A surprise apology to Finland signalled a broader reset in Budapest’s foreign policy, but questions remain about past Russian contacts and the timeline for NATO spending.

Hungary emphasizes its commitment to restoring the trust of its allies and strengthening defense in light of the growing influence of Russia. These positions were voiced by Defense Minister Romulus Ruzin-Sendi during a panel discussion at the Budapest Energy and Strategic Talks, organized by the analytical center Equilibrium Institute.

According to the head of the defense ministry, the country’s defense strategy should reflect the interests and values of the Hungarian nation and its allies. One of the new government’s first steps was to apologize to some allies, notably Finland, whose NATO activity had been delayed by the previous government of Viktor Orbán.

Russian intelligence “tried to slip in through the back door,” but now, allegedly, “we are closing the door to the Russians.”

– Romulus Ruzin-Sendi

Regarding defense spending, Ruzin-Sendi emphasized that under NATO agreements Hungary must bring defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035; currently, priorities are adjusting the pace of achieving this goal, but the course remains oriented toward strengthening defense capabilities.

In the context of the foreign policy course, they also recalled historical context: some media consider that former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was seen as an ally of Russian leader Vladimir Putin in Europe. His policy allegedly blocked European initiatives in support of Ukraine, and ahead of the 2026 elections it intensified anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, portraying Ukraine as a threat to Hungary. There were also reports of Russian intelligence interference in Hungarian elections to support Orbán’s party.

Journalists also disclosed materials that Hungary’s foreign minister during Orbán’s era, Peter Szijjártó, maintained close contacts with the Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov: in 2023–2025 Szijjártó allegedly passed him confidential information regarding internal negotiations both in Budapest and in Brussels. And on July 2, 2024, the day Orbán visited Kyiv, Szijjártó again called Lavrov to inform him about the visit, and Lavrov was interested in a compromise between Ukraine and the EU regarding the start of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession.

Hungary continues to pursue a balanced foreign policy, combining active involvement in European and transatlantic processes with a prudent approach to Russian influence, while preserving its own strategic interests and values.