Ukraine: Zelenskyy sacks General Syrsky following public outcry over Fedorov’s dismissal
Iran: Trump threatens to destroy “Pickaxe Mountain” in the midst of the Strait of Hormuz crisis
The Houthis open a third front: a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and a threat to Bab el-Mandeb
Brief Introduction
Today’s events confirm that the war in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine share the same symptom: the erosion of leadership. In Kyiv, public pressure has forced Zelensky to sacrifice his military chief to preserve internal cohesion following the resignation of the popular Defence Minister, Mykhailo Fedorov. In the Gulf, Washington is threatening to blow up Iran’s last remaining intact nuclear stronghold, the so-called ‘Peak Mountain’, whilst wavering between trade sanctions and all-out bombing. And in the Red Sea, the Houthis – Tehran’s Yemeni proxy – are opening a third maritime front with a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and the threat to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Three crises, one common denominator: the fragility of the leadership and the absence of a long-term strategic plan in Washington, in Kyiv and, of course, in Tehran.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the now former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi, visit an exhibition of the new Ukrainian-made ‘Peklo’ guided missiles – REUTERS/VALENTYN OGIRENKO
Ukraine: Zelenskyy sacks General Syrsky following public outcry over Fedorov’s dismissal
Facts
Mykhailo Fedorov (aged 35), Defence Minister since 14 January 2026, was dismissed after barely six months in office, sparking the second wave of street protests since the start of the Russian invasion.
Fedorov, regarded as the technological moderniser of the Ukrainian Army (a driving force behind the drone war), had publicly clashed with the commander-in-chief, General Oleksandr Syrsky, whom he accused of authoritarianism and of failing to adapt to the new realities of war.
For several days in Kyiv, thousands of protesters demanded Fedorov’s reinstatement and Syrsky’s dismissal.
On Tuesday 21 July, Zelenskyy dismissed Syrsky and appointed General Mykhailo Drapati in his place; he had previously offered Fedorov a prominent post to “unify the state’s technical apparatus”, an offer which has not yet been confirmed as accepted.
Implications
This is the first command crisis of this magnitude since the start of the war to involve massive and sustained demonstrations, and it highlights a fundamental rift between ‘modernising’ Ukraine – technology, drones, digital recruitment – and the more traditional military culture embodied by Syrsky. Zelensky himself acknowledges the need for “a fresh start”, confirming that pressure from the streets – and not just from the front line – is already influencing command decisions.
Outlook and scenarios
The most favourable scenario sees Fedorov reinstated in a high-profile technology portfolio and Drapati consolidating the doctrine of drone swarm warfare without any fracture in the chain of command. The risk scenario is that of a military purge in the midst of war, which would erode troop morale and be interpreted by Moscow as a sign of political weakness – a temptation difficult to resist on the eve of any new Russian offensive.
US President Donald Trump speaks at a 4 July rally, marking the 250th anniversary of US independence, on the National Mall in Washington, DC, USA, 4 July 2026 – REUTERS/EVAN VUCCI
Iran: Trump threatens to destroy “Pickaxe Mountain” in the midst of the Strait of Hormuz crisis
Facts
President Trump warned that the United States will strike the Iranian nuclear facility at Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La – dubbed “Pickaxe Mountain” by US intelligence – near Natanz “very soon” and “with great force”.
This facility, excavated even deeper than Fordow following the lessons learnt from previous air strikes, is the only top-tier Iranian nuclear facility to have survived intact both the US-Israeli offensive of June 2025 (which did strike Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan with GBU-57 bombs) and the campaign of February 2026 that brought down Ali Khamenei.
The announcement comes after the tenth consecutive night of CENTCOM air strikes on Iran and hours after Trump abandoned his own plan to impose a 20 per cent toll on cargo passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
Oil is trading at around $91 a barrel; Goldman Sachs warns that it could reach $120 if the strait remains “disrupted” in the fourth quarter. Incidents continue: an oil tanker attacked off the coast of Oman, missile alerts in Bahrain and Iranian drones intercepted over Jordan.
Implications
The survival of “Pickaxe Mountain” belies the successive proclamations of the “total eradication” of Iran’s nuclear programme and confirms that every previous bombing, far from destroying Tehran’s capabilities, has taught the regime to dig deeper: a paradox of deterrence that the West has unwittingly created. Trump’s U-turn in barely 24 hours – from a toll-collecting “guardian” to a mountain-demolisher – once again illustrates an erratic and transactional foreign policy, dictated by the impulse of the moment rather than by a sustained strategy.
Outlooks and scenarios
If the attack goes ahead and achieves its objective, it would deal a symbolic and material blow to Iran’s nuclear programme, albeit with a real risk of a widespread Iranian response targeting assets and infrastructure in the Gulf. If it fails or causes significant collateral damage, it will further erode Washington’s credibility with its Gulf partners. As happened in April, a last-minute truce brokered by a third party – Pakistan being the precedent – cannot be ruled out; this would temporarily halt the escalation without resolving the root of the problem.
View of a village on the coast of Bab el-Mandeb, Yemen, on 2 April 2026 – PHOTO/ REUTERS
The Houthis open a third front: a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and a threat to Bab el-Mandeb
Facts
Yemen’s Houthis, an armed Zaidi movement and a declared proxy of Tehran, announced on Monday 20 July a naval blockade ‘with immediate effect’ against Saudi Arabia, following Iranian pressure to close Bab el-Mandeb should Washington continue to attack Iranian energy infrastructure.
Bab el-Mandeb, barely 29 kilometres wide at its narrowest point, is the gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal: around 15 per cent of global maritime trade passes through it.
Its total closure would cut an additional 7 per cent from the global oil supply – by blocking the exit of virtually all Saudi exports via this route – on top of the 10 per cent already lost due to the war in the Gulf.
The Houthi movement, which emerged to represent the Zaidi minority and resist Saudi Wahhabism, has controlled Sana’a since 2014 and has several US naval groups deployed in the area, including the USS Boxer, the USS Comstock and the USS Cesar Chávez.
Implications
Tehran is demonstrating, once again, its ability to exert pressure by proxy without directly exposing its own territory: the Houthis are carrying out Iran’s demands, extending the war in the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea and doubling the risk of a global energy chokehold. This is yet further proof that Iranian-backed jihadist terrorism – Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias – remains the most effective and least costly foreign policy tool available to the Tehran regime.
Outlook and scenarios
The escalation scenario would involve effective Houthi attacks on Saudi oil tankers and terminals in the Red Sea, replicating the pattern of harassment seen in 2023–2024. The containment scenario would involve a coordinated international naval response – assets are already deployed – to regulate maritime traffic without opening a fourth front. The greatest risk – and the one requiring the closest monitoring – is the de facto merging of the two chokepoints – Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb – into a single stranglehold on the Gulf’s energy supply.
The Financial Times / Diario Financiero reports on the presidential threat against a backdrop of soaring oil prices and warnings from Goldman Sachs that Brent could reach $120.
*El Español* explains that Mount Qom is the only top-tier Iranian nuclear facility to have survived two separate military operations unscathed, and highlights the inconsistency of Trump’s shift between trade sanctions and the threat of bombing.
CNN and Infobae both describe the Houthi naval blockade as the opening of a new front that extends the energy threat beyond the Persian Gulf, with a potential impact of 7 per cent on the global crude oil supply.
France24 and La Nación (Argentina) describe Syrsky’s dismissal as the culmination of the greatest leadership crisis of Zelensky’s presidency, triggered by Fedorov’s sacking and exacerbated by internal divisions over the doctrine of drone warfare.
Democracy Now! and TIME place both crises – Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb – within the same framework: that of a US-Iranian truce which the White House itself acknowledges as fragile and still unresolved on its key points.
El Secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos, Marco Rubio, participa en un anuncio de la Carta constitutiva de la iniciativa de Paz de la Junta del Presidente Donald Trump destinada a resolver conflictos globales, junto con el 56º Foro Económico Mundial (FEM) anual, en Davos, Suiza, el 22 de enero de 2026 – REUTERS/ DENIS BALIBOUSE
Three crises, one underlying interpretation. In Kyiv, Zelenskyy has done well to listen to public opinion and sacrifice a military commander whose leadership was under scrutiny rather than risk losing internal cohesion in the midst of Russia’s war of aggression: Ukraine’s democratic legitimacy, in the face of the Kremlin’s tyranny, remains its greatest strategic asset, and this crisis of management should not be confused with a fracture in the national consensus regarding Moscow.
In Iran, we unequivocally support the determination to dismantle once and for all the nuclear capabilities of the jihadist oligarchy in Tehran: the very existence of ‘Pickaxe Mountain’, still intact after two campaigns, is clear proof that the job was left half-done. But we demand, once again, what we have been calling for for months: a serious plan for the day after, for the power vacuum or the implosion of the regime, which has so far been conspicuous by its absence in Washington. The President’s erratic swings – from toll collector to mountain-demolisher in the space of twenty-four hours – are not a sign of resolve, but of improvisation, and this should be stated with the same clarity with which we acknowledge the diplomatic successes that this Administration has undeniably achieved in other areas. We trust that the level-headedness of a Secretary of State such as Marco Rubio will continue to smooth out the rough edges of that impulsiveness.
And in the Red Sea, the Houthi blockade confirms, once again, what we have long been denouncing: Iranian-backed jihadist terrorism – the Houthis, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias – is the armed wing through which Tehran wages, by proxy, a war it does not dare to wage directly. In the face of this, the only appropriate response is firm Atlanticist and pro-European resolve, coupled with constant vigilance against any inclination towards appeasement.