Andy Burnham, Prime Minister without the ballot box
The Houthis close Bab el-Mandeb: the second choke point
Brief Introduction
There are days when capricious current affairs place on the same table two seemingly distant news stories that are nevertheless bound by a common thread that the analyst has a duty to reveal. Today is one of those days.
In London, Andy Burnham crossed the threshold of Number 10 Downing Street without having gone through the ballot box; in the southern throat of the Red Sea, the Houthis announce the blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, opening a second maritime front in the war pitting the United States against the oligarchic-jihadist regime in Tehran.
Two scenarios, two latitudes, a single common denominator: the price of energy and the chronic inability of the West to take its own security seriously. We shall confine ourselves to these two matters, and we shall do so without withholding judgment, because an analysis that pretends to be aseptic is not an analysis, but a notary’s record.
Andy Burnham, Prime Minister without the ballot box
The Facts
On Monday 20 July, Andy Burnham —for nearly a decade Mayor of Greater Manchester and dubbed, not without irony, the ‘King of the North’— became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the seventh in little more than ten years. He succeeds Sir Keir Starmer, who resigned as Labour leader in June despite the overwhelming majority secured barely two years earlier.
No general election took place: in the British parliamentary system, prevailing in the leadership contest of the governing party is enough to inherit power, with no investiture debate nor direct mandate from citizens. King Charles III tasked him with forming a Government from the British Royal Household (Buckingham Palace), a mere constitutional formality. Rachel Reeves left the Exchequer, and markets reacted without delay: the ten-year British gilt yield rose to around 5.04%, thirty-year paper touched 5.75%, a two-month high, and sterling lost ground, all following the new Prime Minister’s hint of using “any flexibility within fiscal rules”.
The appointment of the new Chancellor —the most recent reports point to John Healey, who previously resigned over insufficient defence spending— mattered less to traders than the underlying fiscal signal. Donald Trump was quick to congratulate him and celebrate his plans regarding North Sea oil and gas.
British Prime Minister Andy Burnham delivers a speech outside Number 10 Downing Street after taking office, in London, United Kingdom, 20 July 2026 – REUTERS/ ISABEL INFANTES
Implications
It is worth reflecting on the minority nature of this appointment. Burnham reaches the head of government through the majority vote of his own party’s MPs, not the electorate. He holds an absolute majority, yes, but his decisions lack the oxygen and legitimacy of a direct election. The contrast with Sanae Takaichi’s Japan is instructive: taking office last October as the first woman to lead her country, she immediately called snap elections and, on 8 February, won a landslide —between 315 and 316 of the 465 seats in the Lower House, the largest victory for the Liberal Democratic Party since its founding in 1955.
Here is what real, solid democracy looks like, and what much of Europe ought to take note of. As for the ideological profile of the new occupant of Number 10 Downing Street, there is no shortage of observers describing him as a hybrid between Starmer and Jeremy Corbyn: further to the left than the former and many of his colleagues —social democrats of classic pedigree— and closer in many of his policies to the populism of the latter. In short, he is closer to Sanchismo than to old European social democracy —the German SPD, the French Socialist Party, classic Labour, and even more so the Third Way of Tony Blair, the benchmark of that moderation.
The backdrop is one of severe fiscal fragility: British borrowing costs are the highest in the G7, spiking in May to eighteen-year highs due to the energy shock of the Iran war. London is also burdened by the flight —and flight is the right word— of around 16,500 high-net-worth individuals in 2025 alone, according to Henley & Partners, with the resulting drain on revenue, consumption, growth, and jobs. The long shadow of Brexit, that monumental folly, poisons everything.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer – Peter Nicholls/Pool via REUTERS
Perspectives and Scenarios
Everything remains to be seen. His first budget, promised tax reforms, and initial government measures must be closely scrutinized, and we shall provide detailed analysis in upcoming reports. Two contrasting scenarios emerge.
In the first, bond market discipline and the prudence of an orthodox Chancellor impose restraint, forcing Burnham to govern defensively; his own predecessor at the Treasury warned him that attempting to ‘stop being held hostage by markets’ carries the risk of ‘ending up like Liz Truss’.
In the second, the temptation of a leftward shift in public spending triggers a fresh jolt in gilts. The greatest unknown is whether, like Takaichi, he will dare to seek at the polls the legitimacy he currently lacks; his starting weakness suggests he will not. Meanwhile, the agreement over Gibraltar will be marketed as a sign of British flexibility when it is, in truth, a demonstration of Spanish weakness: London’s concessions are temporary; Madrid’s are structural.
Former British Prime Minister Liz Truss had the shortest tenure in UK history, serving just 45 days in office – REUTERS/ CALLAGHAN OHARE
The Houthis close Bab el-Mandeb: the second choke point
The Facts
On the very same Monday, 20 July, the ‘military’ spokesman for the Houthis (a terrorist disguised in uniform), Yahya Sarea, announced in a video a naval blockade ‘with immediate effect’ against Saudi Arabia under the banner of ‘an eye for an eye’, explicitly threatening to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait —the ‘Gate of Tears’— through which around 12% of global trade passes. The immediate trigger was the Saudi bombing of Sanaa airport on 13 July after a Mahan Air aircraft, repatriating Houthi cadres from the funeral of the late Iranian Supreme Leader, defied the air embargo.
This escalation comes with the Strait of Hormuz closed by Tehran since late February following US-Israeli strikes: a complete closure of Bab el-Mandeb would cut roughly 7% of global crude supply, adding to the 10% already removed by the Gulf War. Oil prices and war risk insurance premiums for Red Sea transit jumped. The Riyadh-led coalition pledged to respond with force. On a human level, two US soldiers were killed on Friday in an Iranian attack on a base in Jordan. Mediators from Pakistan and Qatar are attempting to forge a ceasefire.
View of a coastal village in Bab el-Mandeb, Yemen, 2 April 2026 – PHOTO/ REUTERS
Implications
I begin with the essential point, because words are not innocent: the Houthis are not ‘militiamen’, as even centre-right and right-wing media outlets stubbornly persist in calling them, but terrorists wearing military uniforms. That some originate from the former regular Yemeni army means very little: Yemen was for decades two artificially reunited nations, and that fracture —north versus south, and beneath it, sectarian— remains alive.
The closure of this choke point actually aligns with the strategy of the triumvirate currently commanding the Revolutionary Guard, led by General Ahmad Vahidi —the body’s supreme chief since 1 March, former first commander of the Quds Force, and wanted by international justice for the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires.
Three objectives are pursued, as we have consistently maintained: first, to win the internal power struggle within the headless regime; second, to send a message to the region that Tehran is returning stronger to rebuild its channels of influence where it had lost them —notably in Syria following the implosion of Bashar al-Assad’s regime— and rearm its terrorist proxies: Hamas, Hezbollah, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, and the Houthis themselves; and third, to extract blackmail disguised as a ‘toll’ to enrich the coffers of the Revolutionary Guard —not those of Iran— and sow terror once more.
Perspectives and Scenarios
The risk of a second maritime front is massive and its effects global. If the Houthis move from threats to sustained action, merchant traffic will have to round the Cape of Good Hope, driving up freight and insurance costs and delivering another shock to energy prices —the very factor driving up British debt yields: the circle closes on the first topic of this report. The diplomatic route crafted by Doha and pursued by Islamabad remains fragile for now.
Above all looms the greatest unknown on the Iranian chessboard: the absence of a Western plan to anticipate all possible scenarios of this war. An intensification of the power struggle in Iran could create a command vacuum even more acute than that of 28 February 2026, potentially triggering the regime’s implosion and degenerating into regional chaos.
A satellite image shows the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key maritime waterway and the gateway to the Red Sea, as Iran threatens to use its Houthi allies in Yemen to close passage through Bab el-Mandeb into the Red Sea, in this photo provided dated 12 July 2026 – Nasa Worldview/Image via REUTERS
International press coverage over the past twenty-four hours concentrates heavily on these two axes. We present a representative selection of outlets and analysis centres consulted:
The Washington Post, NPR, CBS News, CNN, and NBC: Emphasize that Burnham is the seventh British Prime Minister in a decade and report his promise of a ‘circuit breaker’ against instability, noting that no voter elected him directly.
CNBC, Reuters, Euronext, Saxo, and Mizuho: Focus on the market reaction in gilts and sterling, Rachel Reeves’ departure, and the fiscal signal as the true keystone of the new era.
The Washington Times, Fox News, and NBC News: Treat the Houthi blockade as the opening of a new front in the war against Iran, with the Strait of Hormuz already closed and energy markets under strain.
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and CSIS: The former openly asks whether the Red Sea will become ‘another Hormuz’ and quantifies the strait’s weight in global trade and crude; the latter dissected Takaichi’s decisive electoral victory, a useful mirror for the British case.
AP, Euronews, and The Week: Reiterate the ‘eye for an eye’ rhetoric of the Houthi spokesman and address the threat to Saudi exports and the kingdom’s reliance on its East-West pipeline as an alternative to Hormuz.
Editorial commentary
Andy Burnham is as popular as he could prove populist. His tenure leading Greater Manchester, which earned him the nickname ‘King of the North’, did not stand out for any specific achievement, but he did convey a sense of firm leadership. The pertinent question is what he offers that is distinct from Starmer or Corbyn.
Some view him as a hybrid of both: further left than Starmer and many of his colleagues —genuine social democratic Labour figures— but closer in many policies to Corbyn’s radical socialism, aligning more with Sanchismo than with classic European social democracy, whose finest expression was Tony Blair’s Third Way. Unknowns multiply because he has not even published a manifesto; and since the UK has no investiture debate, defeating internal party rivals is sufficient to govern.
It is, therefore, a minority selection: he holds a parliamentary majority, but lacks direct mandate backing. Consider Japan, where Sanae Takaichi succeeded a party colleague, launched reforms, immediately called an election, and significantly improved her party’s standing. That is a real, robust democracy, and many in Europe should take note.
Although the United Kingdom is no longer part of the European Union —however much many reckless figures remain anchored in that monumental blunder that was Brexit— it suffered more damage from that decision than the rest of us, and continues to pay for it today, as I maintained in my article in La Razón on 21 June 2026, ‘Brexit: Anatomy of a Blunder’. We shall see how Labour attempts to offset its disastrous consequences through negotiations.
And beware of self-serving narratives: the agreement between the European Commission and the UK over Gibraltar will be framed as British flexibility when it is, in reality, a sign of Spanish government weakness, because all concessions made by London are temporary, while those made by Spain are structural.
It must not be forgotten that the UK is undergoing a deep social and economic crisis: London is in clear recession, witnessing the flight —and flight is the accurate term— of over 16,000 high-net-worth individuals who contributed vast sums to public coffers and the local economy through spending, growth, prosperity, and employment. We shall examine his program —if he has one— in detail, the budget when presented, and initial measures as they materialize.
It is crucial to emphasize that even centre-right and right-wing media persist in referring to them as ‘militiamen’: they are not. They are terrorists disguised in military uniforms. That some originated from Yemen’s regular army means little, for Yemen was long two artificially reunited nations, and that division —north versus south, Sunni versus Shia— remains deeply present. Curiously, some Yemenis belong to the Zaydi school, persecuted in Iran yet allied with Tehran in Yemen. Such are the strange bedfellows produced by the jihadist regime’s terrorism and extortion.
It is worth remembering how back in 1988, a dying Khomeini, having won the intra-Shia war in Lebanon of which I was a direct witness —’the war of brothers’ or ‘black flags’ fought between 1986 and 1988 with the defeat of Amal, backed by Syria, while Tehran sustained its creation, its monster, Hezbollah— issued a fatwa to the Alawites of the Assad regime. Incomprehensibly, he declared that the Alawite sect, which is a heresy, was actually a branch of Shia Islam, attempting to legitimize them.
Recall that for Alawites, the Quran is a secondary text; they possess esoteric books accessible only to initiated males, the disclosure of which carries death. They do not pray in mosques, though today they attend Shia mosques and bury their dead there. That concession demonstrated nothing other than the pragmatic, terrorist nature of the Iranian regime, capable of making allies of those who ideologically should be its worst enemies. Here lies the primary difference with Salafists —the terrorist ideology derived from Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood— for whom anyone deviating from orthodoxy is an apostate and an enemy. The Iranians will attempt to broaden their terrorist coalition by incorporating non-mainstream elements; and remember, far less distance separates a Twelver Shia from a Zaydi than separates either from an Alawite.
Geostrategically, the Bab el-Mandeb blockade represents another turn of the screw by the Revolutionary Guard triumvirate —the figures wanted by international justice now embodied by General Vahidi— and serves three core objectives: first, winning internal power struggles within the regime; second, signaling to the region that Tehran will return stronger to rebuild influence where control seemed lost —such as post-Assad Syria— and rearm its proxies; and third, leveraging extortion disguised as tolls to secure immense revenues for the Revolutionary Guard to rebuild its arsenal, influence, and capacity to spread terror and instability throughout the region.