largest trading partner: a testament to the deep economic integration that binds the start-up nation with one of the biggest economic powerhouses in the world. The emotional side of this relationship was only interpreted by Former Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi, since he publicly championed the idea of Israel’s potential inclusion and political integration into the EU, relying on the nation’s liberal democratic nature and commitment to European values. He argued that Israel would promote European interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and bring a natural component to the European project in a tough neighbourhood that consists of ‘complicated countries’.

Technical and Humanitarian Synergy

Considering Israel’s geopolitical necessity for security, the EU–Israel relations have also been shaped by practical and on-the-ground collaboration aimed at resolving regional crises. For instance, a notable synergy of one of these synergies was the joint involvement of the EU and the United Nations (UN), as well as the local authorities collaborating in mitigating the Gaza water crisis. This EU–UN-funded project was developed and expanded to catalyse and establish large-scale seawater desalination plants based on the Israeli model, which proved successful in providing Israel, Gaza, the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Jordan with fresh water despite the scarcity of drinkable water in the region.

The EU and UN provided both financial and technical support in laying the pipelines, providing the Gaza Strip with vital infrastructure for fresh water for civilians under Israeli supervision. However, the cooperation centred on basic human rights issues was jeopardized by Hamas militants, who, instead of allowing this project to be a success, paralysed the entire process by turning those waterpipes into home-made rockets to be launched from civilian areas within Gaza into Israel proper.

The Dilemma of Double Standards

Traditionally, the EU was a staunch supporter of the Jewish State due to the common past and regret about the Holocaust. Yet that sympathy slowly started to erode with the migrant crisis in 2015, when millions of illegal immigrants flooded into Europe from hostile states that do not even recognize Israel’s right to exist. The EU has undergone a complete transformation in internal security and public opinion in regards to Israel, adopting a sceptical approach to Jerusalem, which ultimately left a stain on the EU’s Israel policy.

This shift was particularly visible in the wake of the recurring conflicts between Israel and Hamas—a group designated as a terrorist organization by the European Union—including the intense military engagements of 2019, 2021, and the war that erupted in 2023 following the 7 October massacre in Southern Israel. Various Israeli Governments have periodically accused the EU of employing a ‘double standard’ when it comes to Israel’s right to self-defence, asserting that, as a member of the international community, Israel reserves the right to act decisively to guarantee its internal and external security while observing international humanitarian norms. This has often sparked either controversy or debate in European political circles that have become far too polarized in their interpretation of Israel’s conduct of war.

The Erosion of Solidarity

There is a correlation between the migrant crisis of 2015 and the rise in antisemitic hostility of European states against Israel and Jews living on the continent. From a factual standpoint, Germany experienced a record 72 per cent increase in hate crimes from 2021 to 2023 alone, while Jewish properties and cemeteries in France were desecrated.

In the past five years, surveys indicate that more than 80 per cent of Europeans perceived an increase in antisemitism. Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, most countries have experienced violent attacks on Jews, resulting in the murder of at least 20 Jewish individuals in four attacks in 2025 alone. Unsurprisingly, the UK is poised to be home to most antisemitic attacks, which were also related to the government’s weak response to campus antisemitism. What I describe as the marriage or alliance of the ‘Red’ (Socialists and Communists) and the ‘Green’ (Radical Islamist, mainly rejected by Muslim-majority countries) is oftentimes behind these actions.

‘The EU relies on Israel as a strategic partner, but distances itself from the security imperatives that keep that partner viable in a hostile environment’

This evolving policy of the European states to satisfy the domestic radicals from hostile nations such as Syria, Iraq and Pakistan derives from the scrutiny of disproportionality when compared to its engagement with other regional actors who lack democratic foundations and actively disregard international norms. The friction is compounded by the fact that Hamas, the organization that killed dozens of EU citizens, is considered by some in European political circles to be a legitimate interlocutor. At the same time, Israel’s right to self-defence is constantly questioned in public. This implies that the EU relies on Israel as a strategic partner, but distances itself from the security imperatives that keep that partner viable in a hostile environment—a profound disconnect for many observers.

Premature Recognition of Palestine and Incentive Distortion

The emergence of a new political trend among several European capitals to recognize an independent Palestinian state questions the fundamental principles of international law and the peace process. Paramountly, this risk of political jingoism of a premature recognition raises many risks in the incentivization of undermining negotiated frameworks and paralysing the legal roadmap that leads to the creation of the State of Palestine.

In the aftermath of the 7 October attacks, where dozens of European citizens were murdered and kidnapped by Hamas, the common strategy of numerous EU member states strategically failed to be counterproductive, resulting in glorifying and rewarding the atrocities of an Islamist death cult that not only propagates against the Jewish people but also European and Western Christians in their covenant, encouraging a holy war against non-Muslims.

Failure to Meet Montevideo Criteria

The legal criteria for statehood are clearly underlined in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention. Formally known as the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, the convention requires that political entities possess a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.[3]

The justification for the population case may be justified in this regard, but the remaining elements of the Palestinian statehood are still largely inadequate, while being factually contested by legal scholars. On the one hand, the territorially definitive borders of a future Palestinian state are yet to be negotiated with the Arab population of the region, dispersed all across Judea and Samaria, as well as Gaza, particularly after the Gaza Peace Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, where ‘new borders’ of the strip were laid out in addition to the establishment of a buffer zone in President Trump’s 20-point peace plan.

On the other hand, the criteria of an effective centralized government for the Palestinian people are similarly unmet due to the bifurcation of authority between the Palestinian Authority (Munaẓẓamat at-Taḥrīr al-Filasṭīniyyahn-PLO) and Hamas in Gaza, raising doubts about unified governance and the ability to discharge international obligations. Both these fractions’ incapability to fully enter diplomatic relations with the relevant international states is limited by the sovereignty of the Palestinian ‘entity’ and structural dependence on external actors such as Qatar, Iran and Türkiye. These types of ‘restricted’ diplomatic engagements do not equate to full legal capacity under public international law.

Breach of the Oslo Framework

Such deficiencies are also reflected in the Oslo peace process as well. As a matter of fact, the accords (1993–1995) facilitated a framework aimed at the creation of a Palestinian Authority (PA) as an interim, five-year self-governing body to oversee parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, not as a sovereign Palestinian state. Designed to facilitate negotiations, the PA continues to operate without full sovereignty under continued Israeli security control and has no formal status as an independent state despite actively seeking a permanent membership in the UN against its own pledge not to do so under ‘the 1993 Declaration of Principles’.

This essential point on foreign relations was later indicated in the Oslo Accords II. For instance, Article IX (5)(a) of the Oslo II forbids the Council from having powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions.[4]

The PLO’s longstanding efforts in practising the recognition and international organizational membership outside this process bypass agreed mechanisms and engage the principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’. Hence, the European states’ recognition of a Palestinian state jeopardizes treaty circumvention and, more importantly, weakens the normative force of negotiated conflict resolution in international law. Or Yissachar, the Founder and Senior Fellow at the David Institute for Security Policy, comments:

‘The recognition of a Palestinian state is a political stunt, a lip service voiced by certain European countries who would rather prefer to pretend that there is a magic wand solution to complex problems. It does nothing to resolve the conflict; a stroke of pen in Brussels or Paris does nothing to alter the reality in Jerusalem or Gaza. What it does is, it rewards terrorism for political convenience. After October 7, the worst attack in Israel’s history, one would anticipate European countries to realise that the past conception is no longer applicable. Instead, they chose a meaningless step on the ground but an extremely meaningful step to bypass the parties and reward terrorists for their horrendous crimes. Rather than supporting Israel’s effort, they concealed themselves behind diplomatic wordsmith and signalled appeasement to the world. However, this policy will surely backfire on Europe as terrorists can never be appeased, just defeated. Domestic unrest inflicted by Islamists will not be silenced this way, only fanned and encouraged. Other minorities in Europe could now take this precedent and demand their own nation-state too, bypassing local authorities, contrary to the European position. Israel is Europe’s true stable ally in the region, and it is high time they start appreciating this fact.’[5]

European Recognition as Political Signalling

While Israeli and other international hostages remained captive in Gaza, several European governments moved to recognize the State of Palestine, a step critics argue advances Hamas’ political objectives. Countries including the UK, Ireland, Slovenia, Portugal, Norway, and France also increased pressure on Israel to halt military operations while advocating renewed momentum towards Palestinian statehood. This shift was particularly visible in Spain, where Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez adopted especially confrontational rhetoric towards Israel.

Critics contend that such rhetoric has contributed to an environment in which hostility towards Israel increasingly overlaps with antisemitic expression. Incidents in Spain have included the burning of an effigy representing a Jew during a festival, echoing historical antisemitic imagery, while in León demonstrators chanted antisemitic slogans, including ‘Kill the Jews’, and burned an effigy resembling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These developments have coincided with growing concerns about Holocaust distortion and denial following accusations by Sánchez that Israel was committing ‘genocide’ against Palestinians.

Considering that antisemitism is now normalized in the UK, where innocent Jewish civilians are stabbed or followed regularly or in France, where Jewish households and businesses get vandalized due to Starmer and Macron’s staunchly anti-Israel stances, one would anticipate the opposition leaders in all of Europe to remain silent in the face of these unfoldings. Nonetheless, my interview with Pedro Frazão, a member of the Assembly of the Portuguese Republic, captured a different point of view. His remarks are as follows:

‘From my perspective, many European institutions have adopted an increasingly unbalanced position towards Israel, often demanding from Israel standards that are not applied to any other democratic nation facing terrorism and existential threats. Israel is not only a strategic ally of the West, but also one of the few stable democracies in the Middle East, sharing Europe’s core values of freedom, security and rule of law. After the atrocities committed by Hamas on October 7th, Europe should have demonstrated greater moral clarity in recognising Israel’s right and duty to defend its citizens. The European Union must move away from policies that reward ambiguity towards terrorism or place political pressure almost exclusively on Israel while ignoring the role of extremist organisations and foreign actors that destabilise the region. Countries such as Hungary have shown that it is possible to maintain a more balanced and realistic approach, based on sovereignty, security cooperation and the defence of Western civilisation against radicalism and antisemitism. A stronger EU-Israel relationship would benefit Europe itself, particularly in the areas of intelligence, defence, technology and counterterrorism.’[6]

The Politicisation of Persona Non Grata Designations

The recent decision by the former interim Dutch and Slovenian governments to declare Israel’s Ministers of Finance and National Security persona non grata, and to advance this approach within the EU framework, risks creating a false equivalence between democratically elected members of the Israeli Knesset and terrorist organizations such as Hamas, the Houthis, or Hezbollah. Traditionally, persona non grata designations have been reserved for serious diplomatic breaches, including espionage or interference in domestic affairs. Their use in this context reflects an expansion of the measure into the realm of political signalling at the EU level.

When it is contextualized against the Israeli electoral dynamics, these aggressive measures taken to undermine Israel’s war efforts prove even more problematic. In the last election cycle, these two ministers’ parties only accounted for 10.8 per cent of the Israeli electorate, facing more criticism from a large portion of Israeli voters than any other international actors. Targeting individual Israeli ministers risks conflating specific political actors with the democratic legitimacy of the Israeli state, contributing to reputational damage for a strategic EU partner. Given the EU’s common border policies, such measures may reinforce a distorted perception of Israel’s domestic political landscape.

Moreover, this selective form of diplomatic censure raises questions about the consistency of EU external action, particularly when compared with its approach to Palestinian political figures. In the context of Israel’s conflict with Iran-backed proxies, such asymmetry risks undermining the EU’s credibility as a balanced and legally grounded foreign policy actor.

Or Yissachar’s depicts it more rationally, arguing: ‘Declaring Israeli ministers persona non grata, regardless of personal strains or complicated relationships, is an extreme diplomatic overreach that is only used in rare cases. Certain countries opted to ignore actual terrorists who hold the current high positions in the PA, and would rather take political revenge on Israeli politicians whom they personally despise. International relations don’t align with these thin lines. It is regrettable to see how so much of what is known to locals about these PA officials, past and present, is a mystery to the supposedly most informed people in high office.’[7]

These unsubstantiated decisions have an accumulative effect of normalizing politically motivated diplomatic measures intended to pressure Israel with adverse implications for its international standing and for the integrity of EU foreign policy instruments.

Hungary’s Strategic Alignment with the Jewish State

Following the 7 October attacks, Hungary appeared to act as one of Israel’s loudest supporters within the EU. This choice was based on rational and moral grounds, while many EU member states gradually shifted to adopt a more critical narrative about Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) military operations in Gaza and beyond. 

However, it did not prevent Budapest from maintaining its firmly pro-Israel position, mostly centred on counterterrorism, sovereignty and strategic alliance. On the same day as these atrocious acts of terrorism were executed, Hungary delivered an unequivocal message, condemning Hamas’ actions while reaffirming the country’s support for Israel’s right to defend itself under international law.

PM Viktor Orbán and other Hungarian officials rightfully refused to draw moral equivalence between Hamas terrorism and Israel’s military response. It led to a new dimension of the interpretation of this war, primarily through the lens of counterterrorism and national security.

Divergence from the EU Mainstream

The stance Budapest has taken reveals a wider ideological convergence with Jerusalem on issues such as sovereignty, border security, migration, and national identity. After PM Viktor Orbán was elected in 2010, these two countries cultivated a unique relationship with successive Israeli governments. It is also mirrored in interpersonal relations, which PM Benjamin Netanyahu and PM Viktor Orbán have developed over the past 16 years.

This personal connection between the two even intensified Hungary’s support for Israel during the Gaza War, since the Hungarian side actively enriched its diplomatic language in portraying Jerusalem as a frontline state defending Western civilization (Judeo–Christian) against terrorism.

Rejection of the ICC Arrest Warrants

When the ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan announced his decision to issue arrest warrants against Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz following the Qatari pledge to ‘take care’ of Khan financially, Hungary’s support became more perceptible. Officials in Budapest strongly criticized this political decision with emphasis on the politicisation of international law and the unfair targeting of a democratic state, engaged in counterterrorism operations after 7 October.

From a Hungarian standpoint, the ICC chief prosecutor’s actions not only raised broader concerns but also challenged state sovereignty and supranational judicial activism based on foreign interference. Then-PM Viktor Orbán publicly condemned the warrants and reaffirmed Hungary’s support for Israel at a time when dozens of Western governments adopted a more cautious posture, including those who have historically supported Israel in the international community. Budapest recalibrated its foreign policy toward the Jewish State to oppose many European capitals, willing to question the legitimacy of this political decision.

Benjamin Netanyahu’s state visit to Budapest

Contextually, Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC represented a colossal political shift and conveyed an ironclad geopolitical statement. This morally correct move illustrated Budapest’s readiness to defend what it regarded as a principled position in support of Israel and sovereign democratic governance.

From a normative perspective, Hungary’s stance reflected the principle that democratic states facing existential security threats retain the inherent right to self-defence under international law, particularly against non-state armed groups and state-sponsored terrorism. It also underscored a broader moral argument that singling out Israel through disproportionate diplomatic pressure, while overlooking the conduct of terrorist organizations responsible for mass violence against civilians, risks undermining both the credibility of international institutions and the consistent application of democratic values.

The Orbán Government’s perspective was that the ICC did not serve the principles it was established on and evolved into a political tool orchestrated to threaten Western allies facing existential threats to their security. In asymmetric warfare, countries such as Israel had to render their military power to the fullest to achieve their objectives that could not be patronized. The Hungarian side justified its decision to halt its participation in the ICC because of a politically tainted posture, which this international tribunal adopted to undermine the true nature of international law.

Netanyahu’s subsequent visit to Hungary carried substantial diplomatic symbolism. Rather than treating the Israeli Prime Minister as internationally isolated, the Hungarian leadership welcomed him with full state honours and high-level political engagement. The visit underscored the depth of bilateral relations and highlighted Hungary’s refusal to participate in efforts aimed at diplomatically marginalising Israel’s wartime leadership.

The state visit of PM Benjamin Netanyahu was particularly timely following statements from former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s office indicating that he could face detention, were he to visit the German capital. Whilst Israel’s staunchest ally in the EU, Germany, turned its back on Jerusalem, it was Budapest that stood on the right side of history by welcoming the longest-serving statesman in Israeli politics.

Gideon Sa’ar on Hungary–Israel Relations

His Excellency (H E) Minister of Foreign Affairs (FM) of the State of Israel, Gideon Sa’ar, also touched upon this special relationship, proven to be reliable during one of the hardest times in modern Israeli history:

‘Hungary is a close friend and an important ally of Israel. We know that Hungary stands by our side, and we deeply appreciate its consistent support for Israel in international forums. At a time when countries are being tested, Hungary has stood firmly with us, validating a clear moral stance in the fight against terrorism and in defence of our shared values. The strong relationship between Israel and Hungary serves as a positive example, both within the European Union and beyond, of a productive and successful alliance built on mutual respect and shared interests.’[8]

H E Gideon Sa’ar’s observation pertains to the very warm ties between the two capitals, which have come to view each other as strategic allies. In Israel, Hungary is viewed not merely as a diplomatic partner but also as a Central European ally, which shares Jerusalem’s mutual respect and interests. Whether it was the state visit of PM Netanyahu or Budapest’s position to create a safe environment for its 120.000 Jewish inhabitants spread all across the country, Hungary offers a comprehensive model that ought to serve as an example for all European countries.

Concluding Recommendations

A coordinated approach between Israel and responsible European governments such as Slovakia, Slovenia (under Janez Janša) and the Czech Republic should prioritize the protection of Jewish communities across Europe and the defence of shared security interests. Within the institutional framework of the European Union, these states can also help shape consensus and, where necessary, resist or block resolutions that disproportionately single out Israel. Antisemitism is another important factor in this context. In my recent interview with Israel’s Deputy Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Aviv Zell, he stated:

‘The broader lesson for Europe is not that any country can simply copy another model, but that antisemitism must never be allowed to become socially explainable, politically useful or intellectually fashionable. It usually becomes normalised not only through open hatred, but through hesitation, relativisation and the blurring of lines between legitimate political debate and the targeting of Jewish identity, Jewish security, or Israel’s right to exist safely among the nations. Countries such as Azerbaijan and Hungary demonstrate the importance of clear public boundaries, consistent political messaging, responsible education and moral clarity from institutions. The real test is not only whether Jewish communities are physically protected, but whether they feel that they fully belong. A society that defends its Jewish citizens and Jewish visitors is not doing a favour to one minority. It is defending the integrity of its own civic values.’[9]

Israel has forged impeccable alliances with the likes of Hungary and Czechia in Central Europe and Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean, to align those countries with its strategic interests in mutually fruitful partnerships. One of the biggest diplomatic achievements of Israel has been to divest its allies from Emanuelle Macron’s hideous plans to recognize the Palestinian State as a reward for international terrorism.

Nonetheless, the State of Israel must integrate fully into the Middle East, where its natural geopolitical future is embedded. It now seems highly likely that Israel will gradually lose its diplomatic support from major European states such as the UK, France, Spain and others, as proven in its war against the Iranian regime. When those states did not back the US–Israel strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, new strategic partners in the Gulf reacted more positively to these developments. For instance, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a moderate-Muslim nation governed by His Royal Highness (HRH) Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBS), strengthened its alliance with the Jewish State. They engaged in a more rational foreign policy and preserved the future of the entire Middle East, where normalization is a game-changing factor for regional security and development. Ambassador John Rakolta Jr, who was one of the architects of the Abraham Accords during his ambassadorship in Abu Dhabi, commended this rewarding partnership:

‘The Abraham Accords did not create the relationship between the UAE and Israel; they unlocked it. What had existed quietly for years through security cooperation, technology exchange, and shared concerns about Iran was brought into the open, formalised, and accelerated. The Accords transformed parallel interests into coordinated action, leading to closer cooperation in intelligence, cyber security, regional security, and defence awareness.

The economic impact has been equally significant. Bilateral trade grew from virtually nothing to billions of dollars within a few years, driven by Israeli innovation and Emirati capital and global connectivity. Cooperation has expanded into sectors including artificial intelligence, energy, water technology, agriculture, and healthcare, while the UAE has become a gateway for Israeli businesses into wider regional and Asian markets.

Just as important has been the human dimension. Direct flights, tourism, academic exchanges, and cultural engagement have created people-to-people ties that make the relationship more resilient. Unlike many peace agreements that remain confined to governments, the Abraham Accords have developed strong societal foundations.

The key lesson is that this was not an act of idealism but of strategic self-interest. The UAE recognised that its long-term security and economic diversification required partnerships with technologically advanced and capable states, and Israel was a natural fit.

There are also important lessons for Europe. Durable partnerships are built on clearly defined mutual interests, while gradual engagement often produces more sustainable results than waiting for perfect political conditions. Economic integration reinforces political agreements by creating shared benefits, and decisive leadership is essential for overcoming political sensitivities. Above all, the Abraham Accords demonstrate that the Middle East is evolving, with states increasingly prioritising opportunity and strategic cooperation over longstanding ideological divisions.’[10]

Israel’s footprint in the Muslim world, with robust alliances with Baku, Abu Dhabi, and Astana, remained effective and uninterrupted during the Gaza War, coupled with the Iran War pushing normalization with Riyadh to actualization. In a region riddled with ethnic tensions and intolerance of Tehran’s regional destabilization in Arab societies in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, Israel renews its pragmatic relations with the Arab World.

‘The future of European Jewry and Israel does not lie in no-go zones in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, but in Jerusalem, Baku, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and beyond’

In lieu of attempts to satisfy Western Europe, Israel must unceasingly concentrate on including the Saudis in the Abraham Accords under the supervision of President Trump. With the understanding that the Crown Prince of the Kingdom, HRH Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS), once compared the neutralized supreme leader of the Iranian regime, Ali Khamenei, to Adolf Hitler due to their similar ambitions, I believe the Israelis and Saudis have a historical chance to normalize relations which will lead to the acceptance of Israel’s political future within the Muslim and Arab worlds. It is more important for the security and safety of the Jewish state than fulfilling the demands of European bureaucrats, where the Muslim Brotherhood doctrine propagates and brainwashes the unintegrated migrants while posing a national security risk to the domestic populations of the continent.

The future of European Jewry and Israel does not lie in no-go zones in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, but in Jerusalem, Baku, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and beyond.

[1] Charter of the United Nations, Article 51.

[2] Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 42.

[3] Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, art 1.

[4] Oslo II Agreement, art IX(5)(a) (28 Sept 1995).

[5] Or Yissachar, Interview by Farid Shukurlu, Founder and Senior Fellow, David Institute for Security Policy, 30 April 2026.

[6] Pedro Frazão, Interview by Farid Shukurlu, Member of the Portuguese Parliament, Assembleia da República, Portugal, 1 May 2026.

[7] Or Yissachar, Interview by Farid Shukurlu.

[8] Gideon Sa’ar, Interview by Farid Shukurlu, H E Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel, 5 May 2026.

[9] Aviv Zell, Interview by Farid Shukurlu, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the State of Israel in Azerbaijan, 7 May 2026.

[10] John Rakolta Jr, Interview by Farid Shukurlu, H E Former United States Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, 28 April 2026.

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