The United States has begun a six-month review of its military presence in Europe, placing greater pressure on European governments to demonstrate that higher defence budgets can be converted into deployable forces and military capabilities.
Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s under-secretary for policy, said the review would examine how American forces should be positioned as Europe assumes primary responsibility for its conventional defence. The assessment will be coordinated with General Alexus Grynkewich, who commands both US European Command and NATO’s allied forces in Europe.
No final troop reduction has been announced. The Pentagon is expected to prepare several options, consult allies and work with Congress before decisions are taken. Nevertheless, the language used by Colby and US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth indicates that maintaining the current American posture without substantial changes is unlikely to be the review’s central objective.
Hegseth first announced the process at NATO headquarters in Brussels on 18 June. He said the United States wanted an alliance in which European countries led their own conventional defence. The Pentagon has called this model “NATO 3.0”, distinguishing it from both the Cold War alliance and the post-Cold War period of expeditionary operations and lower European expenditure.
The review is also expected to consider whether individual governments provide dependable access to bases and airspace during American operations. Hegseth said some allies would pass the assessment while others would fail, suggesting that future American deployments could be influenced by bilateral relations and operational access as well as NATO’s collective defence plans.
This creates a difficult policy question for the European Union. Defence remains principally a national responsibility, while NATO conducts collective military planning. EU institutions can finance industrial expansion, support joint procurement, simplify regulation and improve military mobility, but they do not command the armed forces expected to replace American units.
European expenditure is no longer static. The 27 EU members spent €418 billion on defence in 2025, 20 per cent more than in 2024. The European Defence Agency projects spending of €454 billion in 2026, reflecting larger national budgets, equipment purchases and investment in research and development.
The EU has also established financial instruments intended to accelerate procurement. The Security Action for Europe programme provides up to €150 billion in loans for joint purchases, while the wider Readiness 2030 initiative is intended to facilitate as much as €800 billion in additional defence expenditure by the end of the decade.
Money alone will not resolve the problem. Europe continues to depend heavily on the United States for strategic intelligence, aerial refuelling, long-range transport, integrated command systems and some forms of air and missile defence. The EU’s own capability priorities include closing gaps in air defence, military mobility, strategic enablers, drones, cyber capabilities and long-range weapons.
Procurement decisions must also account for production times. Air-defence batteries, transport aircraft, satellites and long-range missiles cannot be delivered on the same timetable as a political decision to remove troops. Even where European alternatives exist, fragmented national orders and different technical requirements can delay deployment and increase costs.
The EU cannot address this solely through programmes limited to its 27 members. Britain, Norway, Turkey and Canada remain important NATO contributors, while the United States would continue to provide nuclear deterrence and other strategic assets under the model described by Washington. A credible European pillar must therefore remain connected to NATO rather than develop as an entirely separate structure.
There is also an American interest in preserving access. US bases in Europe support operations across the Atlantic, Arctic, Africa and Middle East. European Command describes its responsibilities as protecting the US homeland, projecting American combat power and enabling NATO to deter and defend. The military relationship is consequently not a one-directional security guarantee financed exclusively for Europe’s benefit.
The immediate European objective should be to prevent a mismatch between American reductions and the arrival of replacement capabilities. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has said changes must be developed in consultation with allies, while acknowledging that Washington faces competing demands in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
The review does not by itself mark the end of the transatlantic security relationship. It does, however, make American conventional engagement less predictable. European governments can no longer base long-term planning on the assumption that a future US administration will automatically restore forces removed by the present one.
For the EU, the central test is now implementation. Financial mechanisms and defence strategies are in place. The outcome will depend on whether member states can coordinate procurement, expand production and deliver the capabilities needed before changes in the American posture produce gaps in Europe’s defence.
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